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BALANCING HEARSAY AND CRIMINAL 
DISCOVERY 
John G. Douglass· 
"You can't hit what you can't see." 
Walter Jolznson 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I N the law of evidence, conventional theory suggests a direct connection between hearsay and discovery. Broader discovery 
allows for more liberal admission of hearsay. The logic of the 
connection goes something like this. We exclude hearsay because we 
lack the ordinary adversarial means of testing the out-of-court 
declarant through cross-examination.2 Nevertheless, courts still admit 
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Gryzlov. 
1. Hall of Farner Walter Johnson was one of the hardest throwing pitchers in 
baseball history. In the course of his career with the Washington Senators from 1907 
through 1927, he set the Major League record for shutouts. The quoted passage aptly 
describes a batter's futility in facing a Johnson fastball. See The Baseball Almanac 
(visited Apr. 12, 2000) <http://baseball-almanac.com/quojhns.shtml>. 
2. The absence of some or all of the typical adversarial mechanisms for testing 
the truth of in-court testimony forms the principal justification for a general rule 
excluding hearsay. For example, in Williamson v. United Stares, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), 
the Court explained: 
The hearsay rule, Fed. Rule Evid. 802, is premised on the theory that out-of-
court statements are subject to particular hazards. The declarant might be 
lying; he might have misperceived the events which he relates; he might have 
faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood or taken out of context by 
the listener. And the ways in which these dangers arc minimized for in-court 
statements-the oath, the witness's awareness of the gravity of the 
proceedings, the jury's ability to observe the witness's demeanor. and, most 
importantly, the right of the opponent to cross-examine-arc generally 
absent for things said out of court. 
Id. at 598-602; see also Fed. R Evid. art. VIII advisory committee's note (stating the 
justifications for excluding hearsay testimony); John W. Strong ct al., McCormick on 
Evidence: Hombook 426-27 (4th ed. 1992) (hereinafter McCormick Hombook) 
(same); 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence§ 1766 {Chadbourn rev. 1976) (hereinafter 
Wigmore] (same); Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in rile American Criminal 
Trial: An Adversary-Oriented Approad1, 49 Hastings LJ. 477, 485 (1998) (same). 
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most hearsay, often out of necessity-the declarant is dead, or in 
Brazil-or even out of convenience-it is simply impractical to 
assemble all the clerks who provided the data for company payroll 
records. In most instances, we justify categorical exceptions to the 
basic hearsay rule because we find such categories of hearsay 
sufficiently reliable to allow those statements before a jury even 
without the typical process of adversarial testing through cross-
exarnination.3 
But the adversarial process does not simply evaporate once hearsay 
is admitted.4 Where a declarant is available, the law of evidence 
permits the opponent to put her on the witness stand for cross-
3. As Wigmore explained: 
The theory of the hearsay rule . . . is that the many possible sources of 
inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which may lie underneath the bare 
untested assertion of a witness can best be brought to light and exposed, if 
they exist, by the test of cross-examination. But this test or security may in a 
given instance be superfluous; it may be sufficiently clear, in that instance, 
that the statement offered is free enough from the risk of inaccuracy and 
untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination would be a work of 
supererogation. 
Wigmore, supra note 2, § 450, at 251; see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 
(1990) (quoting Wigmore). 
Whether categorical hearsay exceptions developed at common law really provide 
an accurate measure of reliability, however, seems open to question. Professors 
Nesson and Benkler express a scepticism shared by many modem scholars: 
(M]any exceptions have worn too thin to remain convincing .... 
Consider, for instance, the dying declarations exception, which arises from 
the cultural experience of "facing one's Maker" as a moment of truth. But 
in a culture that only grows more cynical about the authenticity of religious 
experience, the exception loses its rhetorical force. Dying declarations no 
longer evoke the image of a person making a solemn statement on the death 
bed, before a confessor, surrounded by family members. Instead, we more 
commonly envision a drugged, whispering patient in an impersonal hospital, 
alone except for a detective holding a little black book and straining to hear 
a name gasped against the flow of pure oxygen. The contemporary image 
lacks the comforting effect of the traditional one. 
As knowledge of human psychology becomes more sophisticated and 
widely disseminated, that discomfort extends to more of the hearsay 
exceptions. Do we still believe that people excited by an upsetting event are 
more likely to tell the truth than to exonerate themselves, to distance 
themselves from blame? Do we still believe that a plaintiff is more likely to 
tell the truth to the physician hired to testify as an expert at the plaintiff's 
trial than to any other person whose testimony does not fit another hearsay 
exception? 
Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring 
Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under the Confrontation Clause, 81 Va. L. 
Rev. 149, 156 (1995) (footnotes omitted); see also John W. Strong et al., 2 McCormick 
on Evidence: Treatise§§ 309-15, at 324-34 (4th ed. 1992). 
4. Of course, the testing process is also relevant in defining some hearsay 
exceptions. Some hearsay is admissible because it has already been subject to an 
adversarial process, see Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (former testimony), while some is 
admissible because the declarant is subject to cross-examination at trial, see id. Ruic 
801(d)(l) (prior statement by witness). 
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examination.5 Where the opponent does not, or cannot, call the 
declarant as a witness, he still may attack the credibility of the 
declarant with any evidence that would be admissible for that purpose 
had the declarant testified in court.6 The testing process can go 
forward even after the hearsay is in evidence.7 
This is where discovery enters the hearsay picture. Adversarial 
testing of hearsay requires information.8 In the case of a live witness, 
effective cross-examination often depends on obtaining two kinds of 
information. The first is advance notice of what the witness is likely to 
5. Federal Rule of Evidence 806 provides: 
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), 
(D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant 
may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which 
would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a 
witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, 
inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any 
requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to 
deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been 
admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the 
declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination. 
Id. Rule 806. 
6. See id. When the declarant is absent, Rule 806 permits the opponent of 
hearsay to use much of the same material which one would expect to surface during 
live cross-examination if the declarant were in the courtroom. For example, an absent 
declarant's inconsistent statements, prior criminal convictions, the letter promising 
immunity or a favorable sentencing recommendation in exchange for testimony, and 
the medical record showing the eye-witness declarant to be legally blind are 
admissible under Rule 806. Of course, that evidence does not simply materialize in 
the courtroom. Much of it can, and should, be presented during the cross-
examination of the government witness who relates the hearsay. Applied effectively 
then, Rule 806 envisions a process of "virtual cross-examination" which can have the 
look, the sound, and at least some of the drama of real cross-examination of the 
declarant. For a more complete description of the process of impeaching an absent 
hearsay declarant through virtual cross-examination, see John G. Douglass, Beyond 
Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-E:camination, and the Right to 
Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 191, 251-60 (1999). 
7. Despite the clear opportunity provided by Rule 806, relatively few trial 
lawyers make effective use of their right to impeach an absent hearsay declarant. 
Trial lawyers and judges are quite accustomed to courtroom battles over the 
admissibility of hearsay, but few have much ex-perience at contests over the crec/ibility 
of hearsay. Though they may have fought hard to keep hearsay from the jury, once it 
is admitted in evidence even the most able advocates often proceed as if the hearsay 
battle were over, at least until the appeal. See Fred Warren Bennett. How to 
Administer the "Big Hurt" in a Criminal Case: The Life and Times of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 806, 44 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1135, 1142 (1995) (explaining how an attorney can 
dispute the credibility of a hearsay statement once it has been admitted); Anthony M. 
Brannon, Successful Shadowboxing: The Arr of Impead1ing Hearsay Declarants, 13 
Campbell L. Rev. 157, 158 (1991) (noting trial lawyers' "virtual total neglect" of 
opportunities to impeach hearsay declarants}; Margaret Meriwether Cordray, 
Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of lmpead1i11g the Nontestifying Declarant, 56 
Ohio St. LJ. 495, 495 (1995) (stating that Rule 806 is "overlooked by lawyers"). 
8. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 66 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) ("[T]he right of cross-examination also may be significantly infringed by 
events occurring outside the trial itself, such as the wholesale denial of access to 
material that would serve as the basis for a significant line of inquiry at trial."). 
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say. Without that information, the cross-examiner scarcely knows 
where to begin.9 The second is the "ammunition" necessary to attack 
credibility: the witness's prior convictions or bad acts, evidence of 
bias, failed memory or inaccurate perception, and-perhaps most 
important of all-the witness's prior statements.10 Discovery operates 
in the same way when it comes to hearsay. Where the discovery 
process equips the opponent of hearsay with the necessary advance 
notice and "ammunition," he can often test the hearsay in much the 
same way he might challenge the testimony of a live witness. 11 And 
9. In American courts, jury trials typically take place in a "unitary" or "one-shot" 
proceeding. The court empanels a jury, the parties present evidence, and the jury 
returns a verdict, all in a single, continuous proceeding. Many cases begin and end 
the same day. Because of the impracticality of reconvening a jury, lengthy 
adjournments are unusual after trial has begun. Unfair surprise poses a greater 
danger in this type of proceeding than it might in systems which adjudicate cases in an 
"episodic" or piecemeal fashion, with several proceedings over the course of weeks or 
months, where parties enjoy more time to react to testimony that unfolds 
unexpectedly. See Mirjan Damaska, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 
425, 428-30 (1992) (comparing Anglo-American common law trials to the more 
"episodic" proceedings of many Continental systems); Roger Park, A Subject Matter 
Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 51, 62 (1987) (hereinafter Park. 
Subject Matter Approach] ("The unitary nature of the American trial makes surprise a 
greater danger than in other systems, where adjournments and continuances can 
mitigate its effect."). 
In a unitary system, pretrial discovery becomes essential to effective cross-
examination of any hostile witness. See id. ("Attorneys need time and preparation to 
be ready to impeach witnesses, to contradict them with the testimony of others, and to 
construct arguments dealing with their testimony."). In a system where trials begin 
and end with little interruption, hearsay creates special risks of unfair surprise. 
Parties may prepare to cross-examine witnesses whom they can anticipate will testify. 
But hearsay often appears unannounced. And even where the declarant is alive and 
available, a unitary trial can make it difficult or impossible for an opponent to find the 
declarant, subpoena her, and get her to court before it is too late. 
10. In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Court noted the importance 
of discovery, especially the discovery of witness statements, to the process of cross-
examination: 
Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer knows the value for 
impeaching purposes of statements of the witness recording the events 
before time dulls treacherous memory. Flat contradiction between the 
witness's testimony and the version of the events given in his reports is not 
the only test of inconsistency. The omission from the reports of facts related 
at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even a different 
order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of 
testing the credibility of a witness's trial testimony. 
Id. at 667. 
11. For live cross-examination, that "ammunition" serves two important 
functions. First, it is the predicate for tactical decision making. In preparing for 
cross-examination, a lawyer sifts through the available facts from the witness's past. 
trying to identify material which will convince the jury to discount the witness's story. 
When the lawyer finds such ammunition-an inconsistent statement or even a change 
in emphasis, a prior dishonest act, or evidence of failing memory-he can construct a 
line of questioning for cross-examination. Second, once the lawyer chooses to pursue 
a line of questioning, that ammunition provides the reins which control the witness. 
The lawyer confronts the witness with the impeaching material-a written prior 
statement, for example-to insure a predictable answer. If the witness denies an 
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discovery can perform an even more important function in the case of 
an available declarant who can be located and subpoenaed. It can 
turn an absent hearsay declarant into a testifying witness, subject to 
full cross-examination in front of the jury. 
In this manner, hearsay rules and discovery rules are linked in 
conventional theory.12 Where more complete discovery permits more 
complete testing of hearsay, our basic reason for excluding hearsay-
lack of adversarial testing-becomes less of a concern. Thus, the 
more a party can discover about the opponent's hearsay, the more 
freely a court can admit hearsay.13 This hearsay-discovery connection 
impeaching fact, the lawyer uses that material to prove that the denial is false. Most 
basic treatises on trial advocacy devote considerable attention to the process of 
"controlling" witnesses on cross-examination in this manner. See Steven Lubet, 
Modem Trial Advocacy 109-47 (2d ed. 1997); Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques 
221-26 (1996). 
"Ammunition" serves essentially the same purposes in impeaching an absent 
hearsay declarant. In preparing to impeach a hearsay declarant, counsel surveys the 
available factual material to determine what "points" he can make about the 
declarant's credibility and how he can prove those points in the declarant's absence. 
At trial, though he has no concern about "reining in" an absent declarant, he uses that 
factual material to confront and to control the responses of t11e government \\itness 
who related the hearsay to the jury and who, on cross-examination, will be asked to 
confirm the weaknesses and limitations of that same hearsay. See Douglass. supra 
note 6, at 255-56. 
For the opponent of hearsay, that ammunition plays another important role as well. 
In those not infrequent cases where the declarant is available to testify, though not 
called as a government witness, defense counsel will rely on that information in 
making the tactical decision whether to call the declarant to the stand for the hostile 
examination permitted by Rule 806. Without access to the necessary "ammunition" 
in the discovery process, he must make that decision in the dark. If he exercises the 
level of caution typical of most eiq>erienced trial lawyers, quite often he \\ill forgo 
cross-examination altogether. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Co11fro111a1io11 
Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 557, 617 n.158 (1988) (hereinafter 
Jonakait, Co11fro11tatio11 Clause] ("Time-worn admonitions tell the advocate not to 
call someone without knowing what he will say."); Park, Subject i'vla11er Approach, 
supra note 9, at 102 ("Without such information, calling the declarant is a risky 
proposition, and trial lawyers are notoriously reluctant to step onto untested ground. 
To call a witness for cross-examination and then fail to accomplish anything can be a 
dramatic setback-whatever the judge may have told the jury about the adverse 
nature of the examination."). 
12. comparative law scholars seem to recognize the link most readily. In an 
article comparing approaches to hearsay in Anglo-American and Continental courts, 
Professor Dama5ka argues that the difference between "episodic" Continental 
proceedings and "one-shot" Anglo-American trials accounts in part for the 
development of rules excluding hearsay in the Anglo-American system. See Damal;ka, 
supra note 9, at 428-30. The principal difference, as Professor Dama5ka points out, is 
the opportunity and time to gather information that might contradict hearsay or to 
locate and call the hearsay declarant as a witness. See id. In effect, more complete 
access to information makes the admission of hearsay less of a concern. See Van 
Kessel, supra note 2, at 519 ("[H]earsay dangers are particularly acute in jurisdic1ions 
that do not provide for effective pre-trial mutual discovery .... "). 
13. It is no accident, then, that the accelerating trend toward liberalized 
exceptions to the hearsay rule in the last quarter century has followed fast on the 
heels of the trend toward more liberal discovery rules, especially in civil cases. See 
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accounts for the near universal tendency to attach "notice" provisions 
to new rules creating nontraditional hearsay exceptions. 14 Likewise, 
the theory of a hearsay-discovery balance is at the heart of reform 
proposals that would limit or modify traditional restrictions on 
hearsay in exchange for broader notice requirements and increased 
access to information regarding a hearsay declarant.15 And the theory 
accounts at least in part for the widely-held notion that trial judges 
apply hearsay restrictions more stringently in criminal cases, where 
discovery is more limited, than in civil matters.16 The result, in theory, 
Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 479 n.7 ("Hearsay rules in the United States, as 
exemplified by the Federal Rules of Evidence, are in many instances more permissive 
in civil than in criminal cases, and in practice have been substantially weakened by 
modern expanded discovery systems and the relentless growth of hearsay 
exceptions."); cf John J. Cound et al., Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials 761-63 
(6th ed. 1993) (noting rapid expansion of modern discovery practices following 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938); William J. Brennan, Jr., 
The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 
Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990) [hereinafter Brennan, A Progress Report] (noting 
significant advances in criminal discovery since the 1960s). 
14. The best known hearsay-notice provision appears in Rule 807 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, the "residual" hearsay exception. See infra note 240 and 
accompanying text. Uniform Rule of Evidence 807, which provides for the admission 
in evidence of certain hearsay statements of child victims or witnesses, requires not 
only the pretrial disclosure of the statement itself, but also provides for out-of-court 
questioning of the child declarant at the opponent's request. See Unif. R. of Evict. 
807(a), (b) (amended 1986). The California Evidence Code contains a similar 
provision, Cal. Evict. Code § 1360 (West Supp. 2000), as well as a broader hearsay 
exception for statements of unavailable victims of physical injury, Cal. Evict. Code § 
1370 (West Supp. 2000). Both require the proponent to give pretrial notice of an 
intention to offer the statement, along with the particulars of the statement. See id. §§ 
1360, 1370. 
15. In civil cases, for example, Professor Roger Park has proposed a "notice-based 
residual exception that permits hearsay to be admitted in civil cases without being 
screened for reliability by the trial judge." Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 
9, at 122. Professor Eleanor Swift has proposed an approach which would condition 
admissibility on a requirement that the proponent produce "foundation facts," that is, 
"[i]nformation about the declarant and the circumstances that influenced her when 
she perceived, remembered, and spoke about the relevant facts." Eleanor Swift, A 
Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1339, 1355 (1987) [hereinafter 
Swift, Fact Approach]; see also Ronald J. Allen, A Response to Professor Friedman: 
The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 797, 799 
(1992) (noting that discovery systems are replacing hearsay restrictions, especially in 
civil cases). 
England, along with some other common-law jurisdictions, has eliminated the 
hearsay rule in civil cases, replacing it with a requirement that the proponent give 
advance notice of intention to offer hearsay. See Richard D. Friedman, The Elements 
of Evidence 335 (2d ed. 1998) (citing the Civil Evidence Act 1995 (c. 38)). 
16. See 5 Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein's Federal Evidence§ 802.04(3][b], at 
802-14, § 802.05(1], at 802-15 (2d ed. 1999) (identifying limited criminal discovery as 
one factor which leads judges to apply the hearsay rule more strictly in criminal 
cases); Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 9, at 87 ("[W]hatever the specific 
content of the hearsay rules, the judicial attitude toward exclusion appears to be 
stricter in criminal cases."); Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 481 (observing that the 
Supreme Court has taken a more conservative approach toward some hearsay 
exceptions in criminal cases). 
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is a fair balance between hearsay admissibility and discovery rights in 
both civil and criminal cases. 
But theory does not always reflect reality. If fairness requires that 
courts limit hearsay more carefully to protect parties with limited 
hearsay-related discovery rights, then it is worth asking whether 
courts actually behave that way.17 My own conclusion is that they do 
not. At least in the federal courts-the focus of this Article18-
hearsay and discovery have drifted out of balance. Despite serious 
disadvantages in the discovery process, federal criminal defendants 
actually face a broader range of admissible hearsay than civil litigants 
and prosecutors. 
Part I of this Article argues that the conventional theory of hearsay-
discovery balance does not reflect the reality of modem federal 
practice. An imbalance has arisen because, in the last quarter century, 
developments in the law of evidence and confrontation are at odds 
with developments-or one might say nondevelopments-in the law 
of criminal discovery. Since enactment of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in 1975, both the law of evidence and modem Confrontation 
Clause doctrine have evolved toward broader admission of hearsay in 
criminal cases. Contrary to conventional theory, that evolution has at 
least matched-and probably has outpaced-the trend toward more 
liberal admission of hearsay in civil cases.19 But while federal courts 
Of course, according to the conventional view, limited discovery is not the only 
factor which leads courts to apply hearsay rules more strictly in criminal than in civil 
cases. The Federal Rules of Evidence themselves include a few restrictions on 
hearsay that apply only in criminal cases. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
And, in theory at least, the Supreme Court views the Confrontation Clause as a rule 
excluding some otherwise admissible hearsay when offered against criminal 
defendants. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990) ("The Confrontation 
Clause ... bars the admission of some evidence that would othenvise be admissible 
under an exception to the hearsay rule."). 
17. Though the theoretical link between hearsay and discovery is widely 
recognized, there is little scholarly work devoted to testing the theory. As far as I am 
aware, there is no empirical study which demonstrates that courts actually limit 
hearsay more strictly in criminal cases than in civil matters, despite the conventional 
assumption to that effect. In fact, two relatively recent empirical studies suggest that 
the opposite is true. See Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been 
Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 473, 477-84 (1992) 
[hereinafter Swift, Judicial Discretion); Myrna S. Raeder, A Response to Professor 
Swift, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 507, 508 & n.2 (1992) (hereinafter Raeder, Response). 
18. I have limited my examination to federal cases because they provide a more 
manageable universe of cases for study, and are governed by a single set of 
evidentiary rules and rules of discovery. Most of my conclusions. and at least some of 
my suggestions for reform, however, should apply to many state systems as well, since 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and-to a lesser extent-the Federal Rules of both 
civil and criminal procedure have served as models for many states. I also believe 
that the federal system provides a clear illustration of a system that is out of balance. 
The federal system has relatively liberal rules admitting hearsay and liberal rules of 
civil discovery, but remains more conservative than many states in its criminal 
discovery practices. 
19. See infra Part I.A.2. 
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are admitting more hearsay-and more problematic hearsay-in 
criminal cases, the rules of criminal discovery show no sign of 
adapting to that reality.20 As a result, in comparison to other litigants, 
federal criminal defendants now face a litigation environment that 
features both minimum discovery and maximum admissible hearsay.21 
Part II offers some proposals to address that imbalance by 
expanding a defendant's right to learn in advance what hearsay he 
must face, and his right to gather "ammunition" to contest that 
hearsay. Where appropriate, I have included proposals that would 
require the amendment of existing rules. But recognizing the practical 
difficulties facing any rule-making initiative,22 my principal focus is to 
suggest more effective means of applying Rule 16,23 the Jencks Act,24 
and the Brady doctrine25-the major discovery tools presently 
available to criminal defendants-to the task of contesting 
prosecution hearsay.26 
This Article is not a critique of developments in the law of evidence, 
nor of the Court's application of the Confrontation Clause to 
20. See infra Part LB. 
21. To make matters worse, judging from the infrequency of reported opinions on 
the subject, criminal defense counsel seldom attempt to employ the existing rules of 
discovery-limited as they are-to anticipate the prosecution's use of hearsay or to 
obtain material which might serve to impeach an out-of-court declarant once hearsay 
has been admitted in evidence. For example, I have found only three federal cases in 
which criminal defendants sought to use the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994), as a 
tool for discovering prior statements of a hearsay declarant. See United States v. 
Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("As far as we can tell, we arc the 
first court of appeals to address this argument."); United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 
657 n.37 (11th Cir. 1984) (declining to order discovery on other grounds); United 
States v. Padilla, No. Sl-94-CR-313-CSH, 1996 WL 389300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 
1996) (finding that defendant failed to raise the issue in a timely manner). 
22. The major practical roadblock to expanding the rules allowing criminal 
discovery relating to hearsay declarants appears to be the reluctance of Congress to 
adopt any rule compelling the government to disclose its witnesses before trial. See 
infra text accompanying notes 170-72. 
23. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. 
24. 18 u.s.c. § 3500. 
25. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
26. For contrasting perspectives on the current rules of criminal discovery in 
federal courts, compare Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 3, 9-12 
(applauding advancements under revised Rule 16, but criticizing continued limitations 
on discovery of, inter alia, the identities and prior statements of government 
witnesses), and H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent?: 
Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie this Presumption, 43 
Rutgers L. Rev. 1089, 1089 (1991) ("It is an astonishing anomaly that in federal courts 
virtually unrestricted discovery is granted in civil cases, whereas discovery is severely 
limited in criminal matters."), and Steven H. Goldberg, What Was Discovered in the 
Quest for Truth, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 51, 56-60 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court 
has simultaneously diminished defense discovery required by Brady while unfairly 
expanding reciprocal discovery from defendants), with Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., The 
Discovery Process in Criminal Prosecutions: Toward Fair Trials and Just Verdicts, 68 
Wash. U. L.Q. 63, 63-64 (defending current restrictions against pretrial discovery of 
names, addresses and prior statements of government witnesses). 
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hearsay.27 It is not an argument that more, or less, hearsay should be 
admitted in criminal cases. Instead, it takes as a starting point the 
undeniable reality that, for good or ill, today's federal criminal trials 
include a wider variety of admissible hearsay than ever before.2l' My 
27. In an earlier article I argued that, when it comes to hearsay, the Confrontation 
Clause should have less to do with exclusion of evidence and more to do \\ith a 
process that allows for effective adversarial challenges to hearsay: 
If the Confrontation Clause is ever to become more than a redundancy. then 
we must move beyond exclusionary thinking and expand our notion of 
confrontation to encompass a broad, affirmative right to challenge hearsay. 
When a hearsay declarant is available, there is little reason to pause over the 
issue of reliability. Instead, courts should be serious about providing the 
defendant with an opportunity for real confrontation, if he really wants that 
confrontation. When the declarant is unavailable, confrontation-hearsay 
analysis should not begin with the assumption that confrontation is 
impossible. Effective challenge to hearsay often is possible despite, or 
sometimes especially because of, the physical absence of the declarant from 
the courtroom. 
Douglass, supra note 6, at 272. The discovery reforms which I propose in this Article 
are an appropriate-indeed, a necessary-complement to a constitutional rule 
protecting the adversarial right to test hearsay even after it is admitted in evidence. 
28. The law of evidence no longer treats the rule against hearsay like much of a 
rule. The modem history of hearsay exceptions has been a one-way street. Once 
born, hearsay exceptions almost never die. See Allen, supra note 15, at 799 
("[H]earsay exceptions, once formed, remain. To my knowledge. there are virtually 
no examples of hearsay exceptions being eliminated .... "}. And once established, 
those exceptions tend to expand in scope. Some "expansions" result from legislative 
action. In White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), for example, the Court faced a 
Confrontation Clause challenge to hearsay admitted under a 1988 re\ision to the 
Illinois Code dealing with statements for purposes of medical diagnosis. See id. at 348-
51. In the state proceedings in the same case, the Appellate Court of Illinois 
characterized the revisions as an effort to "sever artificial restraints." People v. White, 
555 N.E.2d 1241, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). Other expansions of established hearsay 
exceptions occur through the process of judicial interpretation. For example, 
commentators have noted a tendency among modern courts, especially in child abuse 
prosecutions, to expand the "medical diagnosis" exception to admit statements 
identifying an abuser, see Margaret A. Berger, The Deconsrir111ionalizarion of the 
Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosec111oria/ Resrraim Mot/el, 16 Minn. L 
Rev. 557, 606 n.198 (1992), and to eiq>and the "spontaneous declarations" exception 
by easing the time limitations traditionally imposed on the concept of "spontaneity," 
thereby admitting in evidence statements that occurred well after the abusive incident 
which provoked the "declaration," see Allison C. Goodman, Note, Two Critical 
Evitlentiary Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: C/osetl-Circuit Testimony by Child 
Victims and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 32 Am. Crim. L Rev. 855, 876, 882 n.202 
(1995). 
Some scholars contend that the hearsay rule is "dead." For example, Professor 
Allen asserts: 
The hearsay rule is, in short, no longer a rule of exclusion: it is instead a rule 
of admission that is doing its subversive work under the cover of darkness. 
Article VIII of the Federal Rules purports to continue the common law 
development of hearsay in most respects, but it is a false promise. The 
Federal Rules, in concert with modern discovery principles, arc quite clearly 
the harbinger of its demise. My instinct is that it is a death well-deserved, 
and after a burial suitable to its station, the hearsay rule should be allowed 
to lie quietly, undisturbed, for eternity. 
Allen, supra note 15, at 800; see also, e.g., Faust F. Rossi, The Si/em Rei•olurion in The 
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aim is to show how the process of criminal discovery can and should 
adapt to that reality to correct the hearsay-discovery balance when the 
government relies on hearsay. 
I. THE HEARSAY-DISCOVERY IMBALANCE IN FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CASES 
A. Reality Defies Conventional Theory: Criminal Defendants Face 
More Hearsay-and More Problematic Hearsay-Than Other 
Litigants 
Adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 spurred an 
expansion in the scope of hearsay admissible in both civil and criminal 
cases.29 The Rules included twenty-seven separately enumerated 
hearsay exceptions, and defined another handful of out-of-court 
statements as "not hearsay."30 Though those categorical exceptions 
largely tracked exceptions recognized at common law,31 the Rules 
typically opted for the more liberal versions of most common-law 
exceptions32 and, in a few notable instances, broadened hearsay 
admissibility even further.33 The coups de grace for expanded 
admissibility were the heavily-debated residual exceptions.34 And the 
Litigation Manual: A Primer for Trial Lawyers 640, 653 (John G. Koeltl ed., 2d ed. 
1989) (recounting the "rapid erosion of the doctrine of hearsay" as a result of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence). Others find that pronouncement a bit exaggerated. See 
Roger C. Park, Hearsay, Dead or Alive?, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 647, 658 (1998) (hereinafter 
Park, Dead or Alive?] (concluding, based on a number of factors including the 
continuing quantity of judicial opinions and case reversals relating to hearsay, that the 
hearsay rule "retains significant influence"). 
29. See Rossi, supra note 28, at 645-53. 
30. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(l)-(4) (exceptions to hearsay rule); id. 
Rule 801(d) (out-of-court statements which the Rules define as "not hearsay"). 
31. See Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee's note ("The approach to 
hearsay in these rules is that of the common law . . . . The traditional hearsay 
exceptions are drawn upon for the exceptions .... "). 
32. The Rule 803(4) exception for statements for purposes of medical diagnosis, 
for example, did not include the traditional prohibition on statements made to a 
physician consulted with respect to litigation. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) advisory 
committee's note. The Rule 804(b)(2) exception for dying declarations was extended 
to civil cases. See id. Rule 804(b)(2) advisory committee's note. 
33. The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, expanded the common-law 
concept of "statements against interest" to include not only statements affecting a 
pecuniary interest, but also statements against penal interest. See id. Rule 804(b)(3) & 
advisory committee's note. The Federal Rules also allow for a more generous 
approach to the admission of co-conspirator statements. See Bourjaily v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 171, 176-81 (1987) (holding that Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) modified the 
traditional "bootstrapping" rule of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), which 
had required independent evidence of conspiracy as a foundation for admission of co-
conspirator statements). 
34. See Fed. R. Evid. 807 (originally codified at Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) and 
804(b)(5)). The proposed rule first submitted to Congress would have admitted any 
hearsay "not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having 
comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Revised Draft of Proposed 
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process did not stop there. Since 1975, judicial construction of the 
Rules-especially of the residual exceptions-has probably pushed 
the boundaries of admissibility even beyond what the drafters 
envisioned.35 
While expanded admissibility has been the clear trend since 1975, it 
is less than clear who have been the principal beneficiaries of that 
trend, the major "consumers" of this increasing supply of admissible 
hearsay. Civil litigants seem like the most likely candidates. After all, 
conventional theory suggests that courts should admit hearsay more 
cautiously in criminal cases than in civil cases.36 But there is no simple 
Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 422 
(1971). The House of Representatives deleted the provision, finding it injected Mtoo 
much uncertainty." R.R. Rep. No. 93-1597 (1974), reprimed in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
7098, 7106. The Senate adopted a more limited version and the Conference 
Committee forged the current rule from the Senate version by adding the 
requirement of pretrial notice. See id. For a more detailed account of the history of 
the residual exception, see Myrna S. Raeder, The Effecr of rlze Carclw/ls on Criminal 
Defendants: Little Red Riding Hood Meets r/ze Hearsay Wolf and is Devoured, 25 Loy. 
L.A. L. Rev. 925, 925-28 (1992) [hereinafter Raeder, Effecr of Carclw/ls). 
Significantly, when the residual exception was recodificd to Ruic 807 in 1997, the 
Advisory Committee implicitly predicted new hearsay exceptions still to come. The 
avowed purpose of recodification was to "facilitate additions to Rules 803 and 80.t" 
Fed. R. Evid. 807 advisory committee's note. 
35. See Raeder, Effect of Catdwl/s, supra note 34, at 928-34; Rossi, supra note 28, 
at 645-49. 
36. Most contemporary observers conclude that courts behave as conventional 
theory suggests. Judge Weinstein argues: 
In criminal cases, the hearsay rule is suffused with constitutional hues and. 
therefore, applied more stringently than in civil cases. This recognizes the 
greater danger of prejudice to a criminal defendant, and the operation of 
other factors affecting the admissibility of evidence, such as the right of 
confrontation, limitations imposed by the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to counsel, and the rather limited discovery 
permitted in criminal cases. 
Weinstein et al., supra note 16, § 802.04[3)[b), at 802-14 (footnote omitted). Later, he 
asserts: "[T]he impact of the hearsay rule is different in civil and criminal cases. This 
results from the presence in criminal cases of such factors as the narrower scope of 
discovery .... " Id.§ 802.05[1], at 802-15. 
The observations of a jurist of Judge Weinstein's stature ob\•iously should not be 
discounted. But the authorities he cites to support that observation actually say 
nothing about the differences between civil and criminal cases. Instead, the 
observation simply rests upon a few appellate decisions reversing criminal con,ictions 
where hearsay was admitted. The treatise makes no effort to account for the many 
federal decisions affirming convictions where controversial prosecution hearsay was 
admitted, nor does it offer any contrasting authority showing the supposedly more 
liberal attitude of judges toward hearsay in civil cases. 
Other contemporary scholars make similar observations that hearsay is more 
strictly controlled in criminal cases. See, e.g., Park, S11bjec1 Maller Approach, supra 
note 9, at 87 (noting that courts are "uniformly more liberal in receiving hearsay 
evidence in civil cases than in criminal cases"); Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 479, 481 & 
n.14 (noting that recent cases show a more conservative approach to interpreting 
hearsay exceptions). In part they rely on those hearsay exceptions in the Federal 
Rules which explicitly distinguish criminal cases, exceptions which-as I argue below, 
see infra Part l.A.1.b.-do very little to benefit criminal defendants as a practical 
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means to test the theory to determine who faces the widest range of 
admissible hearsay. Federal courts make no effort to "keep score" 
among the various classes of litigants. Empirical studies of reported 
cases offer some helpful, and surprising, insights.37 But, when making 
statistical comparisons between civil and criminal cases, it is hard to 
be certain that we are comparing apples to apples.38 
In the following sections, I assess conventional theory in two ways. 
First, I examine the three main pillars supporting the theory: (a) the 
Confrontation Clause, (b) the Federal Rules of Evidence, and (c) the 
exercise of discretion by trial judges in making hearsay rulings. In 
theory, each of these offers a source of special protection to criminal 
defendants against the expansion of admissible hearsay. Second, I 
look at judicial rulings on hearsay's frontiers, opinions expanding the 
boundaries of admissible hearsay beyond traditional limits. My 
conclusion is that the three pillars of conventional theory account for 
little in the way of special protection for criminal defendants. And at 
hearsay's frontiers, prosecutors are the most successful of any litigants 
in breaking new ground in the admission of hearsay. In reality, it 
appears that criminal defendants face a broader range of admissible 
hearsay than other litigants. And, more often than civil litigants, they 
must contend with the most problematic forms of hearsay: statements 
that fall outside the boundaries of traditional hearsay exceptions. 
1. Three Pillars of Conventional Theory: Extra Protections Against 
Prosecution Hearsay, or the Illusion of Protection? 
In theory, criminal defendants enjoy three sources of extra 
protection against the more liberal admission of hearsay that 
supposedly occurs in civil cases, or when the defendant himself offers 
hearsay. First, the Confrontation Clause limits a prosecutor's use of 
hearsay, but has no application when other litigants offer hearsay in 
evidence.39 Second, the Federal Rules of Evidence include several 
specific limits on hearsay that are unique to criminal cases and, in 
matter. Their only other authority is Weinstein's treatise. 
37. As far as I am aware, no comprehensive comparison of hearsay in civil and 
criminal cases exists to support the apparently widespread assumption that judges arc 
more cautious toward hearsay when it is offered against criminal defendants. The 
only empirical studies on the subject reach the opposite conclusion. See Swift, Judicial 
Discretion, supra note 17, at 482-86 (finding that prosecutors were proportionately 
more successful in offering hearsay under Rules 803(1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) than 
other classes of litigants); Raeder, Response, supra note 17, at 508 & n.2 (finding 
prosecutors the most successful users of "residual" hearsay). My own survey, which 
essentially aimed to update Professor Raeder's 1991 survey of residual hearsay cases, 
likewise found that prosecutors succeeded more often than other litigants in offering 
hearsay under the residual exception, even though one might expect courts to be most 
cautious in admitting such "fringe" hearsay against criminal defendants. See infra 
notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
38. See infra note 96. 
39. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990). 
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some instances, apply only to prosecution hearsay . .w Third, at least 
partly out of concern for defendants' limited discovery rights, trial 
judges are said to exercise their discretion to limit hearsay more 
strictly when offered against criminal defendants:11 But a closer look 
at the first two of these pillars suggests that neither the Confrontation 
Clause nor the Federal Rules of Evidence actually serve to exclude 
much prosecution hearsay that would be admissible if offered by other 
litigants.42 As for the third pillar, while the overall impact of judicial 
discretion is hard to measure, the best available evidence suggests 
that, on average, judicial judgment calls actually favor prosecutors 
over other litigants in a significant way:13 
a. The Confrontation Clause 
In theory, the Supreme Court applies the Confrontation Clause as a 
kind of super hearsay rule, a constitutional trump card to limit the 
admission of especially unreliable hearsay in criminal cases. "The 
Confrontation Clause," the Court tells us, "bars the admission of 
some evidence that would othenvise be admissible under an exception 
to the hearsay rule."44 When the Federal Rules of Evidence were 
40. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (public records); id. Ruic 803(22) (judgments); id. 
Rule 804(b)(l) (former testimony); id. Rule 804(b)(2) (dying declarations). Rule 
804(b)(3) {declarations against interest) also distinguishes ch•il from criminal cases, 
but by limiting defense-offered hearsay in criminal cases more strictly than 
prosecution hearsay. 
41. Weinstein's treatise contends, "[R)eversible error is found more often in 
criminal cases when hearsay is improperly admitted against a defendant. 
Consequently, the trial judge's discretion to admit hearsay evidence against a criminal 
defendant may be curtailed." Weinstein et al., supra note 16, § 802.04[3)(b). at 802-14 
to -15; see also Park, Subject Matter Approach. supra note 9, at 87 (highlighting that 
the judicial attitude towards exclusion appears to be stricter in criminal cases): Van 
Kessel, supra note 2, at 479, 481 (noting that judges in criminal cases have been "less 
radical [and] more uneven"). 
42 See infra Part l.A.1.a-b. 
43. See infra Part l.A.1.c. 
44. Wright, 497 U.S. at 814. In recent years. however, at least two members of the 
Court, the Justice Department, and several prominent scholars have challenged the 
notion that hearsay declarants are "witnesses against" the accused under the 
Confrontation Clause. They argue, therefore, that the Clause generally docs not 
operate to exclude hearsay at all. 
Through an amicus brief filed in White v. l/li11ois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the Justice 
Department argued that the Confrontation Clause applies only to in-court testimony 
and certain forms of "testimonial" hearsay (e.g .• affidavits, depositions. and prior 
testimony) created in anticipation of a criminal trial. See id. at 352. The majority in 
White rejected the argument with the simple statement that it "comes too late in the 
day to warrant reexamination" of the Court's many earlier opinions which, at least 
implicitly, had taken the broader view that "witnesses against" an accused included 
hearsay declarants in general. Id. at 353. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, 
joined by Justice Scalia, urging more thorough consideration of the government's 
position. See id. at 358-66 (Thomas. J., concurring). 
The leading scholarly proponent of the argument is Professor Akhil Recd Amar. 
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure 89-144 (1997); Akhil 
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enacted in 1975, confrontation-hearsay doctrine was at a somewhat 
uncertain stage.45 Still, there is little doubt that, twenty-five years ago, 
the constitutional exclusionary rule against unreliable hearsay 
appeared more formidable than it does today. Indeed, several early 
Warren Court opinions could be interpreted to suggest that hearsay 
from a nontestifying declarant was admissible only where the 
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant in an earlier proceeding.46 Against that background, it 
seems likely that in 1975 Congress expected that Confrontation 
Clause concerns ultimately would restrict the range of hearsay 
admissible against criminal defendants under the new Rules, while 
leaving more room for flexibility when courts applied the same rules 
in civil cases.47 
But Confrontation Clause history took a different course. In the 
twenty-five years since the enactment of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the Supreme Court has never invoked the Confrontation 
Clause to exclude hearsay that was otherwise admissible under the 
Rules.48 Instead of adapting, and narrowing, the codified hearsay 
Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 
Geo. L.J. 1045, 1045 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First 
Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 647 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, First Principles). 
In my view, both the text and history of the Confrontation Clause are consistent 
with the Court's view that hearsay declarants should be treated as "witnesses" for 
confrontation purposes. See Douglass, supra note 6, at 224-40. However, that does 
not lead to the conclusion that the Clause operates to exclude hearsay from criminal 
trials. As I have argued elsewhere in greater detail, the Clause guarantees the 
adversarial right to "test" whatever hearsay the rules of evidence and the Due Process 
Clause permit the prosecution to offer in evidence. See id. 
45. The Advisory Committee observed: "Until very recently, decisions invoking 
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment were surprisingly few, a fact 
probably explainable by the former inapplicability of the clause to the states and by 
the hearsay rule's occupancy of much the same ground." Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII, 
advisory committee's note. In drafting the final version of the Rules, the Conference 
Committee noted that confrontation-hearsay principles were "under development'' 
by the courts. See S. Rep. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7068. 
Rather than attempt to codify confrontation principles into all hearsay exceptions, the 
Rules left that process for future refinement by the Supreme Court. See id. 
46. See Raeder, Effect on Catchalls, supra note 34, at 930-31 (citing Douglas v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). 
Practically all of the Court's confrontation-hearsay opinions prior to 1975 dealt with 
hearsay in the form of testimony from prior judicial proceedings and, accordingly, 
focused almost exclusively on the adequacy of defendant's earlier opportunity to 
cross-examine. See Douglass, supra note 6, at 202-03 & n.50 (collecting pre-1975 
cases). The 1970 plurality opinion in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1970), 
departed from that approach, but offered no clear indication of the Court's future 
course. 
47. This is especially true in relation to the residual exception. Professor Raeder 
makes a strong argument that the residual exception was passed in part because 
Congress felt it would have minimal application in criminal cases because of 
Confrontation Clause restrictions. See Raeder, Effect of Catchalls, supra note 34, at 
931-32. 
48. In Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), the Court avoided a 
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exceptions in criminal cases to conform with the Confrontation 
Clause, the Court has adapted its views on confrontation to conform 
with the rules of evidence.49 The Court accomplished that feat by 
incorporating traditional hearsay exceptions into its "general 
approach" to confrontation-hearsay analysis. In its 1980 decision in 
Ohio v. Roberts,50 the Court declared that hearsay falling \vithin a 
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception satisfies the Confrontation Clause 
as well. And in the two decades since Roberts, other than the 
"residual" hearsay exception,51 the Court has never found a hearsay 
exception that is not "firmly rooted. "52 As a result, other than hearsay 
Confrontation Clause challenge to hearsay admitted as a statement against interest by 
finding that the hearsay was improperly admitted under Ruic 804(b)(3). See it!. at 605. 
The opinion at least suggests that "genuinely self-inculpatory" statements properly 
falling within the bounds of 804(b)(3) would likewise satisfy Confrontation Clause 
concerns. Id. Perhaps the closest the Court has come to excluding, on constitutional 
grounds, hearsay that would have been admissible under the Federal Rules, was in 
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). There the Court found a Confrontation Clause 
violation where hearsay was admitted under a state "residual exception" identical to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24). Id. at 811-12. But, because it was dealing with a 
state evidentiary ruling, the Court never considered whether the statement was 
properly admitted under the rules of evidence. Had the facts in Wright arisen in a 
federal court, the Court might simply have ruled the statement inadmissible under 
Rule 803(24), and avoided the constitutional issue. 
49. See Douglass, supra note 6, at 211 ("The hearsay 'tail' now wags the 
constitutional 'dog."'); Jonakait, Co11fro111atio11 Clause, supra note 11, at 558 ("The 
confrontation clause is no longer a constitutional right protecting the accused, but 
essentially a minor adjunct to evidence Jaw."). 
50. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
51. Fed. R. Evid. 807. In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 817-18. the Court found that 
Idaho's "residual exception," identical to former Federal Ruic 803(24). was not a 
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception. 
52. The Court's standard for "firm roots" has been generous: 
History, rather than reliability, generally has driven the Court's decisions 
identifying "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. Even the search for 
historically adequate "roots," however, has been Jess than exacting. The 
Court has relied upon a rather amorphous mix of chronological age and 
widespread acceptance-a sort of historical popularity contest. The Court's 
test is so generous that virtually all recognizable hearsay exceptions have 
passed. Applying this approach, the Court has ruled that the exceptions for 
co-conspirator statements, spontaneous declarations, and statements for 
purposes of medical diagnosis are "firmly rooted." In dictum at leas!, the 
Court similarly has recognized the firm roots of the exceptions for public 
records, business records, dying declarations, and prior 1rial lcstimony 
subject to cross-examination. FolJO\ving the Courl's example. federal and 
state appellate courts have been quick to fill in the few remaining gaps, 
finding sufficiently firm roots in the exceptions for recorded recolleciion, 
admissions by an agent, statements regarding the declarant's stale of mind, 
and the res gestae exception. 
Douglass, supra note 6, at 209-10. 
Moreover, given the Court's generous approach 10 idenlifying "firmly rooled" 
exceptions, it is hard to imagine that the Courl would find any of the exccplions 
currently enumerated in the Federal Rules to be lacking "firm roots." Indeed, in the 
Court's view, the presence of a hearsay exceplion among those enumeraled in the 
Federal Rules is a critical factor in determining that the exception has "firm roots." 
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admitted under the residual exception,53 it seems almost certain that 
any hearsay admissible today under the Federal Rules of Evidence is 
likewise admissible under the Confrontation Clause.54 Contrary to 
what many may have anticipated in 1975, the Court has not carved out 
a narrower range of hearsay admissible against criminal defendants. 
When it comes to hearsay falling under the "residual" exception-
the frontier of admissibility under the Federal Rules-the Court gives 
us at least a theoretical basis for applying a more restrictive standard 
in criminal than in civil cases. Under the "general approach" of 
Roberts, hearsay falling outside of a "firmly rooted" exception meets 
Confrontation Clause standards only where it possesses 
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."55 But the Court has 
declined to give any teeth to that standard. In its only treatment of 
residual hearsay under the Confrontation Clause, the Court offered 
no more than a nonexclusive list of factors which might provide such 
"particularized guarantees," and granted trial courts "considerable 
leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors."56 Judging from 
both the number and the language of reported opinions, the lower 
federal courts have used that leeway to admit residual hearsay against 
criminal defendants more frequently, and with no more demanding 
standard for reliability, than they apply in civil cases.57 
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992). See generally Douglass, supra note 
6, at 209 nn.93, 94 (discussing the threshold of what constitutes "firm roots"). 
Of all the enumerated exceptions in the Federal Rules, there remains doubt that 
only one, the 804(b)(3) exception for statements against interest, may not qualify as 
"firmly rooted." In Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999), the Court failed to 
produce a majority on the issue. Four justices found that statements against interest 
by an accomplice that inculpate an accused are not within a firmly rooted exception. 
See id. at 1899. Three argued that the statements at issue were not "genuinely self-
inculpatory" in any event, and declined to reach the question whether the exception 
was "firmly rooted." Id. at 1904-05 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). In its earlier 
opinion in Williamson, a majority of the Court strongly hinted that genuinely self-
inculpatory statements admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) carried the kind of 
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" that would render the exception 
"firmly rooted" under the Roberts formula. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605. 
53. See Fed. R. Evid. 807. 
54. See United States v. Salim, 664 F. Supp. 682, 693 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (Weinstein, 
J.) ("Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence is by now-ten years after 
promulgation by the Court and adoption by Congress-a 'firmly rooted' set of 
hearsay exceptions."); Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 
1702 (7th ed. 1999) ("The Supreme Court has come quite close to holding-if it has 
not in fact held-that a hearsay statement offered against a defendant in a criminal 
case will automatically satisfy the Confrontation Clause if it is admissible under one of 
the Rule 803 exceptions."). 
55. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
56. Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22. 
57. See Raeder, Response, supra note 17, at 508 & n.2. See generally Douglass, 
supra note 6, at 218-19 ("Lower courts searching for 'particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness' have managed only to prove that reliability is in the eye of the 
beholder. . . . As an exclusionary rule that purports to establish a constitutional 
barrier against unreliable hearsay, independent of the law of evidence ... , [Wright] is 
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In sum, the Confrontation Clause does little that the Federal Rules 
of Evidence do not already do to regulate hearsay in criminal trials. 
The constitutional standard and the rules are essentially redundant. 
And, with the few exceptions discussed below, those rules are the 
same in civil and criminal cases. 
b. The Federal Rules of Evidence 
On the surface, the Federal Rules of Evidence lend some support to 
the conventional view that criminal defendants face a more carefully 
restricted range of admissible hearsay than other litigants. After all, 
there are five enumerated hearsay exceptions which limit the 
admission of hearsay more severely in criminal cases than in civil 
cases.58 But, just as with the Confrontation Clause, the appearance of 
a standard favoring criminal defendants is greater than the reality of 
modern hearsay practice. 
Rule 804(b )(2) does not allow a hearsay exception for dying 
declarations in criminal cases other than homicide prosecutions.59 But 
dying declarations are seldom admitted in civil cases either.l"'J And 
their limitation in criminal cases applies whether the declaration is 
offered by the prosecution or defense. Moreover, where the 
government really needs the hearsay of a deceased declarant 
regarding the circumstances of her death, the residual exception can 
erase any limitation imposed by Rule 804(b)(2).M 
The hearsay exception for judgments of previous felony convictions 
does not allow admission, in criminal cases, of a prior judgment 
against someone other than the accused.62 But third party convictions 
too malleable to have much of an effect."); see infra text accompanying notes 90-95. 
58. The five exceptions are Rules 803(8)(8) and (C) (public records), 803(22) 
Gudgments), 804(b)(l) {former testimony), and 804(b)(2) (dying declarations). 
59. The dying declaration exception provides: 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death: 
In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding. a statement 
made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's death was 
imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant 
believed to be his impending death. 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2). 
60. My own Westlaw search for dying declarations cases under 80-t(b)(2) 
produced 43 cases. Only seven were civil cases. Of those. only two admitted the 
hearsay. 
61. See United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959-61 (6th Cir. 1995); Government 
of Virgin [<;lands v. Joseph, 964 F.2d 1380, 1388 (3d Cir. 1992). 
62. The Rule provides in part: 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction: 
Evidence of a final judgment ... adjudging a person guilty of a crime ... to 
prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when 
offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other 
than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(22). The drafters imposed this limit to avoid conflict with Kirby i•. 
United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). See Fed. R. Evid. 803(:!2) ad,•isory committee's 
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are rarely used and seldom relevant in civil cases.63 The principal use 
of Rule 803(22) in civil cases is to admit the prior conviction of a party 
to the civil case in order to establish an element of the civil cause of 
action or defense against the same party. For example, this occurs 
when the victim of an assault sues his already-convicted assailant or an 
insurer offers the property owner's arson conviction in defense of its 
denial of coverage. In any event, even where a third-party judgment 
is relevant, it may face exclusion for reasons other than the hearsay 
rule.64 
Rule 803(8), the hearsay exception for public records and reports, 
contains two limits which apply only in criminal cases. The first, 
803(8)(B), limits the use of police and other law enforcement reports 
in a criminal case.65 As with dying declarations, the limitation applies 
whether the government or the defendant offers the report. For 
practical purposes, then, the limit probably creates more obstacles for 
defendants than for prosecutors. To prosecutors, police generally are 
available and predictably cooperative witnesses. Where a police 
report contains relevant observations, prosecutors typically prefer to 
present that information through the officer's testimony in court, 
rather than through hearsay. Thus, in most cases, Rule 803(8)(B) 
merely confirms the tactical choice most prosecutors would make in 
any event. Moreover, despite what appears to be unequivocal 
language in the Rule, most federal courts have ruled that 803(8)(B) 
allows the report in evidence where the reporting officer testifies in 
person at trial.66 If the officer's report adds detail, enhances 
credibility, or simply reinforces the live testimony, the prosecutor may 
have the option to use the hearsay as well. On the other hand, 
defense counsel are understandably more wary that they may 
note. Kirby was an early Confrontation Clause case where the Court reversed a 
conviction for possession of stolen property. To prove the stolen nature of the 
property, the trial court had admitted in evidence the record showing conviction of 
the thieves. See Kirby, 174 U.S. at 49-50. 
63. There appear to be only a handful of reported civil cases admitting third-party 
convictions under the hearsay exception. See Saltzburg et al., supra note 54, at 1806-09 
(identifying only two such cases among the 17 annotated cases under Rule 803(22)). 
64. See Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1347-49 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding, 
in products liability suit against manufacturer of the vehicle occupied by plaintiff's 
decedent, that the manslaughter conviction of the driver of the other vehicle, though 
admissible under Rule 803(22), should have been excluded under Rule 403 since it 
might have led the jury to the mistaken conclusion that the manufacturer could not be 
liable if the other driver was criminally responsible for the accident). 
65. The Rule provides a hearsay exception for records and reports of public 
agencies setting forth "matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which 
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters 
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel." Fed. R. Evid. 
803(8)(B). 
66. See United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 673-74 (7th Cir. 1980); Saltzburg et al., supra note 54, at 
1685. 
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unwittingly elicit unfavorable details from a police witness. For the 
defense, Rule 803(8)(B) poses the tough choice between calling a 
potentially adverse witness or foregoing favorable hearsay that an 
officer included in her report. 
Rule 803(8)(C) is the hearsay exception for reports of fact finding 
by government agencies.67 Of the five hearsay provisions which 
distinguish criminal from civil cases, 803(8)(C) is probably the only 
one which creates any significant practical advantage for criminal 
defendants in comparison to other litigants. The Rule 803(8)(C) 
hearsay exception receives relatively wide use in civil cases, 
particularly auto accident and products liability cases, where litigants 
offer the findings of government agents-including police-who 
investigate accidents, injuries, and even whole industries.""' The Rule, 
on its face, allows such reports in criminal cases only when offered 
against the government. But two judicial trends have limited the 
advantage which the Rule ostensibly creates for criminal defendants. 
First, even in civil cases, courts often exercise their discretion to redact 
or exclude such reports when they contain opinions, conclusions, or 
findings not clearly supported \vith fact.69 Conversely, despite the 
Rule's apparently unequivocal exclusion of government fact finding 
reports offered against criminal defendants, some courts have 
admitted such reports when they merely record facts observed by 
investigators outside of the "adversarial" process of criminal 
investigation, or when they reach conclusions based on reliable 
scientific methods.70 These two judicial trends have chipped away 
67. The Rule provides a hearsay exception "in civil actions and proceedings and 
against the Government in criminal cases," for public agency reports setting forth 
"factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted 
by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness." Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C). 
68. See, e.g., Simmons v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 993 F2d 1326.1327-28 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (admitting state trooper's accident investigation report in a FELA action); 
Lubanski v. Coleco Indus., 929 F.2d 42, 45-46 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that a police 
officer's report regarding the circumstances of an auto accident may be admissible in 
a resulting products liability action if report's conclusions are trustworthy); Jn re 
Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 871 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1989) (admitting an FAA 
report on an airline's safety record). See generally Saltzburg et al., supra note 54, at 
1769-78 (providing annotations of cases holding evidence admissible when a \\itness is 
"trustworthy"). 
69. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 7'ir7 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(upholding trial court's redaction of diagnosis of mesothelioma from autopsy report 
and hospital records); Faries v. Atlas Truck Body Mfg. Co., 797 F.2d 619, 622-23 (8th 
Cir. 1986) {holding that a police report should not have been admitted where the 
officer did not measure skid marks, based conclusions on statements of interested 
persons, and report lacked corroboration). See generally Saltzburg et al., supra note 
54, at 1783-84 (providing annotations of cases where police reports are admitted in 
civil trials). 
70. See Saltzburg et al., supra note 54, at 1684-85 ("Where the risk of 
manipulation and untrustworthiness is minimal-in particular where the report 
contains unambiguous factual matter made under nonad,•ersarial circumstances-
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much of the advantage that Rule 803(8)(C) otherwise gives a criminal 
defendant by expanding the universe of government fact finding 
reports admissible against him, while narrowing the universe of 
reports admissible in civil cases or against the government.71 
The fifth instance where the hearsay rules distinguish civil from 
criminal cases appears in Rule 804(b )(1 ), the exception for former 
testimony.72 In criminal cases, the Rule allows former testimony only 
where the party against whom it is offered had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony in a former proceeding.73 In 
civil cases, the Rule is only slightly more liberal, allowing former 
testimony even where the opponent of the hearsay was not a party to 
the earlier proceeding, as long as "a predecessor in interest" had an 
opportunity to examine the declarant. But the Rule's more restrictive 
approach in criminal cases has been nullified by judicial interpretation 
of the residual hearsay exception. Under the residual exception, 
federal courts have consistently admitted former testimony offered by 
the government, even where the defendant was not a party to the 
earlier proceeding, as long as the declarant was cross-examined by 
someone-typically a co-conspirator-with a motive and interest 
similar to the defendant's.74 Whatever slight advantage Rule 
Courts have held that the report should be admitted despite the apparently absolute 
language of the Rule."); see also United States v. Enterline, 894 F.2d 287, 288-91 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (admitting a police-created computerized list of vehicles reported stolen): 
United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 79-80 (5th Cir. 1988) (admitting a fingerprint 
card offered to show defendant was a convicted felon); United States v. De Water, 846 
F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1988) (admitting a breathalyzer report). 
71. What remains is a slightly greater willingness of courts in civil cases to admit 
agency findings that sound like opinions or conclusions, as long as they are rendered 
by someone with appropriate experience or expertise, and as long as they rest upon 
sufficient factual support. Still, the current approach to 803(8)(C) is far from one of 
categorical admission of fact finding against civil litigants and prosecutors, and 
categorical exclusion when offered against criminal defendants. 
72. The exception reads in part: 
(1) Former testimony: 
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing ... if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a 
predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop 
the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l). 
73. The legislative history of the Rule reflects that Congress felt it was "generally 
unfair to impose upon the party against whom the hearsay evidence is being offered 
responsibility for the manner in which the witness was previously handled by another 
party." H.R. Rep. No. 93-650 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7088. 
Accordingly, the House rejected a more broadly drafted Rule that would have 
admitted former testimony where any party "with motive and interest similar" to that 
of the party against whom the former testimony is offered had an opportunity to 
examine the witness at the former proceeding. Id. The Conference Committee 
accepted the House amendment. See id. 
74. See United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1046-48 (1st Cir. 1997) (admitting 
testimony from an unrelated gambling trial against a different defendant under the 
residual exception where declarant was cross-examined thoroughly by defense 
attorney in the earlier trial); United States v. Shaw, 69 F.3d 1249, 1253 (4th Cir. 1995) 
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804(b)(l) may have given to criminal defendants, the residual 
exception has taken away. 
c. Judicial Discretion in Admitting Hearsay 
In admitting or excluding hearsay, as with most evidentiary rulings, 
trial courts exercise a range of discretion even when applying 
apparently fixed rules.75 Therefore, even if neither the Confrontation 
Clause nor the Federal Rules of Evidence create any substantial 
hearsay-related advantage for criminal defendants, it remains possible 
that judicial discretion alone might provide that advantage. Perhaps 
courts more often make discretionary "judgment calls" in favor of 
criminal defendants, giving them the benefit of the doubt when 
prosecution hearsay gets near the edge of admissibility.71' 
Admittedly, it is difficult to measure the collective "discretion" of 
hundreds of federal trial judges. Reported opinions may not tell the 
full story.77 And direct case comparisons are difficult, given the 
variety of factual contexts in which hearsay issues arise. Still, we can 
draw some conclusions from what courts say-or do not say-when 
they consider hearsay. If discretion is more limited in admitting 
prosecution hearsay, then we should expect courts to say so on 
occasion. But it is virtually impossible to find opinions in which trial 
courts acknowledge that their discretion to admit hearsay against 
criminal defendants is more limited than in other circumstances.7:\1 It is 
(finding the testimony of since-deceased witness, subject to cross-examination at trial 
of co-conspirator, admissible under the residual exception); United States v. Deeb, 13 
F.3d 1532, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1994) {admitting the testimony subject to cross-
examination at the trial of defendant's accomplices under the residual exception); 
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 7-8 {1st Cir. 1990) (admitting the testimony of 
now-deceased witness from the earlier trial of codefcndants under the residual 
exception). 
75. See United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1015 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[T)he trial 
judge is in the best position to weigh competing interests in deciding whether or not to 
admit certain evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, the decision of the trial judge 
to admit or reject evidence will not be overturned by an appellate court." (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)). Professor Raeder argues that appellate courts too 
readily apply an abuse of discretion standard to uphold evidentiary rulings which 
really concern an issue of law that should be reviewed de novo. See Raeder, Response, 
supra note 17, at 517-18. 
76. Several commentators, including Judge Weinstein, contend that judicial 
discretion plays an important role in placing stricter limits on hearsay when offered 
against criminal defendants. See Weinstein et al., supra note 16, § 802.0-l[3)[b), at 802-
14 to -15; Park, Subject Matter Approach. supra note 9, at 87; Van Kessel, supra note 
2, at 479, 484-85. 
77. Evidentiary rulings often are made during trial, without written opinion. And 
there is no guarantee that the issues which surface in published opinions provide a 
representative sample of hearsay decisions. This is especially true of appellate 
decisions in criminal cases. which, as a general rule, consist only of defense appeals 
from adverse evidentiary rulings. See infra note 96. 
78. My research has disclosed none. Of course, the collective silence of trial 
courts on the issue is not especially surprising. Trial courts issue written opinions in 
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just as hard to find appellate opinions which say that it should be so 
limited. On the other hand, it is quite typical for appellate courts to 
begin their assessment of a trial court's decision to admit prosecution 
hearsay with the familiar refrain that such rulings will not be reversed 
absent an abuse of discretion.79 And that refrain is almost always a 
prelude to an opinion affirming a conviction.80 
Judge Jack B. Weinstein contends that trial judges' discretion to 
admit prosecution hearsay is curtailed because "reversible error is 
found more often in criminal cases when hearsay is improperly 
admitted against a defendant."81 But the only available empirical 
evidence contradicts that assertion. In her 1991 study of federal court 
opinions addressing five hearsay exceptions over a ten-year period, 
Professor Eleanor Swift found reversible errors far more likely in civil 
than in criminal cases.82 According to her study, even in cases where 
appellate courts identified an error in the admission of prosecution 
hearsay, they reversed less than 20% of the time, while affirming most 
cases under the harmless error standard. The rate of reversals where 
errors were identified in civil cases was three times that high.83 My 
own survey of appellate action in post-1991 cases dealing with residual 
hearsay documents a similar reluctance among appellate courts to 
reverse cases where prosecutors have succeeded in offering residual 
hearsay at trial.84 I found reversals in only 6% of such cases. 
In sum, neither the language, the sheer numbers, nor the results of 
published opinions leave us with much hard evidence that trial judges, 
in the exercise of their discretion, apply a more stringent standard to 
prosecution hearsay in criminal cases than to hearsay proffered by 
other litigants. And a closer look at hearsay admitted under the 
residual exception, where judicial discretion is least confined by the 
part to justify their decisions in anticipation of appellate review. 
79. See Swift, Judicial Discretion, supra note 17, at 479 n.17. 
80. See id. at 478. 
81. Weinstein et al., supra note 16, § 802.04[3][b], at 802-14. 
82. See Swift, Judicial Discretion, supra note 17, at 479-80. Professor Swift 
surveyed 237 federal court opinions reporting hearsay rulings under Rules 803(1), (2), 
(3), ( 4), and (6). See id. at 478. 
83. Professor Swift found only three reversals in the 16 criminal cases where 
appellate courts found that the trial court had erred in admitting prosecution hearsay, 
for a reversal rate of 19%. By contrast, of the 21 civil cases where appellate courts 
identified error in admitting hearsay, they reversed twelve, or 57%. See id. at 479-80. 
Professor Park takes issue with Professor Swift's conclusion, arguing that the results 
of her survey show only that "criminal defendants are more likely to appeal from 
harmless errors." Park, Dead or Alive?, supra note 28, at 650 n.13. I believe there is 
more substance to Professor Swift's results. Criminal defendants, just like other 
litigants, have a tactical incentive to choose their best issues for appeal and to jettison 
those which may appear frivolous. And even if it is true that criminal defendants 
have a lower threshold for choosing issues to raise on appeal, the collective message 
sent to trial courts when over 80% of erroneous evidentiary rulings are nonetheless 
affirmed seems unmistakable. 
84. See infra note 93. 
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Rules of Evidence, suggests that prosecutors may be the most 
frequent beneficiaries of judicial judgment calls.85 
2. Hearsay's Frontiers: Where Criminal Defendant's Face the Most 
Troublesome, and Often the Most Critical, Hearsay 
So far, we have seen that the three principal safeguards which might 
limit prosecution hearsay more strictly than hearsay in general do not 
impose much of a limit. The Confrontation Clause largely mimics the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, and those Rules create few meaningful 
limits that are unique to prosecution hearsay. To the extent that we 
can measure the impact of judicial discretion in the application of 
those Rules, there is no evidence that criminal defendants enjoy any 
advantage over other litigants. 
But in order to appreciate fully the hearsay challenges facing 
criminal defendants, we should take one further step. Perhaps the 
best way to measure the relative impact of hearsay on criminal 
defendants is to look at hearsay's frontiers-the rules and judicial 
opinions which expand admissible hearsay beyond traditional limits. 
It is important to consider the fringes of admissible hearsay for two 
reasons. First, at least from the perspective of traditional evidence 
law, such hearsay poses the greatest risks. After all, if traditional 
hearsay exceptions rest upon reasonable assessments of reliability, 
then the further courts stray from the core of traditional exceptions, 
the less reliable such hearsay becomes.86 Second, proponents typically 
offer "fringe" hearsay because they really need it. Courts allow it for 
the same reason: it is critical to the proponent's case and there is no 
available substitute.87 In other words, courts typically admit new and 
controversial forms of hearsay where both the risks and the needs for 
such hearsay are high.88 And if the stakes are high, then so is the 
defendant's need for adequate tools to contest such hearsay, including 
the tool of discovery. 
85. See infra notes 89-116 and accompanying text. 
86. Whether traditional categorical exceptions actually measure "reliability" in 
any reliable fashion, of course, is subject to debate. See supra note 3. 
87. In fact, the residual exception requires that hearsay be important to qualify for 
admission. The exception applies where "the statement is more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts." Fed. R Evid. 807(B). 
88. Perhaps the clearest modern examples of need-driven expansions of 
traditional hearsay limits are (1) the admission of out-of-court statements by children 
regarding acts of abuse, and (2) the admission of grand jury testimony of unavailable 
prosecution witnesses. The first has evolved from both legislative and judicial action 
aimed primarily at expanding the limits of the traditional exceptions for "excited 
utterances" and statements for purposes of mec.iical diagnosis. See infra text 
accompanying notes 122-27. The second is the product of a generous. and 
controversial, interpretation of the residual exception. See infra text accompanying 
notes 100-01. In both instances, prosecutors have been the impetus for the expansion 
of admissible hearsay. 
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Under the Federal Rules, much of hearsay's frontier is occupied by 
the residual exception, where the absence of categorical limits leaves 
more room for judicial adventurism.89 But far from suggesting that 
courts apply stricter limits to hearsay in criminal cases, federal cases 
applying the residual exception suggest exactly the opposite. Based 
on the number of reported cases, prosecutors appear to be the most 
prolific users of the residual exception at trial.90 And, statistically 
speaking, they are the most successful. A 1991 survey of residual 
hearsay cases found that prosecutors succeeded in 81 % of the 
reported cases where they offered hearsay under the residual 
exception.91 Civil litigants fared roughly half as well, while criminal 
defendants succeeded in only 15% of their efforts to use the residual 
exception.92 My own survey of residual hearsay opinions since 199193 
89. Rule 807, the "residual exception," applies to "statement[s] not specifically 
covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness." Fed. R. Evid. 807. Courts have a considerable range of discretion 
in determining what statements are sufficiently reliable under this standard. See 
Weinstein et al., supra note 16, 807.03[2][a], at 807-12. In theory, the Confrontation 
Clause limits that discretion more severely when prosecutors offer hearsay. See Idaho 
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814-15 (1990). In practice, there seems to be little difference 
between the Rule's requirement of equivalent "circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness" and the constitutional requirement that non-"firmly rooted" hearsay 
possess "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." See Douglass, supra note 6, at 
216-17 & n.142. Few angels could dance along the thread that separates the two 
standards. 
90. See Raeder, Response, supra note 17, at 508 n.2. Professor Raeder surveyed 
408 reported residual hearsay cases from federal courts from 1975 through July 1, 
1991. Prosecutors offered residual hearsay in 171 cases. Civil plaintiffs were a distant 
second with 113 cases. See id. 
91. See id. Most of the cases included in Professor Raeder's survey were decided 
before the Supreme Court's opinion in Idaho v. Wright, a case that certainly held the 
potential to cut back on successful use of residual hearsay by prosecutors. But Wright 
seems not to have stemmed prosecutors' tide of success. My own survey of post-1991 
cases produced results every bit as favorable to prosecutors as Professor Raeder's. See 
infra note 93. 
92. See Raeder, Response, supra note 17, at 508 n.2. Taking into account the final 
outcome of cases after appeal, Professor Raeder found that prosecutors ultimately 
succeeded in offering residual hearsay in 138of171 cases, for a success rate of 81 %. 
In stark contrast, criminal defendants succeeded in only 11 of 75 cases, a success rate 
of 15%. Civil plaintiffs succeeded in 43% of cases (49of113), while civil defendants 
succeeded 43% of the time (24 of 49). See id. 
93. In order to determine whether the trends identified by Professor Raeder were 
still apparent, my research assistant, Michael Gryzlov, performed a Lexis search for 
residual hearsay cases since July 1991, the cutoff date for Professor Raeder's survey, 
using a search request of "[807 or 804(b)(5) or 803(24)] w/10 hearsay." The request 
initially generated over 400 cases. After excluding irrelevant cases and those where 
the residual hearsay exception was only an alternative grounds for the court's ruling, I 
tabulated the results from the first 100 cases where the court made a definitive ruling 
under the residual hearsay exception. Of those 100 cases, 82 involved rulings on 
residual hearsay offered at trial. The remaining cases involved residual hearsay 
offered in connection with motions for summary judgment or motions for preliminary 
injunctions in civil cases. The final results of the survey are based on those 82 rulings 
where residual hearsay was offered at trial and no other hearsay exception applied. 
In order to distinguish the impact of appellate action, I further divided the sample. 
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confirms that prosecutors may still be the most prolific users of 
residual hearsay at trial.94 And these more recent cases suggest an 
even higher rate of success for prosecutors.95 
Admittedly, factors unrelated to judicial views on hearsay skew 
these statistically apparent success rates in favor of prosecutors.96 
There were 70 cases with opinions from a United States Court of Appeals, and 12 
cases where we identified a trial court ruling with no record of appellate action. The 
following tables reflect the results: 
R "d alH es1 u earsav ere at n 
-
DOC ate m1mons Off d T "al A II 0 .. 
Proponent #Cases Fed. Dist. Ct. U.S. Ct. A1m. Success Rate 
Admits Excludes Error Reverses Adm. Total 
Civil Plaintiff 7 3 0 0 3n 43% 
4 0 0 
Civil Defendant 9 5 1 1 419 44% 
4 0 0 
Criminal Pros. 35 7 2 33135 94% 
0 0 0 
Criminal Def. 19 0 0 0 
19 1 1 1119 5% 
es1 u R "d alH earsav ere at rm - o .one ate 1om1ons Off d T . l N A II 0 . . 
Proponent #Cases Fed. Dist. Ct. U.S. Ct. Agg. Success Rate 
Admits Excludes Error Reverses Adm. Total 
Civil Plaintiff 7 4 3 4n 57% 
Civil Defendant 3 1 2 1/3 33% 
Criminal Pros. 1 1 0 1/1 100% 
Criminal Def. 1 0 1 0/1 0% 
Residual Hearsav Offered at Trial-All Cases 
Proponent #Cases Fed. Dist. Ct. U.S. Ct. Agg. Success Rate 
Admits Excludes Error Reverses Adm. Total 
Civil Plaintiff 14 7n4 50% 
Civil Defendant 12 5112 42% 
Criminal Pros. 36 34136 94% 
Criminal Def. 20 1120 50• lo 
94. My survey identified 70 appellate opinions and 12 district court opinions ruling 
on hearsay offered at trial under the residual exception. Of those 82 opinions, 36 
(44% of the total) were cases where prosecutors were the offering party. Criminal 
defendants and both classes of civil litigants trailed far behind. Criminal defendants 
offered residual hearsay in 20 cases (24%). Civil plaintiffs were proponents in 14 
cases (17%) while civil defendants offered residual hearsay in only 12 cases (15%). 
95. My survey showed prosecutors succeeding in an astounding 94% of reported 
cases where they were the proponents of residual hearsay. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, criminal defendants succeeded as proponents only 5% of the time. Chil 
litigants fell squarely in the middle, with plaintiffs succeeding in 50% of cases where 
they were the proponent and defendants succeeding 42% of the time. 
96. The biggest problem with empirical comparisons, at least those involving 
appellate decisions, is that in criminal cases the government cannot appeal from an 
adverse evidentiary ruling at trial. As a result, essentially all appellate opinions 
dealing with hearsay in criminal cases arise where the defendant lost the issue at trial, 
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Still, the statistics offer clear support for at least one important 
conclusion: federal prosecutors seldom see their trial victories 
reversed based upon erroneous admission of prosecution hearsay 
under the residual exception.97 Application of the harmless error 
doctrine accounts for a fair percentage of prosecution victories.98 But 
the greater number of appeals, typically citing the "abuse of 
discretion" standard of review, simply find no error in admitting 
residual hearsay offered by the government. Thus, at a minimum, the 
statistics cast serious doubt on the conventional assumption that trial 
courts face stricter limits on discretion in admitting "fringe" hearsay 
offered by prosecutors. 
Looking beyond statistics, there is further evidence that federal 
either because the trial court admitted prosecution hearsay or excluded hearsay 
tendered by the defense. That was true of all of the 70 appellate decisions which my 
survey identified. The cases where the defendant prevailed in offering or opposing 
hearsay at trial are never presented on appeal. Civil litigants, like criminal 
defendants, are free to appeal adverse hearsay rulings. Therefore, if we judge the 
relative success rate of the parties only by review of appellate decisions, our statistical 
success rates will be skewed. We have no way to tell how many defense "successes" 
and government "failures" in criminal trials have been screened out of our sample of 
cases by the government's inability to appeal. This factor alone probably accounts for 
much of the difference among the statistically apparent success rates of prosecutors, 
criminal defendants and civil litigants. 
In an effort to account for this appellate "screening" factor in criminal cases, my 
own survey looked separately at federal district court opinions. Unfortunately, the 
vast majority of reported district court opinions on residual hearsay are in civil cases, 
primarily cases where the court addresses residual hearsay in ruling on a summary 
judgment motion or motion for preliminary injunction. Of the 100 cases surveyed, 
only two were district court opinions addressing residual hearsay at trial in criminal 
cases. True to form, the government succeeded as proponent of the hearsay in one, 
while the defendant failed as proponent in the other. 
From my own experience as an Assistant United States Attorney, I also believe a 
fair amount of "screening" of inadmissible hearsay occurs in the prosecutor's office 
before trial. Sensible prosecutors seek to avoid creation of serious appealable issues 
that might result in reversal and retrial. By contrast, because the government cannot 
appeal from an acquittal, defense counsel has the opposite incentive when it comes to 
hearsay. If the hearsay is favorable, his incentive is to offer it, no matter how 
debatable its admissibility. Accordingly, in comparison to defense counsel, 
prosecutors screen more inadmissible, or seriously debatable, hearsay before it is even 
offered in evidence. 
But, in a different way, this "screening" factor may only highlight the importance of 
the generous attitude that federal courts seem to take with residual hearsay offered by 
prosecutors. Prosecutors are less likely to "screen" their own hearsay in those cases 
where they need it most. In other words, they are more likely to "push the envelope" 
with debatable hearsay in those cases where they most need the hearsay to prove 
guilt. Those are the very cases where judicial scrutiny ought to be most exacting. Yet 
the high rate of prosecution success with residual hearsay suggests the opposite. 
Courts seem quite generous in admitting important prosecution hearsay under the 
residual exception. 
97. My survey found 35 appellate decisions reviewing a trial court's admission of 
prosecution hearsay under the residual exception. Only two ended in reversal. See 
supra note 93. 
98. The appellate court found error 7 of the 35 appeals in the sample surveyed. 
The harmless error doctrine saved five out of seven convictions. See supra note 93. 
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courts admit "fringe" hearsay most readily at the behest of 
prosecutors. The admission of grand jury testimony from unavailable 
witnesses is probably the clearest example of judicial adventurism at 
hearsay's frontier.99 Practically without exception, courts make that 
departure in admitting hearsay against criminal defendants.100 Grand 
jury testimony no doubt represents one of the riskier classes of 
hearsay admitted under the residual exception. It lacks the principal 
guarantee of trustworthiness required to admit former testimony 
under the traditional hearsay exception: prior examination by the 
opposing party. Grand jury testimony is obtained in secret, in an ex 
parte proceeding, and by a prosecutor whose principal aim often is to 
develop evidence that a particular target committed a particular 
crime. Yet, in an increasing number of cases, federal courts have 
found adequate "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" in 
grand jury testimony to satisfy both the residual exception and the 
Confrontation Clause.101 
99. By admitting grand jury testimony under the residual exception, courts 
circumvent the limit which Rule 804(b)(l) imposes on former testimony, namely, the 
requirement that the opponent had an opportunity to examine the witness in the 
earlier proceeding. Professor Jonakait argues that admission of grand jury testimony 
under the residual exception subverts the basic framework of the Federal Rules, by 
ignoring the clear limits Congress intended to place on hearsay under the "former 
testimony" exception. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Tlze Subversion ofr/ze Hearsay Rule: 
Tlze Residual Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstalllial Guaramees of Tmstwortlziness, and 
Grand Jury Testimony, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 431, 441 (1986). Judge Sarokin made 
a similar argument in rejecting government efforts to admit grand jury testimony: 
"[I]f we allow the residual exception to relax Rule 804(b)(l)'s fairness inquiry and 
admit 'trustworthy' grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(5), we have allowed the 
residual exception to subvert 804(b)(l)'s purpose." United States v. Vigoa, 656 F. 
Supp.1499, 1505 (D.NJ.1987), affd, 857 F.2d 1467 (3d Cir. 1988). 
100. My own survey of 100 post-1991 cases found 11 cases where the prosecution 
succeeded in offering grand jury testimony of an unavailable declarant. I found none 
where criminal defendants or civil litigants succeeded. Civil cases, of course, seldom 
relate to matters which involve a grand jury investigation. And, even where civil and 
criminal cases pertain to the same subject matter, rules of grand jury secrecy• can 
prevent civil litigants from gaining access to grand jury transcripts. See Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 6(e). 
101. See, e.g., United States v. Earles, 113 F3d 796, 799-802 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that the totality of circumstances can create enough trustworthiness to make the 
hearsay admissible); United States v. McHan, 101 F3d 1027, 1037-38 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(same); Curro v. United States, 4 F.3d 436, 437 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); United States 
v. Kladouris, 964 F.2d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to exclude the testimony 
simply because the witness was not cross-examined); United States v. Panzardi-
Lespier, 918 F.2d 313, 316-17 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding evidence admissible after 
"exhaustive factual analysis" of "the encompassing circumstances of the case"); 
United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 652-55 (1st Cir. 1990) (same). One 
commentator remarked, "The admission of grand jury testimony under Rule 
804(b)(5) is a widespread practice, constituting what has become virtually another 
enumerated exception." Joseph W. Rand, Note, Tlze Residual Exceptions to r/ze 
Federal Hearsay Rule: The Futile and Misguided Auempr to Restrain Judicial 
Discretion, 80 Geo. L.J. 873, 902 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
That observation may be a bit overstated. There are still a handful of cases where 
courts have reversed convictions, typically on Confrontation Clause grounds, based 
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The receptiveness of federal courts to prosecution hearsay from 
unavailable government witnesses has not been limited to grand jury 
testimony. Despite Rule 804(b )(1 )'s explicit limitation on former 
testimony offered against criminal defendants,102 prosecutors have 
consistent success in offering hearsay from prior judicial proceedings 
where someone-whether or not related to the defendant-had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant,103 and sometimes where-
as in the grand jury-there was really no adversarial examination at 
all.104 In addition, federal courts have proved remarkably flexible in 
their application of the residual exception to hearsay gathered by 
police with an eye toward criminal prosecution. A number of cases 
admit such statements from crime victims, eye witnesses, and even 
accomplices, even though such hearsay often bears little resemblance 
to statements admissible under traditional exceptions.105 
Of course some civil cases "push the envelope" under the residual 
exception as well.106 But such cases seem fewer in number than those 
upon erroneous admission of grand jury testimony under the residual exception. See, 
e.g., United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326, 330-32 (6th Cir. 1991) (reversing a 
conviction on Confrontation Clause grounds when a co-conspirator's grand jury 
testimony was admitted into evidence when the co-conspirator refused to testify at 
trial); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1272-74 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversing a 
conviction because a co-conspirator's grand jury testimony was erroneously 
admitted). 
102. See supra note 72. 
103. See United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1046-48 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming 
a gambling conviction where the trial court admitted testimony from an unrelated 
gambling trial where the defendant was not present); United States v. Shaw, 69 F.3d 
1249, 1253-54 (4th Cir. 1995) (admitting te&timony from the trial of defendant's co-
conspirators which occurred while the defendant was a fugitive); United States v. 
Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1994) (admitting testimony from co-
conspirator's trial where witness was subject to cross-examination by co-defendants); 
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1990) (admitting the testimony of a 
deceased witness from the trial of co-defendants). 
104. See United States v. Seavoy, 995 F.2d 1414, 1418-20 (7th Cir. 1993) (admitting 
unavailable accomplice's testimony from guilty plea proceeding). 
105. See, e.g., United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 393-94 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(finding statements made to government investigators by defendant's daughters were 
properly admitted under residual exception); United States v. Bradley, 145 F.3d 889, 
894-96 (7th Cir. 1998) (approving admission, under residual exception and 
Confrontation Clause, of hearsay statement made by the defendant's wife to police 
detective, since statement describing domestic violence was made while events were 
fresh in her mind, she knew police would investigate and attempt to confirm her 
statement, she made statement voluntarily, and she never recanted); United States v. 
Accetturo, 966 F.2d 631, 635-36 (11th Cir. 1992) (admitting deceased victim's 
voluntary, written statements to police); United States v. Ellis, 951 F.2d 580, 583-84 
(4th Cir. 1991) (admitting deceased accomplice's statements to prosecutors and 
investigators pursuant to plea agreement). 
106. See, e.g .. Brookover v. Mary Hitchcock Mem'l Hosp., 893 F.2d 411, 420-21 (1st 
Cir. 1990) (admitting the testimony of patient's mother in a medical malpractice case 
concerning patient's disclosure of his futile efforts to summon help from nurses); 
Robinson v. Shapiro, 646 F.2d 734, 741-43 (2d Cir. 1981) (admitting testimony of co-
worker who reported hearing deceased declarant's statements about conditions which 
later led to fatal accident). 
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admitting prosecution hearsay.107 Where parallels can be drawn 
between civil and criminal cases, the results seem to confirm the 
notion that prosecutors hold the advantage over other litigants. For 
example, in contrast to the generally favorable treatment of grand jury 
testimony offered by prosecutors, the one court which has addressed 
the issue in a civil case was far less receptive to such hearsay. 1v~ In 
contrast to criminal cases admitting the statements of unavailable 
declarants to police during investigation, hearsay statements obtained 
by investigators seem less readily admissible under the residual 
exception in civil cases.109 Extrajudicial statements of deceased or 
unavailable victims and witnesses, though occasionally admitted under 
the residual exception in civil actions,110 certainly receive no more 
favorable treatment than in criminal cases.111 
107. My survey found only 12 cases admitting residual hearsay al trial in civil cases, 
compared to 34 cases where prosecutors succeeded in offering residual hearsay. More 
often in civil cases, courts encountered residual hearsay tendered in connection with 
motions for summary judgment or for preliminary injunctions. My survey found 18 
such cases out of the sample of 100. See supra note 93. 
108. In excluding the hearsay, the court wrote: 
[T]he grand jury testimony does not have the requisite circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness required by Rule 807. The grand jury 
proceeding is the government's show. The government calls the witnesses, 
frames the questions, and presents only testimony that is fa\'orable to the 
government's theory of the case. The government is under no obligation to 
and, as a general rule, does not ask questions that might be exculpatory to 
the target of the grand jury investigation. The government may frame the 
questions in a way that even neutral testimony appears inculpatory. If the 
questions posed by the prosecutor are framed in a way that violates the rules 
of evidence, there is no one there to object, much less to make a ruling. 
Moreover, a grand jury witness knows that he is not going to be subjected to 
cross-examination and that his testimony will not be made public. 
In re Industrial Silicon Antitrust Litig., No. 95-2104, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20459, at 
*9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998). 
109. Compare, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F2d 411, 414-
15 (5th Cir. 1985) (in civil case, excluding statements made in an interview with 
government lawyers pursuant to a grant of immunity), and Land v. American Mut. 
Ins. Co., 582 F. Supp. 1484, 1485-89 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (in civil case, excluding 
statements of deceased victim of personal injuries made to an insurance claims 
adjuster), with Bradley, 145 F.3d at 894-95 (admitting hearsay statement of 
defendant's wife to police}, and Accetturo, 966 F2d at 634-36 (affirming conviction 
where trial court admitted hearsay statements made by unavailable dcclarant to 
government agents and finding that the declaranl's expectation that agents would 
conduct further investigation to corroborate his statements is an indicator of the 
statements' reliability), and Ellis, 951 F.2d at 582-84 (affirming conviction where trial 
court admitted statements made to government investigators pursuant to cooperation 
agreement). 
110. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1079-81 (7th Cir. 1992) (alleging 
child abuse, in civil case, at an Air Force day care center. admitting hearsay 
statements of children to their parents). Interestingly, the court in Doe relied almost 
exclusively on earlier criminal cases to reach its result. See also Nowell ''· Universal 
Elec. Co., 792 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1986) (admitting a \vidow's testimony that 
her husband told her an empty varnish drum, which exploded and injured husband, 
came from the defendant); Crawford v. City of Kansas City, 952 F. Supp. 1467, 1472-
73 (D. Kan. 1997) (admitting hearsay statements, in a civil case, of deceased security 
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Criminal defendants fare the worst of all litigants in offering 
hearsay under the residual exception. Defendants have very limited 
success in offering hearsay statements gathered during investigation 
by police. n 2 Hearsay statements made to defense investigators 
seldom find their way into criminal trials. n3 Remarkably, defendants 
have less success than prosecutors when they offer hearsay out of the 
grand jury, even though a prosecutor was present and questioned the 
declarant in that setting.114 Finally, defendants have almost no success 
under the residual exception in offering their own out-of-court 
guard made during police internal affairs investigation). 
111. Compare Wilander v. McDermott Int'!, Inc., 887 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(excluding accident witness's hearsay statement made in anticipation of litigation), 
affd 498 U.S. 337 (1991), and Katona v. Federal Express Corp., No. 95-Civ. 10951 
(JFK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3496, at *9-*16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1998) (in civil case, 
excluding deceased declarant's statements to his wife regarding circumstances of 
accident), and Land, 582 F. Supp. at 1487-89 (in civil action, excluding accident 
victim's statements to claims adjuster), with Bradley, 145 F.3d at 894-97 (admitting 
wife's statement to police who responded to her 911 call regarding abuse), and United 
States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 392-94 (4th Cir. 1998) (admitting statements of 
defendants' daughters to government investigators), and United States v. Rouse, 111 
F.3d 561, 569-70 (8th Cir. 1997) (admitting statements of alleged child abuse victims 
to FBI agent). 
112. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1395-96 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(affirming trial court's ruling to exclude two FBI 302 reports of unavailable 
declarants' descriptions of bank robber); United States v. Colson, 662 F.2d 1389, 1392 
(11th Cir. 1981) (excluding taped statements between witness and police in which 
witness claimed he procured false testimony against defendant). 
113. See United States v. Gaines, 969 F.2d 692, 697-99 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming 
conviction where trial court excluded defense investigator's testimony regarding 
statements of defendant's husband). But cf United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 
545, 547-49 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing conviction where trial court declined to admit 
videotaped interviews of defense investigator with later-deported aliens where aliens 
were under oath and defense offered government opportunity to attend and 
participate in interviews). 
114. When defendants offer exculpatory grand jury testimony, they rely most often 
on Rule 804(b)(l), the former testimony exception. Under the Supreme Court's 
ruling in United States v. Salemo, 505 U.S. 317, 320-25 (1992), grand jury testimony 
may meet the requirements of 804(b)(l) where, under the particular facts of the case, 
it appears that the prosecutor had a "similar motive" to develop the testimony in the 
grand jury. See id. at 322. Defendants appear to have failed more often than they 
have succeeded in meeting that test. Compare United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 
522-24 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming conviction where trial court excluded exculpatory 
grand jury testimony offered by defense), and United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 
912 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no "similar motive" in the Salemo case upon remand from 
the Supreme Court), and United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(finding the exclusion of grand jury testimony proper after examining the prosecutor's 
"motive and interest"), with United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(suggesting grand jury testimony offered by the defense will almost always meet the 
"similar motive" test). Somewhat surprisingly, defendants typically fail to raise, or 
courts fail to address, the residual exception as an alternative theory of admissibility. 
Salemo never addressed the residual exception. See Salemo, 505 U.S. at 320-25; see 
also Omar, 104 F.3d at 523-24 (noting that defendant failed to pursue admissibility 
under residual exception, apparently because the testimony was unlikely to be viewed 
as reliable). 
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statements or those of their accomplices.11s And the residual 
exception has done little to overcome the traditional reluctance of the 
law of evidence to admit hearsay "confessions" of unavailable 
declarants offered to exculpate the accused.116 
The success of prosecutors at the fringes of admissible hearsay is 
evident not just in residual hearsay cases, but in cases dealing with 
traditional hearsay exceptions as well. Co-conspirator statements are 
among the most widely used form of hearsay117 for federal 
prosecutors. For decades, federal courts followed the traditional rule 
requiring independent evidence of conspiracy as a foundation for 
admitting co-conspirator statements.118 But the Supreme Court eased 
that limitation in 1987, accepting the view of the Department of 
Justice that the Federal Rules of Evidence allowed a trial court to 
consider the hearsay statement itself as part of the foundation for 
admissibility.119 As a result, co-conspirator statements can effectively 
create their own basis for admission. This expansion of traditional 
hearsay boundaries benefits prosecutors almost exclusively. Criminal 
defendants make almost no use of the co-conspirator exception.120 
And civil litigants offer co-conspirator statements much less 
frequently than prosecutors.121 
The modern expansion of two other traditional hearsay exceptions 
has come largely at the behest of prosecutors. The last two decades 
have witnessed a significant increase in judicial acceptance of out-of-
court statements made by crime victims, especially victims who are 
115. See, e.g., United States v. Washington. 106 F.3d 983, 999-1002 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(affirming conviction where trial court excluded defendant's out-of-court statement to 
a friend); United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785. 796-98 (7th Cir. 1988) (excluding 
statements of two alleged co-conspirators in interview with prosecutor and agents); 
United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 990-91 (3d Cir. 1985) (excluding defense-offered 
hearsay statement of accomplice made to informant after accomplice became aware 
of investigation); United States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277. 1285 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(holding trial court properly excluded taped phone conversation in which defendant, 
aware he was under investigation, made exculpatory statements). 
116. Rule 804(b)(3), the exception for statements against interest, sets a higher 
standard for admissibility where such statements are offered to exculpate the accused. 
If a statement fails to meet that standard, it almost certainly would not satisfy Rule 
807's demand for "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." 
117. See Fed. R. Evict. 801(d)(2)(E) (defining co-conspirator statements as "not 
hearsay"). 
118. See Glasser v. United States. 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942). The traditional rule 
requiring independent evidence was said to prevent hearsay statements from creating 
their own foundation for admissibility, that is, pulling themselves up by their own 
"bootstraps." Id. at 75. 
119. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176-81 (1987). 
120. The exception applies to statements made by co-conspirators of the opposing 
party. In theory, a criminal defendant could invoke the exception only where the 
declarant had "conspired" with the United States Government. 
121. While the co-conspirator hearsay "exception" certainly applies in civil cases, 
the vast majority of reported 801(d)(2)(E) cases are criminal cases. See Saltzburg et 
al., supra note 54, at 1586-1625 (collecting cases); Weinstein et al., supra note 16, at§§ 
801-807 (same). 
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unavailable to testify at trial.122 The trend is most pronounced in 
criminal cases where prosecutors offer hearsay statements from young 
children reporting incidents of sexual abuse, 123 but it extends as well to 
statements of adult victims of spousal abuse, sexual assaults, and other 
crimes.124 Prosecutors enjoy a remarkable rate of success when they 
offer such hearsay.125 In large measure, that success rests upon the 
judicial expansion of the hearsay exceptions for excited utterances and 
statements for purposes of medical diagnosis in ways which clearly 
depart from traditional limits.126 At least in the federal courts, that 
departure principally serves to increase the range of hearsay 
admissible against criminal defendants.127 
With respect to another traditional hearsay exception, statements 
against interest, 128 federal courts have ventured more cautiously 
122. See Swift, Judicial Discretion, supra note 17, at 490-92. 
123. See id. at 490-501. The residual exception also accounts for the admission of a 
great deal of child-victim hearsay offered by prosecutors. See, e.g., United States v. 
Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 569-70 (8th Cir. 1997) (allowing admission of testimony of FBI 
agent of what three child victims said during initial interview). See generally Saltzburg 
et al., supra note 54, at 1951-53 (collecting cases). 
124. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(admitting rape victim's statements to her doctor about the circumstances of the 
assault). 
125. See Swift, Judicial Discretion, supra note 17, at 490-501. 
126. See id. at 492-98. In fact, the Supreme Court's general approach to hearsay 
under the Confrontation Clause may actually have encouraged the expansion of 
traditional hearsay exceptions like those for excited utterances or statements for 
purposes of medical diagnosis. By effectively exempting hearsay within "firmly 
rooted" exceptions from further Sixth Amendment scrutiny, the Court has given 
litigants and lower courts an incentive to "pigeonhole" new forms of hearsay within 
"firmly rooted" exceptions by expanding the boundaries of those exceptions. 
Douglass, supra note 6, at 211 & n.108. See generally Allison C. Goodman, Note, Two 
Critical Evidentiary Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Closed-Circuit Testimony by 
Child Victims and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 855 (1995) 
(exploring evidentiary issues in child sexual abuse cases in the context of the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment). 
127. Perhaps because federal courts handle few civil cases alleging sexual abuse of 
children, there are comparatively few federal civil cases using the expanded 
exceptions to admit victims' hearsay statements. In at least one federal case, a civil 
plaintiff profited from the same expansion of traditional hearsay limits, though she 
did so by relying on precedent from criminal cases where similar hearsay was offered 
by prosecutors. See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948-50 (4th Cir. 1988). In 
another federal civil case, the Seventh Circuit relied on the residual exception to 
reach a similar result. See Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1079-82 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
128. The exception provides: 
(3) Statement Against Interest. 
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the 
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the 
declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's 
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A 
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances 
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
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toward hearsay's frontier.129 Still, they have opened the door, if only 
partially, to a class of hearsay that poses unique challenges to criminal 
defendants: an accomplice's self-inculpatory statements that also 
incriminate the defendant. Typically, such cases begin when an 
accomplice gives a full or partial confession shortly after his arrest 
and, in the process, implicates his partner in crime. The hearsay-
confrontation issue arises when the accomplice fails to testify in 
person at his partner's trial.130 When the Federal Rules were enacted, 
there were few reported cases where prosecutors even attempted to 
offer an accomplice's hearsay under the exception for statement's 
against penal interest.131 At that time, it was unclear whether such 
statements could be admitted under any circumstances without 
violating the Confrontation Clause.132 The Supreme Court has since 
reviewed three cases where trial courts admitted accomplice hearsay 
as statements against interest, ruling that the hearsay should have 
been excluded in each case.133 Nevertheless, the Court has declined to 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). 
129. Contrary to the judicial trend toward expanding other hearsay exceptions, the 
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest has retained somewhat stricter 
limits. In Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (199.t), the Court held that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), the federal version of the exception for 
statements against interest, applies only to those portions of a narrative which are 
"genuinely self-inculpatory" and not to other "collateral" portions of the same 
statement. Id. at 600-01. 
130. In Lilly v. Virginia.119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999), for example, the confrontation issue 
arose when the defendant's brother gave a videotaped statement to police, 
implicating the defendant as the shooter in a homicide. At trial, Lilly's brother 
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court permitted the prosecution to 
offer the videotaped statement in evidence, over Lilly's Confrontation Clause 
objection. See id. at 1894-1900. 
131. In part, this was because the common-law exception for statements against 
interest, as applied in federal courts, extended only to statements against pecuniary 
interest, not statements against penal interest. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 
243, 273 (1913). The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 80-t(b)(3) reports several 
state decisions expanding the exception to cover statements against penal interest, but 
mentions no federal decisions to that effect. 
132. As late as 1986, the Supreme Court gave reason to conclude that the Sixth 
Amendment might categorically prohibit use of an accomplice's hearsay statement 
implicating the accused, absent cross-examination of the accomplice. See Lee v. 
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) ("[W]hen one person accuses another of a crime 
under circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the 
accusation is presumptively suspect and must be subjected to the scrutiny of cross-
examination."). 
In the process of enacting the Federal Rules, the House inserted an amendment 
that would have rendered inadmissible an accomplice's out-of-court statement 
implicating both himself and the accused. The amendment was added to codify the 
Confrontation Clause principle established in Bruton \'. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 
135-37 (1968). The Conference Committee deleted the provision, preferring to leave 
development of constitutional limits to the courts. See S. Rep. No. 93-1277 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7068. 
133. See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1887, 1898-1901 (reversing state conviction on 
Confrontation Clause grounds because trial court admitted nontestifying accomplice's 
videotaped statement inculpating accused); Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605 (holding 
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adopt a categorical approach excluding such statements. Indeed, Lilly 
v. Virginia, 134 the Court's most recent foray into the murky world of 
accomplice hearsay, produced no majority for any approach. The 
Court's fragmented opinion leaves lower courts with considerable 
leeway to admit "genuinely self-inculpatory" hearsay statements from 
accomplices.135 Accordingly, Lilly may do little to curb the trend of 
lower federal courts to admit accomplice hearsay at the behest of 
prosecutors where they can show such statements are "genuinely" 
self-inculpatory, or where they can show other "guarantees of 
trustworthiness."136 By contrast, criminal defendants have had 
comparatively little success in offering self-inculpatory hearsay from 
their non testifying accomplices. Indeed, Rule 804(b )(3) itself imposes 
stricter limits on such hearsay when offered to exculpate a 
defendant.137 And civil litigants have comparatively few occasions to 
accomplice's blame-shifting statements were not "genuinely self-inculpatory" and 
therefore not properly admissible under Rule 804(b)(3)); Lee, 476 U.S. at 539-47 
(1986) (finding Confrontation Clause violation where the trial court admitted 
accomplice's confession inculpating defendant). 
134. 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999). 
135. Williamson held that "genuinely self-inculpatory" statements are admissible 
under Rule 804(b)(3). Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605. And the Williamson Court further 
observed, "the very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory ... is itself one 
of the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' that makes a statement 
admissible under the Confrontation Clause." Id. lilly does not disturb that finding. 
In his concurring opinion joined by two other Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist holds 
out the possibility that "genuinely self-inculpatory" statements of accomplices might 
fit a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception and thereby satisfy the Confrontation Clause 
without further inquiry. See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1904-05 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
Justice Thomas agrees that "the Clause does not impose a 'blanket ban on the 
government's use of accomplice statements that incriminate a defendant."' Id. at 1903 
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' opinion for the four-member plurality 
contends that "accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not 
within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule." Id. at 1899. Accordingly. it 
seems that the Court has split four to four, or perhaps four to three, on the question 
whether any "genuinely self-inculpatory" accomplice statements may fit within a 
firmly rooted exception (i.e. Rule 804(b )(3)) and thereby qualify for automatic 
admission under the Confrontation Clause. But even Justice Steven's plurality 
opinion in Lilly notes that such statements will satisfy the Confrontation Clause if the 
admitting court finds sufficient "indicia of reliability." See id. at 1901 (quoting Idaho 
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990)). At least eight members of the Court, therefore, 
leave the door open to such hearsay in some circumstances. 
136. See United States v. Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1998) (admitting 
accomplice statement that clearly subjected declarant to criminal liability); Earnest v. 
Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996) (admitting hearsay where entire statement 
inculpated declarant and defendant equally); United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 345-
50 (2d Cir. 1995) (admitting out-of-court statement by accomplice to defendant's 
girlfriend); United States v. Workman, 860 F.2d 140, 143-46 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming 
conviction where trial court admitted a tape-recorded statement of a deceased 
accomplice under residual exception). 
137. Rule 804(b)(3) provides: "A statement tending to expose the declarant to 
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless 
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The residual exception seems not to have opened the door 
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use accomplice statementsY8 Once again, at the fringes of 
admissibility, prosecutors hold most of the cards. 
One final example of prosecutorial success at hearsay's frontier 
deserves mention, though it is a phenomenon that has been limited to 
the states. So far, we have examined the apparent willingness of 
federal courts to expand the boundaries of admissible hearsay at the 
behest of prosecutors. But federal judges are not alone when it comes 
to liberalizing hearsay rules at the expense of criminal defendants.139 
In the states, legislatures seem even more anxious to open criminal 
courts to inculpatory hearsay. A number of states have enacted 
statutes designed to broaden the range of admissible hearsay 
statements of child victims of sexual abuse.140 Some have included 
similar "designer hearsay" provisions regarding elderly victims and 
victims of spousal abuse.141 In reaction to public sentiment expressed 
over evidentiary rulings in the O.J. Simpson case, California enacted 
an even broader provision dealing \vith hearsay statements of 
unavailable victims of any "physical injury."142 Venturing even 
further, Florida amended its evidence code in 1990 in an effort to 
allow admission of certain self-inculpatory statements of nontestifying 
co-defendants.143 Some of these legislative initiatives apply only in 
any wider to exculpatory third-party confessions offered by defendants. See, e.g., 
United States v. Hinkson, 632 F.2d 382, 386 (4th Cir. 1980) (excluding third-party 
confession where declarant later denied making statement). 
138. Though criminal cases present the issue more frequently, there are a few 
reported civil cases which address "blame-shifting" statements similar to those at 
issue in Williamson and Lilly. See, e.g., Ciccarelli v. Giebner Sys. Group, 862 F. Supp. 
1293, 1297-1300 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (applying the 804(b)(3) hearsay exception in an 
ERISA case). 
139. There is ample evidence that state courts have been equally, if not more, 
receptive to prosecution hearsay at the fringes of traditional evidentiary limits. See, 
e.g., Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 534 (Va. 1998) (admitting, as statement 
against penal interest, accomplice's videotaped confession implicating the defendant 
in murder); People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1246-50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (relaxing 
the requirements of spontaneity and immediacy to admit child victim's statements as 
spontaneous declarations). 
140. The Comment to the 1986 Amendment to Rule 807 of the Unifonn Rules of 
Evidence notes that "[m]ore than twenty states have promulgated rules or enacted 
legislation modifying the hearsay rule in various respects to permit the 
introduction ... of extrajudicial statements and testimony of children who are the 
victims of physical or sexual abuse or who witnessed violent or sexual acts committed 
against others." Unif. R. Evid. 807 cmt. 
141. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.803(24) (West 1999) (creating hearsay exception 
for statements of elderly victims of abuse where the circumstances of the statement 
provide "sufficient safeguards of reliability"). 
142. Cal. Evid. Code § 1370 (West Supp. 1998). For commentary on the California 
legislation, see Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 530, 538. 
143. See Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988, 991 n2 (Fla. 1997) (describing 
amendment to Fla. Stat. § 90.804(2)(c)). Of course, the amended statute has given 
rise to several successful Confrontation Clause challenges. See itl. at 992-93 (citing 
Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1997)). 
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criminal cases.144 All of them are intended, and used, primarily to 
assist prosecutors. There is nothing in the realm of civil litigation that 
compares to this groundswell of legislative and rule making interest in 
expanding hearsay exceptions for prosecutors. 145 
In sum, if conventional theory is correct, courts should be most 
adventurous in admitting nontraditional hearsay in civil cases or 
against prosecutors, and most cautious when considering hearsay 
offered against criminal defendants.146 But the reality of modern 
practice defies that theory. Successful efforts to liberalize hearsay 
have come most often where conventional wisdom would least expect 
them: in criminal cases with hearsay offered by prosecutors. As a 
result, criminal defendants probably face more "fringe" hearsay than 
other litigants. 
There is no doubt that plenty of hearsay finds its way into civil 
cases. But the notion that criminal defendants somehow face a 
smaller dose of admissible hearsay than other litigants is almost 
certainly out of touch with modern practice. Absent readily 
enforceable constitutional limits on hearsay-which do not exist 
under current Confrontation Clause doctrine-criminal prosecution 
generates unique pressures on the hearsay rule. Simply put, 
prosecutors need more hearsay.147 And they often need it from less 
than trustworthy sources. More often than other litigants, prosecutors 
must look to accomplices, co-conspirators, reluctant victims, and 
intimidated, absconded, or dead declarants148 for the evidence which 
will help them meet the heaviest burden of proof that our system 
imposes on any litigant. Increasingly, courts and legislatures have 
responded to that need by pushing the limits of traditional hearsay 
doctrine. One may view such developments as an appropriate 
response to antiquated principles of law which limit the search for 
144. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1228 (applying only "for the purpose of 
establishing the elements of the crime" of child sexual abuse); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
5/115-10 (West 1998) (same); Md. Code Ann. [Cts. & Jud. Proc.]§ 775 (1998) (out-of-
court statements of child abuse victims). 
145. In fact, concerns over expert testimony-primarily arising from civil cases-
gave impetus to the only proposal in the history of the Federal Rules which might 
actually narrow the range of hearsay admissible in federal courts. A 1999 proposal to 
amend Rule 703 would restrict the admissibility of hearsay which forms the basis of 
expert opinion. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Ruic 
703, reprinted in Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 1999 Federal Rules 
of Evidence 283, 295. 
146. See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text. 
147. See Richard O. Lempert & Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to 
Evidence 493-94 (1977); Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 508 ("The prosecution generally 
calls more witnesses and relies on hearsay more often than criminal 
defendants .... "). 
148. See, e.g., Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 9, at 109 ("In civil cases. 
problems of declarant unreliability and witness fabrication are probably less serious 
than in criminal cases because of the different sources from which evidence is 
derived."). 
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truth. Or one may view them as a shortsighted assault on individual 
liberty under the banner of crime control. But whatever one's views 
on the developing law of hearsay and confrontation, the result has 
been to put criminal defendants at a serious disadvantage when it 
comes to contesting hearsay. They face more hearsay, and more 
problematic hearsay, than prosecutors or civil litigants. But they do 
not possess comparable tools to learn what they are up against. 
B. Nondevelopments in the Law of Criminal Discovery: How 
Criminal Discovery has Failed to Keep Pace with the £-cpanding 
Admissibility of Hearsay 
A wider variety of hearsay is admissible in federal courts today than 
ever before. And prosecutors have been major beneficiaries of the 
trend toward expanded admissibility since adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in 1975. Against that background, I now turn to 
the other side of the hearsay-discovery balance. In this section, I take 
a brief look backward at developments-or. more accurately, 
nondevelopments-in the world of hearsay-related discovery. My aim 
is to show how criminal discovery rules and practices have failed to 
keep pace \vith the expansion of admissible hearsay spurred by 
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Of course, it would be misleading to suggest that federal criminal 
discovery has remained entirely static throughout the modern period 
of hearsay expansion. Indeed, criminal discovery was born and raised 
to adolescence in the last half-century. As late as 1963, it was still 
possible to argue that federal criminal defendants had no pretrial 
discovery rights at all.149 The Supreme Court had not yet identified a 
clear constitutional basis for discovery even of exculpatory material.150 
Federal courts occasionally asserted an inherent power to govern 
discovery in criminal cases,151 but discovery was a matter for the 
court's discretion, not a defendant's right. Rule 16 originally codified 
that approach, providing only that district courts were authorized to 
order discovery of defendant's statements and of certain documents 
and tangible evidence material to the defense.m In 1957, Jencks v. 
149. See Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 4-5. 
150. Before Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). the Court had not identified 
any clear constitutional right to discovery. It had come close in Jencks i·. U11itetl 
States, 353 U.S. 657, 665-72 (1957), but it ultimately rested that decision on its 
supervisory powers, rather than on the Confrontation Clause. See Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 68 {1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
151. The notion of a court's inherent power to order discovery. in the absence of 
any constitutional or legislative mandate, traces its roots to the observations of Justice 
Cardozo, who found "at least the glimmerings" of such power when writing as a 
Justice of the Court of Appeals of New York. See People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme 
Court, 156 N.E. 84, 86 (N.Y. 1927). 
152 See, e.g., Gevinson v. United States, 358 F.2d 761, 766 (5th Cir. 1966) (treating 
Rule 16 discovery of documents as discretionary); United States''· Kaminsky, 275 F. 
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United States153 first established a defendant's right to obtain the prior 
statements of government witnesses. But Congress quickly 
retrenched. The Jencks Act154 narrowly defined which statements 
were discoverable and prohibited courts from ordering disclosure 
before the witness testified at trial. 
By the early 1960s, criminal discovery restrictions had come under 
fire from respected jurists and academics.155 Even earlier, in the 
Nuremburg War Crimes Trials, American prosecutors faced the 
embarrassment of a Soviet protest that American rules of discovery 
were unfair to defendants.156 In the face of mounting criticism, the 
1960s and 1970s brought significant reforms in criminal discovery. In 
Brady v. Maryland,157 the Court first recognized a defendant's Due 
Process right to discover exculpatory evidence.158 With Giglio v. 
United States,159 that right expanded to cover material for 
impeachment of government witnesses. The Brady right was still 
growing as late as 1976, when United States v. Agurs160 confirmed the 
government's obligation to disclose some materials even in the 
absence of a specific request from the defendant.161 In 1975, only six 
months after enacting the new Rules of Evidence, Congress approved 
important amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, calling for pretrial discovery of a defendant's prior 
Supp. 365, 367-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (same); United States v. Louis Carreau, Inc., 42 
F.R.D. 408, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (stating that if Rule 16 had been intended to require 
disclosure of defendant's statements, it would have used the word "shall" rather than 
"may"). See generally Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1974 
Amendment ("[I]t is desirable to require broader disclosure by the defendant under 
certain circumstances."). 
153. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
154. 18 u.s.c. § 3500 (1994). 
155. Justice Brennan and California Supreme Court Justice Traynor were probably 
the most prominent critics of traditional limits on criminal discovery. See William J. 
Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 
Wash. U. L.Q. 279, 280; Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal 
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 228, 229-30 (1964). The level of controversy over 
criminal discovery is reflected in an outpouring of scholarly commentary in the late-
1950s and early-1960s. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1966 
amendment (collecting articles). 
156. See Robert H. Jackson, Some Problems in Developing an International legal 
System, 22 Temp. L.Q. 147, 150-52 (1948). 
157. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
158. Earlier cases had recognized that prosecutors violate due process through 
deliberate use of perjured testimony or fabricated evidence, or deliberate suppression 
of exculpatory evidence. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942) (finding 
prosecutor's misconduct in deliberately suppressing exculpatory evidence violated 
fundamental fairness required by Due Process Clause); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 
103, 112-13 (1935) (stating, in dictum, that prosecutor's deliberate use of fabricated 
evidence violated due process). But those early cases turned upon the prosecutor's 
deliberate misconduct, not defendant's constitutional right to discovery. 
159. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
160. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
161. See id. at 110. 
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statements, the results of scientific tests, and "material" documentary 
or tangible evidence.162 In contrast to the earlier version of the Rule, 
discovery was no longer a matter of the court's discretion.1b3 It was a 
defendant's right under the new Rule 16.1M 
But the growth of criminal discovery-at least in federal courts-
largely ended by the mid-1970s. In contrast to their expansive 
approach to the admission of hearsay under both the Federal Rules 
and the Confrontation Clause, federal courts have been cautious in 
their approach to issues of "materiality" under Rule 16.1!!.S The 
Supreme Court has said little about the Rule, other than to limit its 
application to items which rebut the government's case-in-chief, as 
opposed to evidence which might support other defense claims.11>6 
And Agurs seems to have set the high water mark for the Brady 
doctrine.167 Later cases have limited Brady by tying "materiality" to 
162. Act of July 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, § 2, 89 Stat. 370, 374-75. 
163. The earlier version of Rule 16 provided that "the court may order" discovery 
of the items specified in the Rule. Most courts viewed that language as permissive, 
not mandatory, meaning that courts still had discretion to deny discovery where they 
saw fit. See, e.g., United States v. Louis Carreau. Inc .• 42 F.R.D. 408, 412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967) (stating that under Rule 16 courts had the discretion to deny a defendant's 
discovery request). The amendments proposed in 1974 and enacted in 1975, made 
discovery a self-executing process between the parties. much as in civil cases. And, by 
providing that "the government shall permit" discovery of the items listed in the Rule, 
the amendments give defendants a basis for compelling discovery from the 
government. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1974 amendments. 
164. The amendments adopted in 1975 required the government to disclose 
defendant's prior statements, see id. Rule 16(a)(l)(A). his criminal record, see id. 
Rule 16(a)(l)(B), documents and tangible objects material to the preparation of the 
defense or intended to be offered in evidence by the government, see id. Rule 
16(a)(l)(C), and the results of scientific tests, see id. Rule 16(a)(l)(D). 
165. See, e.g., United States v. Vue, 13 F3d 1206, 1208-09 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that disclosure was properly denied where the defendant failed to show he would 
have been acquitted had INS records been introduced before jury); United States v. 
Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1179-81 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding telephone record not 
discoverable under Rule 16 where it would not have rebutted government's case and 
would only have impacted defendant's decision to testify); United States v. Phillip, 
948 F.2d 241, 250 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding videotaped statements of six-year-old child 
abuse victim were not material to defense because inconsistent answers would not 
have been exculpatory at trial). 
166. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458-62 (1996). In Armstrong, 
the Court ruled that a defendant was not entitled to discover government documents 
which might back up a selective prosecution claim, absent a preliminary shO\\ing of 
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. See id. at 468. With respect to Rule 
16, the Court rejected defendant's claim that such evidence was "material to the 
preparation of defendant's defense." Id. at 462. The Court stated, "(W)e conclude 
that in the context of Rule 16 'the defendant's defense' means the defendant's 
response to the Government's case in chief." Id. 
167. See Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 26, at 1104-08 (arguing that the Court 
has retreated from its earlier, more liberal application of Brady principles by adopting 
a "result-oriented" standard of materiality in United States 1·. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
684 (1985), and subsequent cases); cf. Goldberg, supra, note 26, at 56-58 (contending 
that Agurs was actually the beginning of Brady's decline). 
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the likelihood that undisclosed evidence would have changed the 
result at trial.168 
Limitations on witness-related discovery-the limits most relevant 
when it comes to hearsay-remain virtually untouched since the 
Jencks Act of 1957. Ironically, at almost the same time that Congress 
passed new Rules of Evidence and opened the doors of federal courts 
to an expanding variety of hearsay, it rejected proposed amendments 
which would have expanded witness-related discovery under Rule 16. 
In 1974, the Advisory Committee drafted, and the Supreme Court 
adopted, a proposed amendment requiring the government to identify 
its witnesses before trial.169 Based primarily upon Justice Department 
concerns over witness tampering and intimidation, 170 the Senate 
ultimately killed the proposal.171 Many proponents of liberalized 
discovery would have gone further than the Court's relatively modest 
proposed amendment. The American Bar Association's Standards 
Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial called for pretrial 
disclosure not only of the identities of government witnesses, but of 
their prior statements as well.172 But Congress left intact the Jencks 
168. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Court set the standard for 
"materiality" that governs Brady disputes today. Bagley held, "The evidence is 
material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable 
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 
682. In dissent, Justice Marshall took the Court to task for recasting a Brady standard 
that defines materiality "not by reference to the possible usefulness of the particular 
evidence in preparing and presenting the case, but retrospectively, by reference to the 
likely effect the evidence will have on the outcome of the trial." Id. at 699 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); see also Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 26, at 1105 (arguing that 
Bagley marks a retreat from Brady through its shift to a "result-oriented" standard). 
169. The proposed amendments included a new provision, Rule 16(a)(l)(E), which 
would have required the government to disclose the names and criminal records of 
witnesses it intended to call at trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's note 
to 1974 amendments. The committee supported the proposal by noting that many 
states already required such disclosures before trial, and that the American Bar 
Association's Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial called for 
pretrial disclosure not only of witness's names but of their prior statements as well. 
See id. 
170. For a summary of Justice Department opposition to the 1974 amendments, see 
Brennan, A Progress Repon, supra note 13, at 6, and Dennis, supra note 26, at 65-69. 
171. The House was willing to accept the proposal, after amending it to make the 
witness-discovery obligation reciprocal, limiting discovery to three days before trial, 
and providing that the court could deny discovery of witness lists upon a showing of 
good cause. The Senate struck proposed Rule 16(a)(l)(E) altogether. The 
Conference Committee ultimately adopted the Senate version, stating: 
A majority of the Conferees believe it is not in the interest of the effective 
administration of criminal justice to require that the government or the 
defendant be forced to reveal the names and addresses of its witnesses 
before trial. Discouragement of witnesses and improper contacts directed at 
influencing their testimony, were deemed paramount concerns in the 
formulation of this policy. 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-414, at 12 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 713, 716. 
172. See ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial § 
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Act's prohibition on compelled pretrial disclosure of government 
witness statements, never seriously considering the ABA Standard. 
Although the 1975 debate over government witnesses did not deal 
with hearsay directly, it had important implications for hearsay-
related discovery. Absent a rule requiring pretrial notice of the 
government's intention to offer hearsay, pretrial identification of 
government witnesses would at least provide defendants a place to 
start. After all, some government witnesses may consent to an 
interview. And an interview can disclose what information is first-
hand, and what may be presented as hearsay. An interview can also 
identify a potential hearsay declarant and can disclose details about 
the declarant or the circumstances under which she spoke. Without a 
pretrial witness-disclosure rule, however, defendants are left without 
even a starting point for tracking down hearsay. Of course, the prior 
statements of government \vitnesses would offer an even more direct 
means for a defendant to learn about prosecution hearsay. If the 
government expects to call a \vitness to relate hearsay to the jury, 
chances are strong the same hearsay \vill appear in the witness's prior 
statements. But the 1975 amendments did nothing for defendants on 
that score either. 
In sum, 1975 saw Congress enact Rules of Evidence that set in 
motion the most rapid expansion of hearsay admissibility in our 
history. Yet, at virtually the same time, Congress rejected or ignored 
proposals that would have given criminal defendants the names and 
prior statements of government \vitnesses-tools that would have 
provided at least indirect opportunities to anticipate and challenge 
prosecution hearsay. By taking a 1970s view of hearsay, but a 1950s 
view of criminal discovery, Congress set the stage for the hearsay-
discovery imbalance we see today in federal criminal cases. 
Developments in the quarter century since 1975 have done little to 
address that imbalance. Later amendments to Rule 16 have 
broadened criminal discovery a bit, especially discovery relating to 
experts,173• But the bar to pretrial discovery relating to government 
witnesses and witness statements remains largely intact today.17" 
2.l(b)(i) (Approved Draft 1970). Although several of the proposed Rule 16 
amendments were modeled after the ABA Standards, the proposals before Congress 
in 1975 conspicuously omitted the ABA's Standard relating to witness statements. 
Apparently, the drafters concluded that proposed Rule 16(a)(l)(E) would be 
controversial enough without calling for a new look at the Jencks Act's prohibition on 
compelled pretrial disclosure of government witness statements. 
173. A 1993 amendment added Rule 16(a)(l)(E) and Rule 16(b)(l)(C), requiring 
both the government and defense to disclose an intention to rely on expert testimony 
and a summary of the expert's opinion and its basis. 
174. There has been only one significant crack in the armor protecting against 
pretrial disclosure of witness statements. A 1983 amendment added subsection (i) to 
Rule 12, requiring the government at a suppression hearing to produce prior 
statements of its witnesses. In 1993, an amendment to Rule 26.2 likewise required 
disclosure of prior statements after government witnesses testified at detention 
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Despite continuing concerns voiced by the judiciary,175 Congress still 
bows to Justice Department arguments that the risks of witness 
intimidation are too serious to require such disclosures. With very 
few exceptions, federal courts have rejected defense efforts to require 
pretrial disclosure of government witness lists.176 And, insulated by 
the Jencks Act, prosecutors remain free to choose when, or if, they 
will disclose witness statements before trial. 177 
In one respect, a defendant's right to early discovery of prosecution 
hearsay may actually have diminished since 1975. The Federal Rules 
of Evidence include only one provision that directly links discovery 
and hearsay: the pretrial notice requirement attached to the residual 
exceptions.178 But despite their willingness to admit increasingly 
adventurous forms of hearsay under the residual exception in criminal 
cases, federal courts have been less than demanding in their 
application of the notice requirement.179 The language of the pretrial 
notice provision is mandatory.180 But courts have been generous in 
forgiving government failures to comply.181 
hearings and preliminary examinations. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2(g) and advisory 
committee's note to 1993 amendment; infra text accompanying notes 371-72. 
175. See, e.g., Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 10-14 (discussing the 
concern that state and federal discovery rules may be too broad); Sarokin & 
Zuckerman, supra note 26, at 1099-1100 (noting that restrictions on defendants' 
access to information about the government's witnesses before trial impedes 
facilitation of plea agreements). In 1994, judicial concerns came to a head when the 
Judicial Conference of the United States considered yet another Advisory Committee 
proposal regarding pretrial disclosure of government witnesses' names and their 
statements. See Pretrial Disclosure Revision to Criminal Procedure Rule Stirs 
Controversy, Inside Litig., June 1994, at 11, 11 (1994) [hereinafter Inside Litig.]. 
176. In capital cases, a federal statute requires the government to disclose a list of 
its witnesses before trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1994). In noncapital cases, few courts 
compel such disclosure. There is no due process right to discover the identities of 
prosecution witnesses before trial. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 
(1977). 
177. Most federal circuit courts view the mandatory language of the Jencks Act as a 
strict limit on their power to order pretrial disclosure of government witness 
statements. See, e.g., United States v. Malone, 49 F.3d 393, 396-97 (8th Cir. 1995) 
{finding that defendant was entitled to discover witness's statements only after 
witness testifies on direct examination); United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d 1190, 1197 (Isl 
Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1414-15 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(same). The Fifth Circuit, has held that trial courts retain discretion to order such 
pretrial disclosure. See United States v. Blackburn, 9 F.3d 353, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1993). 
178. See Fed. R. Evid. 807. In order to invoke the residual exception, the 
proponent of hearsay must provide notice of its intention to offer the statement, the 
"particulars" of the statement, and the name and address of the cleclarant, all 
"sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet" the hearsay. Id. 
179. See Raeder, Effect of the Catchalls, supra note 34, at 936 ("The catchall notice 
provision has not provided a sufficient opportunity to challenge the hearsay evidence 
because of the flexible approach taken by many courts that have permitted notice at 
trial."); Rand, supra note 101, at 883-88. 
180. The Rule provides, in pertinent part: "[A] statement may not be admitted 
under this exception unless the proponent ... makes known ... in advance of the 
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Pretrial hearsay "notice" provisions, like that in the residual 
exception, seem like a natural accompaniment to rules admitting new 
forms of hearsay. Nevertheless, neither the courts nor Congress has 
sought to balance the expanding range of hearsay admissible under 
the categorical exceptions in the Rules with similarly expanded 
pretrial notice requirements. Outside of the residual exception, there 
is no notice requirement for newly admissible forms of "fringe" 
hearsay,182 even though the challenge of contesting such hearsay is no 
different than with residual hearsay. 
In some measure, the absence of development in the law of 
hearsay-related discovery stems from a lack of pressure from the 
defense bar. For a variety of reasons, defense counsel seldom press 
the limits of the existing rules of discovery in order to pursue 
prosecution hearsay.183 For example, the Brady rule entitles 
defendants to exculpatory material, including so-called "Giglio" 
material that may serve to impeach a government witness. There are 
dozens of reported cases debating the Brady-Giglio rule in connection 
with testifying witnesses.184 In stark contrast to those numbers, only a 
handful of cases apply Brady-Giglio doctrine to the discovery of 
trial ... the proponent's intention to offer the statement." Fed. R. Evid. 807. 
181. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 749 F.2d 628, 633 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding 
the admissibility of evidence despite the prosecution's failure to provide notice); 
United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976} (allowing evidence to be 
admitted despite the government's failure to provide notice on the ground that the 
notice requirement is not "inflexible"). 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 117-38. 
183. The principal reason that defendants seldom pursue hearsay-related discm•el)' 
may be that they seldom think about impeaching hearsay declarants in the same way 
they are familiar with attacking testifying witnesses. An experienced state court trial 
judge writes: 
As a trial judge ... I sometimes wonder at what seems to me the passing up 
of golden opportunities by the able advocate. Foremost among these lost 
opportunities is the virtual total neglect to do anything about the other side's 
hearsay once it has been admitted by the trial judge into e\•idence. True 
enough, the able advocate fought valiantly against the hearsay admission; 
but, having lost that position, he does not fall back to the next logical 
position-impeaching the hearsay declarant. 
Brannon, supra note 7, at 158. The reasons that defense counsel frequently ignore 
such opportunities may be more complex. See Douglass, supra note 6, at 222-23 
(arguing that Confrontation Clause doctrine itself is partially to blame, by diverting 
counsel's time and attention to questions of admissibility to the exclusion of matters 
relating to the testing of hearsay before a jury, and by giving defense counsel a tactical 
incentive to forego opportunities to impeach hearsay declarants in favor of preserving 
"pure" confrontation issues for appeal). 
Of course, one practical reason for defense counsel's inaction may be that the lack 
of information regarding the government's expected witnesses stymies any efforts to 
learn about hearsay declarants. Until a defendant knows who the testifying witnesses 
are, and what they are likely to say, he often has no place to start in preparing to meet 
hearsay. 
184. See Symposium, Twenty-Sixth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 85 Geo. 
LJ. 775, 1089-90 nn.1113 & 1114 (1997) (collecting cases applying Giglio to a variety 
of impeachment material). 
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material to impeach the growing legion of hearsay declarants. 185 
Similarly, there has been little effort to extend the Jencks Act to 
obtain discovery of prior statements of hearsay declarants after their 
out-of-court statements have been admitted in evidence. Only one 
federal court of appeals has considered a defendant's effort to obtain 
"Jencks material" relating to a hearsay declarant.186 And that court 
rejected the argument.187 
Finally, no discussion of discovery developments would be complete 
without reference to informal discovery. The federal system of 
limited discovery has weathered a variety of criticisms in recent 
decades. One could argue that the system has survived only because 
most federal prosecutors are reluctant to rely on the strict limits 
imposed by the rules.188 Most discovery in most federal cases occurs 
informally, and much of it is earlier and broader than the letter of the 
law requires. 189 In many cases, informal discovery provides 
defendants with important insights about prosecution hearsay.190 But 
there are serious problems with a system that counts on informal, 
voluntary disclosure to solve most of its discovery problems. For one 
185. See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 513-14 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Hawryluk, 658 F. Supp. 112, 117 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
186. See Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 512-13. 
187. See id. at 513. 
188. The Justice Department itself appears to recognize that the current system 
would crumble under the weight of judicial criticism if federal prosecutors themselves 
did not routinely provide more discovery than the rules require. In an effort to 
forstall Rule 16 amendments requiring pretrial disclosure of government witnesses 
and their statements, Jo Ann Harris, Chief of the Department's Criminal Division, 
appeared at a meeting of the Advisory Committee and offered to implement a new 
internal policy requiring prosecutors to make such disclosures except in unusual cases. 
See Inside Litig., supra note 175, at 11. 
189. One former Assistant United States Attorney writes: 
In practice ... prosecutors and courts recognize that strict compliance with 
the rules can easily result in trial by ambush. As such, the practice of many 
U.S. Attorney's Offices is to offer earlier and broader discovery to the 
defense. That is not to say that there is an "open file" attitude, but there is a 
recognition that mere compliance with the rules, unless there is a compelling 
reason to refuse to go further, may not be sufficient to fulfill the prosecutor's 
duty. 
Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of 
Federal Prosecutors, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 553, 554 (1999) {footnote omitted). For 
example, it has become typical practice in most cases for federal prosecutors to 
disclose "Jencks material" (i.e., witness statements) before trial, rather than waiting 
until after the witness's direct testimony as the Jencks Act permits. See id. at 562-63; 
see also United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771, 773 n.5 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting the 
prevailing practice of prosecutors to provide Jencks material before trial). 
190. Usually, those insights will be somewhat limited. Where prosecutors disclose 
witness statements before trial, defendants may be tipped off that a witness will relate 
important hearsay. But defendants still lack the formal means to follow up on that 
information by compelling the witness or the declarant to submit to pretrial 
questioning. Cf Raeder, Effect of Catchalls, supra note 34, at 936 (stating that when 
prosecutors provide notice that they intend to use hearsay, it is of limited value where 
defense has no right to depose witnesses or available declarants). 
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thing, the system tends to work best when it matters least. 
Prosecutors aiming for guilty pleas have the strongest incentive to 
disclose in cases where their evidence is most overwhelming.1\11 In the 
weaker cases, the very ones where discovery is most likely to make a 
difference to the defendant, there is less incentive for a prosecutor to 
disclose and more reason to play "hard ball" when the rules permit it. 
Moreover, voluntary informal disclosure works best when it is most 
convenient for the prosecutor. Understandably. defense counsel may 
feel that an informal discovery request will be more favorably 
received if it is not too ambitious or burdensome. In such an 
environment, defense counsel are more likely to focus their requests 
on the items they deem most essential, particularly prior statements 
and impeachment material for prospective government witnesses. 
They may be less inclined to push their luck in seeking identification 
of hearsay declarants and related impeachment materials. since the 
burden of producing such material may appear to be heavier and its 
value may appear to be less significant. In effect, an informal system 
makes beggars of defense counsel. And, as the old saying goes, 
"beggars can't be choosers." 
In sum, though criminal trials may no longer be the "game of 
blindman's bluff''192 that spurred discovery reformers in the 1960s, the 
advances in criminal discovery since that time have offered little when 
it comes to hearsay. Other than for residual hearsay, defendants have 
no right to pretrial notice of the hearsay they must face. Brady, 
Giglio, and the Jencks Act remain undiscovered and underused tools 
for contesting hearsay. And most significantly, the continued bar 
against compelled pretrial disclosure of government witness lists and 
witness statements leaves defendants without an important. albeit 
indirect, means to stumble across the hearsay they will have to contest 
at trial. 
C. The Short End of the Stick: Hearsay-Related Discovery Rights of 
Criminal Defendants Compared to Those of Civil Litigants and of 
Prosecutors 
During the last quarter century, criminal discovery practices have 
failed to keep pace \vith the expansion of admissible hearsay in federal 
courts. As a result, compared to other litigants, today's federal 
criminal defendants are in a precarious position when it comes to 
191. The United States Attorneys' Manual counsels prosecutors to consider 
pretrial disclosure of the names of government witnesses in appropriate cases. One 
reason is to "enhance the prospects that the defendant will plead guilty." U.S. Dep't 
of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual§ 9-6.200 (2d ed. 1998). reprilltetl i11 Lloyd 
L. Weinreb, Criminal Process: Cases. Comment, Questions 867 (5th ed. 1993). The 
manual is available on-line at <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_roomf 
usaml>. 
192. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co .• 356 U.S. 677. 6b'2 (1958) (Douglas, J.). 
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hearsay. It is no secret that civil litigants have vastly greater formal 
discovery rights than criminal litigants. For reasons which I explain 
below, those differences are magnified when it comes to discovery 
relating to hearsay. It is perhaps less obvious, though equally true, 
that prosecutors enjoy an advantage over criminal defendants in 
anticipating an opponent's use of hearsay and in assembling the 
"ammunition" necessary to contest it. Thus, if we compare the 
hearsay-related discovery opportunities of all classes of litigants, we 
find criminal defendants at the bottom of the list. 
1. Civil vs. Criminal Discovery Relating to Hearsay 
Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure explicitly address discovery relating to hearsay.193 
But the two systems of discovery produce starkly different results 
when it comes to hearsay.194 Hearsay seldom takes civil litigants by 
193. The one explicit link between hearsay and discovery appears in Rule 807 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires a proponent of hearsay to provide 
notice in advance of trial of an intent to offer hearsay under the residual exception. 
See Fed. R. Evid. 807. 
194. In large measure, the handicaps facing criminal defendants in preparing to 
contest prosecution hearsay simply mirror the fundamental differences between civil 
and criminal discovery in general. The scope of civil discovery is designedly broad, 
encompassing virtually anything relating to the subject matter of the litigation. See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (providing that parties may discover any matter "relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action" as long as it "appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"). By contrast, there is no 
general rule allowing a criminal defendant to learn the government's case against him. 
See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). Except for clearly exculpatory 
"Brady material," criminal discovery is confined to categories of information 
enumerated in Rule 16 and to the narrow category of "witness statements" defined in 
the Jencks Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994). 
Rule 16 gives defendants the right to discover their own statements, see Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(A), their criminal record, see id. Rule 16(a)(l)(B), documents and 
tangible objects which are "material" to the defense or which the government will 
offer at trial, see id. Rule 16(a)(l)(C), the results of scientific tests, see id. Rule 
16(a)(l)(D), and the substance of anticipated testimony from government experts, see 
id. Rule 16(a)(l)(E). The Rule provides for roughly comparable reciprocal discovery 
from the defense. See id. Rule 16(b). 
The Jencks Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500, defines defendant's right to discover 
the statements of government witnesses. The Jencks Act prohibits federal courts 
from ordering discovery of witness statements until after a government witness has 
testified on direct examination at trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994). Once the 
witness testifies, the Jencks Act requires the government to produce a narrowly 
defined category of prior statements of the witness. See id. § 3500(b ). Rule 26.2 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure essentially restates the Jencks Act, and provides 
for reciprocal discovery of the prior statements of defense witnesses. See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 26.2. Significantly, Rules 26.2(g), 12(i), and 46(i) now extend the obligation 
to disclose "Jencks" material-witness statements-to include witnesses testifying in 
pretrial suppression hearings, preliminary hearings, and detention hearings. See id. 
Rules 12(i), 26.2(g), 46(i). 
Several provisions in the Rules of Evidence also require pretrial disclosures. See, 
e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (requiring prosecution to disclose evidence of "other 
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surprise. Before trial, they can learn the content of any hearsay 
statements they must face, identify and, quite often, locate and 
question the declarant, and assemble virtually any information 
relevant to contest that hearsay or impeach the declarant. By 
contrast, the process of criminal discovery often leaves criminal 
defendants guessing at the first stage of the learning process. Criminal 
defendants have no reliable means even to identify the out-of-court 
statements they will face at trial, much less the power to assemble 
information to contest such statements. Two aspects of civil 
discovery, not present in the criminal process, account for most of the 
difference: (1) a civil litigant's obligation to identify both witnesses 
and hearsay declarants well before trial,195 and (2) discovery 
depositions.196 
At an early stage in civil litigation, typically without even a formal 
discovery request, each party must disclose the names and identifying 
data of "each individual likely to have discoverable information,"197-
a category which includes not only prospective witnesses but also the 
declarants of any hearsay which a party might seek to introduce at 
trial. By contrast, as we have seen, Congress rejected a proposed rule 
requiring pretrial disclosure of anticipated government witnesses.1"3 
Instead, the Jencks Act provides that government witness 
statements-which obviously would serve to identify witnesses-shall 
not be the subject of discovery or subpoena before trial.199 And there 
is no criminal counterpart to Rule 26's broad command to disclose any 
"individual likely to have discoverable information." As a result, 
criminal defendants have no formal discovery tool designed to inform 
crimes" which it intends to offer); id. Rule 412 (intent to offer sexual history of 
victim); id. Rule 413 (evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases): id. Ruic 414 
(evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases): id. Rule 609 (evidence of 
conviction over ten years old). 
Though the reasons for liberal discovery-promoting truth-seeking by avoiding 
surprise, narrowing issues for trial, and encouraging settlement-exist just as fully in 
criminal as in civil litigation, they are offset in criminal cases by other concerns, 
typically cited to justify more limited discovery in criminal cases: (I) fear that 
defendants may seek to influence or intimidate witnesses (or worse): (2) fear that 
defendants will use discovered information as a reference point for fabricating 
evidence or committing perjury; and (3) unfairness to the government stemming from 
supposed constitutional limits on a court's power to order reciprocal discovery from 
the defense. See generally Frank W. Miller et al., Cases and Materials on Criminal 
Justice Administration 781 (4th ed. 1991) (summarizing the arguments against broad 
discovery in criminal cases). 
195. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A). 
196. See id. Rule 30. 
197. Id. Rule 26(a)(l)(A). The Rule allows courts to opt out of the process of 
compelled initial disclosures through local rule or by order in a specific case. Even in 
those districts which have such local rules, however, it is commonplace to request 
similar information through written interrogatories. 
198. See supra text accompanying notes 169-72. 
199. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994). 
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them who will testify for the government,200 much less to identify 
declarants whose "testimony" will come only in the form of hearsay. 
Even when a criminal defendant manages to learn of the 
prosecution's intention to offer an important hearsay statement at 
trial,201 his opportunity to prepare to contest that hearsay pales in 
comparison to the rights afforded a civil litigant under comparable 
circumstances. The major difference is that the civil litigant has the 
right to compel discovery depositions.202 Where the declarant is alive, 
subject to subpoena, and does not invoke a privilege to avoid 
testifying-a situation more typical of declarants in civil than in 
criminal cases203-the opponent's right to depose that declarant 
virtually eliminates the adversarial concerns at the heart of the 
hearsay rule. In a deposition, the opponent can subject the declarant 
to the full dose of adversarial cross-examination, often more 
exhaustively than might be permitted at trial.204 If he likes the results 
of the deposition, the opponent often has the option to call the 
declarant as a witness at trial, or to use parts of the deposition to 
impeach any hearsay offered by the other party.205 By contrast, 
200. Capital cases are the exception. There, the government must provide a list of 
witnesses before trial. See id. § 3432. 
201. While nothing assures a criminal defendant that he has learned about all 
significant government hearsay before trial, criminal defendants are not wholly 
without means to anticipate prosecution hearsay. Typically, where defendants can 
identify prosecution hearsay before trial, it is because: (1) the hearsay consists of a 
written statement appearing in a document which the government intends to offer at 
trial and the document has been disclosed by the government under Rule 16(a)(l)(C); 
(2) the hearsay forms the basis of an expert opinion disclosed under Rule 16(a)(l)(E); 
(3) the government gives notice of its intention to offer "residual" hearsay under Rule 
807; (4) the government files a pretrial motion in limine which identifies the hearsay 
and seeks a pretrial ruling on admissibility; (5) the hearsay is identified in an affidavit 
supporting a search or arrest warrant or in testimony at a preliminary hearing; or, 
most typically, (6) the government voluntarily provides informal discovery earlier and 
broader than the rules require. 
202. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30. 
203. Criminal cases are more likely to involve hearsay from unavailable declarants 
for a variety of reasons. It is quite common in criminal cases that the witnesses with 
the most intimate knowledge of the facts will refuse to testify and invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1892-93 (1999) 
(discussing how declarant, who was defendant's brother and an accomplice in the 
crime, refused to testify at trial). It is much less typical for witnesses in civil cases to 
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. Criminal cases more often give rise to 
hearsay from declarants who run or hide out of fear of retribution, or declarants who 
are themselves fugitives from the Jaw. Finally, an increasing number of criminal cases 
involve hearsay from abused children who are found unable to testify in court or from 
abused spouses who are unwilling to testify. 
204. Questioning in depositions tends to be longer, more detailed, and covers a 
broader subject matter than questioning at trial. Discovery depositions are not 
confined to matters admissible at trial, but may encompass any subject reasonably 
calculated to lead to admissible evidence. With no judge controlling the proceedings, 
and no jury to bore with detail, parties typically feel few time constraints in a 
deposition. 
205. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(l) ("Any deposition may be used by any party for the 
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criminal defendants have no right to take discovery depositions.M As 
a result, where the government relies on hearsay from an available 
declarant,207 the defendant faces a tough dilemma with little assistance 
from the discovery process. If the court admits the hearsay, the 
defense may choose to call the declarant to the stand for cross-
examination.208 But with no opportunity to depose the declarant 
before trial, defense counsel must make that strategic decision in the 
dark. Unless he has another reliable source for "ammunition" to 
impeach the declarant, or unless he is a risk-taker of the highest order, 
counsel often will forgo that opportunity and the hearsay will go 
unchallenged.209 
Where the declarant of important hearsay is unavailable, a civil 
litigant still can depose the witness who relates the hearsay statement, 
or other witnesses familiar with the declarant or the circumstances of 
the statement, and gather any available information that might expose 
weaknesses in the declarant's memory, perception, or credibility. 
Moreover, a civil litigant has a broad right to require pretrial 
production of documents which might lead to information impeaching 
a declarant, whether such documents are in the possession of his 
opponent or a third party.210 By contrast, a criminal defendant has no 
means to depose anyone who may shed light on the credibility of a 
hearsay statement. And his ability to require either the government 
or third parties to produce documents before trial is more limited than 
a civil litigant's.211 
purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness, or for 
any other purpose permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence.''). Rule 806 of the 
Rules of Evidence permits use of deposition testimony to impeach a hearsay 
declarant in the same manner. See Fed. R. Evid. 806. 
206. The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for depositions. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
15. But the Rule permits the taking of depositions only "for use at trial" and only in 
"exceptional circumstances." Id. Typically. parties employ the Rule when they 
anticipate that a crucial \vitness \vill become unavailable before trial. The Rule does 
not permit discovery depositions. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 advisory committee's notes 
to 1974 amendment ("Subdivision (a) ... makes explicit that only the 'testimony of a 
prospective witness of a party' can be taken. This means the party's own witness and 
does not authorize a discovery deposition of an adverse witness."). 
207. Under current doctrine, except in cases of hearsay in the form of former 
testimony, the Confrontation Clause does not require the government to demonstrate 
that a declarant is unavailable in order to introduce her hearsay statements. See White 
v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353-54 (1992). 
208. See Fed. R. Evid. 806. 
209. See supra note 11. 
210. A civil litigant can obtain any relevant document from his opponent merely by 
filing a "Request for Production of Documents." Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. He can obtain 
access to third-party documents by issuing a subpoena under Ruic 45. See ill. Rule 45. 
In either case, the scope of permissible discovery is not limited to admissible 
documents. It encompasses anything reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
211. The government must provide a criminal defendant only those documents it 
intends to offer at trial, or other documents "material" to preparation of the defense. 
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a}(l}(C). The concept of materiality under Ruic 16 is Jess 
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The obvious impact of these differences in discovery rights is to 
leave a criminal defendant in a much more difficult position than a 
civil litigant when it comes to contesting hearsay. The civil discovery 
process largely eliminates surprise from hearsay, often allows an 
opponent to question the declarant in person, and equips an opponent 
with documents and testimony useful to impeach an unavailable 
declarant. Criminal defendants, on the other hand, often first learn of 
significant, incriminating hearsay when they hear it at trial. Where 
they learn about it earlier, they have few formal tools available to 
investigate the declarant or the circumstances of the out-of-court 
statement. 
2. Prosecution vs. Defense Discovery 
On the surface, the process of criminal discovery seems to favor the 
defense over the prosecution. Constitutional discovery principles 
protect only the defendant; there is no reciprocal Brady obligation 
requiring the defense to disclose incriminating evidence to the 
prosecution. The Fifth Amendment generally prohibits such 
compelled disclosure.212 Most of a defendant's reciprocal discovery 
obligations under Rule 16 arise only after the government has 
complied with defense requests for disclosure.213 And the defendant's 
right to government disclosure of documents and tangible objects is 
broader than the defendant's reciprocal obligation.214 Indeed, the 
generous than the civil discovery standard in Rule 26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) 
(allowing discovery of anything "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence"). A criminal defendant may subpoena documents from third 
parties under Rule 17(c). See Fed R. Crim. P. 17(c). But Ruic 17(c) is essentially a 
means to gain pretrial access to otherwise admissible material. It was not intended as 
a discovery rule at all. See Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 218-21 
(1951) ("Rule 17(c) was not intended to provide an additional means of discovery."). 
212. The Fifth Amendment, however, does not make all criminal discovery a "one-
way street." In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1970), the Court upheld a 
Florida notice-of-alibi provision in the face of a Fifth Amendment challenge. Three 
years later, a unanimous Court held that a notice-of-alibi provision which accorded 
defendant no reciprocal discovery rights violated the Due Process Clause. See 
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1973). In the wake of Williams, reciprocal 
discovery provisions expanded significantly in state practice. See Robert P. Mosteller, 
Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1567, 
1574-84 (1986). Reciprocal discovery, conditioned upon defendant's first invoking his 
own discovery rights, became a part of federal practice with the 1975 amendments to 
Rule 16. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b) advisory committee's notes to 1974 amendment. 
213. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(l)(A)-(B). The only exception is Rule 16(b)(l)(C), 
which requires a defendant to disclose a summary of expert testimony where he has 
filed a notice under Rule 12.2(b) of intent to present expert testimony regarding his 
mental condition. 
214. The defendant need only disclose those documents he intends to offer in 
evidence, while the government must also disclose any documents "material to the 
preparation of the defendant's defense." Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(C), with 
id. Rule 16(b)(l)(A). The difference is designed to avoid the clash with the Fifth 
Amendment that would arise if defendant were required to produce all "material" 
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limited power of the government to compel disclosure of information 
from the defense is a principle justification for the limited discovery 
rights afforded criminal defendants.215 The rules are fair, the 
argument goes, because discovery is limited in both directions. There 
may not be much discovery, but at least there is a rough parity in the 
process. 
In reality, this notion of "discovery parity" is largely a fiction. 
Merely comparing the parties' formal, post-indictment rights tells us 
little about the relative discovery opportunities of the prosecution and 
defense. In many federal prosecutions, that comparison means little 
because it ignores the fact that the government does most of its 
"discovery" in a grand jury investigation before the indictment is ever 
filed. Like discovery depositions in civil cases, grand jury proceedings 
empower the government to compel witness examinations on the 
record and under oath long before trial, unhampered by rules of 
evidence, and subject to very broad concepts of relevance.216 
Thorough prosecutors can, and do, exercise that power to anticipate 
defenses, to "lock in" witnesses who might prove favorable to the 
defense, and to gather impeachment material for use in cross-
exarnining defense witnesses at trial.217 
When it comes to anticipating and contesting adverse hearsay, the 
grand jury offers prosecutors most of the advantages that civil litigants 
obtain through discovery depositions. Before the grand jury, 
prosecutors can question prospective trial witnesses and identify 
statements likely to appear at trial in the form of hearsay. With grand 
jury subpoenas, prosecutors can compel available hearsay declarants 
information regardless of his intent to disclose it at trial. \Vi/Iiams i•. Florida rests 
largely on the notion that a court does not violate the Fifth Amendment by requiring 
an "accelerated" pretrial disclosure of evidence that the defendant will disclose at 
trial in any event. See Yale Kamisar et al., Modem Criminal Procedure: Cases, 
Comments, and Questions 1228-29 (9th ed. 1999). 
215. See State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Iowa 1969) ("[S)ince the State cannot 
compel the defendant to disclose his evidence, disclosure by the State would afford 
the defendant an unreasonable advantage at trial."). See generally Brennan, A 
Progress Report, supra note 13, at 7 (summarizing and responding to the claim that 
Fifth Amendment restrictions on reciprocal discovery justify limits on the 
government's obligations to disclose). 
216. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (holding that a 
grand jury subpoena will not be quashed if there is any reasonable probability that 
subpoenaed material will lead to information relevant to the investigation); Kastigar 
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (acknowledging the government's power to 
compel testimony before the grand jury). 
217. Federal courts have held that a prosecutor unlawfully abuses grand jury power 
by using the grand jury after indictment solely for the purpose of gaining information 
for an advantage at trial. See, e.g., /11 re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated 
January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1985) (quashing subpoena as an 
abuse of the grand jury process). But there is little practical limit on the government's 
ability to use the grand jury before indictment to shore up its case and anticipate 
defenses. No rule compels the government to terminate a grand jury investigation 
and present an indictment as soon as it has developed probable cause to indict. 
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to appear for examination in person. And the grand jury offers the 
power to compel testimony and documents from any source that 
might limit, contradict, or impeach an unavailable declarant. Better 
yet, unlike a civil deposition, the whole process occurs ex parte and in 
secret.218 The prosecutor proceeds unhampered by objections. The 
witness testifies without counsel at her side. 
There is, of course, no "parity" in a grand jury investigation. 
Defendants have no control over the grand jury process. In many 
cases, they are unaware of the grand jury's investigation until it is 
over. Once the investigation is complete, as a general rule defendants 
are not even entitled to the transcribed record of grand jury 
proceedings unless and until a grand jury witness later testifies for the 
government at trial.219 In sum, of all litigants, civil or criminal, only 
criminal defendants lack the single most effective tool available to 
anticipate and contest most hearsay: the right to compel pretrial 
examination of witnesses, especially adverse witnesses.220 
The government has another power, not possessed by any other 
litigant, that allows prosecutors not only to contest hearsay, but often 
to choose whether critical information will appear at trial as hearsay 
or through the testimony of a live witness. The government alone has 
the power to grant a hearsay declarant immunity from prosecution.221 
Equally important in many instances, the government can pursue a 
course that other litigants cannot pursue without facing criminal 
sanctions for witness tampering. Prosecutors can make "deals" with 
witnesses, offering immunity, reduced charges, or favorable 
sentencing recommendations in exchange for information or 
testimony.222 These powers give the government tremendous leverage 
218. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d)-(e). 
219. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994) (Jencks Act); Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(3). 
220. Opportunities to examine adverse witnesses occasionally arise at preliminary 
hearings or in other pretrial proceedings. But the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure do not require preliminary hearings once an indictment is filed. See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 5(c). In most cases, federal prosecutors avoid preliminary hearings by 
indicting the case before arrest, within ten days after arrest for defendants in custody, 
or within 20 days for defendants released pending trial. See id. Most other pretrial 
hearings do not require live testimony on the merits of criminal charges and, hence, 
provide little opportunity for effective discovery. By contrast, preliminary hearings 
are part of routine practice in many states, and they often create significant 
opportunities for examination of the prosecution's principal witnesses. 
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002. The immunity statute provides that, upon application of 
the prosecutor, the court "shall" issue an order compeJiing a witness to testify. See 18 
U.S.C. § 6003. The effect of the compulsion order is to grant "use immunity" for 
testimony compelled by the order. See generally Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443 (granting 
"use immunity" in exchange for compelled testimony). Prosecutors may accomplish a 
similar result through contract, by entering into an "immunity agreement" with a 
cooperating witness. See United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d 1558, 1562 (1 lth Cir. 
1994) (noting that "basic principles of contract law" govern immunity agreements). 
222. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1299-1302 (10th Cir. 1999) (en 
bane) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2). which forbids giving gratuities to witnesses 
in return for testimony, does not apply to the acts of prosecutors in entering into plea 
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to shape the hearsay landscape of a criminal trial. It is not unusual for 
a hearsay declarant in criminal cases to become "unavailable" for live 
testimony solely because she asserts her Fifth Amendment privilege.223 
By exercising, or choosing not to exercise, its immunity granting 
power, the prosecution can determine whether that declarant's story is 
presented at trial as hearsay or live testimony. Not surprisingly, that 
decision will be governed in large part224 by which version-live 
testimony or hearsay-is more likely to favor the prosecution. If the 
declarant seems likely to make a credible witness, the government 
may bargain for her live testimony by offering a favorable plea. On 
the other hand, where the hearsay comes from an unsavory declarant, 
the government may choose to "stand pat" and offer the hearsay.m 
By contrast, the defense has no power to open a declarant's mouth 
through a grant of immunity.226 
Even in gathering information outside of formal, compulsory 
processes, the government enjoys substantial practical advantages 
over most defendants. Most federal prosecutors have the support of 
investigating agents throughout the trial preparation stage of a 
criminal case. Once the government has identified a potential defense 
witness, or a declarant of significant, exculpatory hearsay, it is a rare 
case where the prosecution lacks the resources to contact the witness 
or investigate the circumstances of the hearsay. By contrast, most 
defendants are represented by appointed counsel who can devote 
little time to pretrial interviews or other investigation of prospective 
agreements which offer leniency in exchange for cooperation and testimony). 
223. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887. 1892-93 (1999) (discussing how 
declarant became "unavailable" when he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege). 
224. Another consideration, of course, is the government's interest in prosecuting 
the prospective witness. The government can sometimes control that factor as well, 
merely by controlling the timing of prosecutions. 
225. The government's power to alter the hearsay landscape of a case can extend to 
defense hearsay as well. Where the government is able to anticipate a defendant's 
intention to offer exculpatory hearsay, the prosecutor's "deal-making" powers can 
alter a defendant's plans. In some cases. the government can effectively preempt 
defense use of exculpatory hearsay by reaching an immunity agreement with the 
declarant, discovering incriminating information through pretrial interviews or grand 
jury testimony, then calling the declarant as a government witness at trial. The 
witness then explains the earlier hearsay statement as incomplete, out of context, or 
inaccurately reported. 
226. A number of circuits have ruled that federal courts have no power to grant 
immunity to witnesses absent a request from the prosecutor. See, e.g .• United Staes v. 
Robaina, 39 F.3d 858, 863 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that "use immunity" can only be 
granted upon the Attorney General's request); United States\'. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 
1469, 1483 (7th Cir. 1993) (declining to grant immunity in the absence of a formal 
offer from the prosecutor); Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams) v. United States, 995 
F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that federal courts cannot grant use 
immunity to witnesses testifying under a Rule 26(c) protective order). The Second 
and Fourth Circuits have suggested that courts may order immunity in cases where 
misconduct by the prosecutor would otherwise result in injustice. See United States v. 
Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 512 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821. 826 
(2d Cir. 1992). 
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government witnesses, much less of hearsay declarants.227 And 
defendants' disadvantage in resources is compounded by another 
problem: witnesses typically cooperate more readily with police and 
prosecutors than with defense counsel or defense investigators. With 
time and investigative resources in short supply, defense counsel may 
not devote time and energy to pursuing witnesses who are likely to 
slam the door in their faces. 
II. CORRECTING THE BALANCE: EXPANDING CRIMINAL 
DISCOVERY TO CONTEND WITH EXPANDED ADMISSION OF 
PROSECUTION HEARSAY 
There are two ways to adjust any balance: subtract from one side, 
or add to the other. Most scholarly treatment of hearsay in criminal 
cases looks only at one side of the balance. There is an extensive 
ongoing debate over adjustments to the rules of admissibility, both 
under the law of evidence228 and under the Confrontation Clause.229 
Most of that discussion assumes a fixed model of the criminal process: 
227. One survey of appointed counsel in New York City found that defense 
counsel actually interviewed witnesses before trial or guilty plea in only 21 % of 
homicide cases and only 4% of other felony cases. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. l, 42 
(1997) (citing Michael Mcconville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor 
in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 581, 762 (1986-87)). 
228. See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc Determinatio11s: 
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 Ind. L.J. 551, 553 (1996) (suggesting 
a text-centered approach to interpretation of the Rules of Evidence); Park, Subject 
Matter Approach, supra note 9, at 106-07 (advocating the retention of existing hearsay 
rules for criminal cases); Swift, Fact Approach, supra note 15, at 1342-43 (formulating 
a "foundation fact approach" to hearsay admissibility); Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 
485-92 (reviewing arguments and analyses regarding admission of hearsay). 
229. A number of excellent works debate the limits of hearsay admissibility under 
the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Amar, First Pri11ciples, supra note 44, at 693-97 
(arguing that Confrontation Clause applies only to testifying witnesses and declarants 
who testify through, for example, deposition and affidavit); Berger, supra note 28, at 
561-62, 607-12 (arguing for a higher standard of admissibility for statements elicited 
by prosecutors and government agents); Richard D. Friedman, Co11frontatio11: The 
Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo. L.J. 1011, 1031-32 (1998) (arguing that the 
Confrontation Clause applies only to "testimonial statements," excluding such 
statements absent confrontation of the declarant, with no exception for "reliable" 
hearsay); Jonakait, Confrontation Clause, supra note 11, at 622 (arguing that the 
Confrontation Clause should be restored to its true purpose of preserving the 
adversarial process, rather than allowing the clause to fulfill the goals of evidence 
law); Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiri11g 
Foundational Testing and Corroboration under the Confrontation Clause, 81 Va. L. 
Rev. 149, 173-74 (1995) (rejecting the Court's reliance on "arcane rules of evidence" 
to define the constitutional rule and arguing that hearsay is admissible under the 
Clause only where (1) the trial court "has made an independent foundational finding 
that the hearsay is competent" and (2) the "hearsay is independently corroborated"). 
The full list is too long to include here. For a collection of earlier confrontation-
hearsay articles, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (1980), where the Court 
chronicled the "outpouring of scholarly commentary" on the hearsay-confrontation 
issue. 
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a criminal trial which takes place in one, typically brief episode,2..11) 
preceded by relatively little discovery. But if we look at hearsay and 
discovery as part of a single system that should be in balance, then we 
must consider a second way to adjust that balance.:?31 Rather than 
debating only whether to subtract some hearsay from one side, we 
also should consider how we might add some discovery to the other. 
In the four sections which follow, I examine the "discovery" side of 
the balance and make some suggestions for expanding a defendant's 
access to information relating to prosecution hearsay. Section A 
considers a defendant's right to pretrial notice of the hearsay which a 
prosecutor expects to use at trial. In Section B, I suggest how Brady 
principles,232 Rule 16,233 and the Jencks Act2.'-' may serve as tools for 
obtaining ammunition to impeach hearsay. Section C proposes the 
limited use of depositions in criminal cases where necessary to give 
defendants pretrial access to available hearsay declarants. Finally, 
Section D argues for an approach to the question of admissibility 
which would increase a prosecutor's incentive to provide early and 
complete disclosure regarding hearsay. 
In arguing for expanded discovery, I am mindful that any reforms 
must accommodate the legitimate public concerns which presently 
restrict discovery in criminal cases. Principal among those concerns is 
the protection of witnesses.235 The need for speed and efficiency in 
230. See, e.g., Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 9. at 62 ("The unitary 
nature of the American trial makes surprise a greater danger than in other systems. 
where adjournments and continuances can mitigate its effect.''): Van Kessel. supra 
note 2, at 525, 532. Professor Van Kessel recognizes that certain aspects of the 
adversary system in criminal cases, notably limited discovery and the parties' control 
over investigation and presentation of evidence. account in large measure for the 
hazards of unreliability and unfair surprise which justify the rule against hearsay. See 
id. at 525. He calls for an expanded notice requirement for hearsay. and notes with 
approval the trend in some states toward broader criminal discovery. See itl. at 532. 
Because of his view that significant procedural reform faces "insurmountable 
barriers" in the American system, id. at 525. however. Professor Van Kesscl's 
principal focus is on adjustments to rules affecting admissibility. 
231. Scholars who look at hearsay from a comparative law perspective tend to 
focus more on procedural reforms rather than looking solely at rules governing 
admissibility. See, e.g., Sean Doran, A Commem 011 Gorc/011 \'an Kesse/'s Hearsay 
Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: An Adversary-Orie111etl Approach. 49 
Hastings LJ. 591, 593 (1998) ("[I]t is worth paying just as much attention to the 
possibilities of procedural reform as to the methods whereby the hearsay rule can be 
best accommodated \vithin the existing procedural framework."): cf. DamaSka. supra 
note 9, at 428-30 (exploring the connection between common-law hearsay rules and 
the "one-shot" nature of common-law trials). 
232 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
233. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. 
234. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994). 
235. Witness-related concerns have formed the heart of Department of Justice 
resistance to discovery amendments that would require pretrial disclosure of 
government witnesses. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-247. at 41 (1975). reprimetl in 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 674, 712 (arguing that proposed 1974 amendment to Rule 16 was 
"dangerous and frightening in that government witnesses and their familit:s will even 
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the criminal process also cannot be overlooked.236 Critics have 
blamed expanded discovery for the increased cost and delays which 
plague much modem civil litigation.237 The criminal process need not 
emulate those failures. My aim is to suggest some avenues for 
incremental reform, broadening defense access to information relating 
to hearsay, but with minimal impact on other legitimate interests at 
stake in the criminal process. 
A. Advance Notice of Prosecution Hearsay 
"You can't hit what you can't see." Baseball legend Walter 
Johnson's account of his pitching aptly describes a defendant's 
predicament in the face of some hearsay.238 The first step in 
contesting hearsay is simply knowing what is coming. But, like 
Johnson's fastball, prosecution hearsay can burst upon a criminal 
defendant with little or no time to react. The following sections 
discuss two avenues through which a criminal defendant might learn 
before trial of the prosecution's intention to introduce a hearsay 
statement, and learn the substance of the statement itself. The first 
avenue is the most direct: a rule requiring such notice. Today such a 
rule exists only for "residual" hearsay admitted under Rule 807.239 I 
argue for expansion of that notice requirement to other forms of 
prosecution hearsay. A second avenue for learning the substance of 
some prosecution hearsay may already exist under Rule 16(a)(1) of 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. I argue that Rule 16(a)(l)(C)-the 
rule providing for discovery of documents and tangible evidence-
provides an important avenue for defendants to discover 
"documentary" hearsay, statements written or signed by the hearsay 
declarant herself, or "recorded" hearsay, statements directly from the 
mouth of the declarant which the government possesses in the form of 
an audio or video recording. Application of Rule 16(a)(l)(C) to 
pretrial discovery of hearsay, however, requires us to address an 
additional, complex question: whether the hearsay declarant is a 
"government witness" whose statements are protected against pretrial 
discovery by Rule 16(a)(2) and the Jencks Act. I suggest several 
approaches which would resolve that question in favor of broader 
discovery of prosecution hearsay. 
be more exposed than they now are to threats, pressures, and physical harm"). 
236. In federal courts, defendants have both constitutional and statutory rights to a 
speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1994) (Speedy Trial Act). 
237. See Cound, supra note 13, at 762-63. The extensive amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1993 aimed largely to simplify and streamline 
discovery. 
238. See supra note 1. 
239. See Fed. R. Evid. 807. 
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1. Expanding a Defendant's Right to Pretrial Notice of Prosecution 
Hearsay 
Under current practice, a defendant's opportunities to anticipate 
prosecution hearsay are best described as "haphazard." The Federal 
Rules of Evidence explicitly require advance notice only when the 
proponent intends to rely on the residual exception.240 In theory, 
notice of "residual" hearsay is designed to protect an opponent from 
surprise by the most unpredictable, nontraditional, and presumably 
least reliable forms of hearsay. But, given the judicial expansion of 
some of the more "traditional" exceptions,241 the theory which limits a 
notice requirement to "residual" hearsay is open to question. In the 
case of a child's hearsay statement alleging sexual abuse, for example, 
defense counsel's need for advance notice is not diminished where the 
child makes the statement to a doctor or a psychologist, rather than to 
a police investigator. Yet a defendant's right to pretrial notice 
depends upon whether the trial court ultimately fits a particular 
statement into the "pigeonhole" for statements for purposes of 
medical treatment242-for which no advance notice is required-or 
admits it under the residual exception.243 Presently, no rule entitles a 
defendant to pretrial notice that a police officer will testify at trial and 
recount an accomplice's post-arrest "statement against interest" which 
implicates the defendant.244 But few would argue that a defendant has 
any lesser need to prepare to meet such hearsay than he would if, for 
example, the same accomplice made the same statement before a 
grandjury and the court found it admissible only under Rule 807.245 
Moreover, absent a rule requiring pretrial notice, the current 
system's heavy reliance on informal discovery2.it. can add to a 
defendant's uncertainty in anticipating hearsay. Regardless of the 
good faith of the prosecutor, even "open file" discovery may tum out 
to be a trap for the unwary. The prosecutor's file may include agents' 
240. Rule 807 reads: 
Id. 
[A] statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of 
the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to 
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the 
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 
241. See supra text accompanying notes 117-38. For a more detailed discussion of 
the modem expansion of some of the traditional, categorical exceptions, see 
Douglass, supra note 6, at 210-14. 
242 See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). 
243. See id. Rule 807. 
244. The admissibility of accomplice confessions as "statements against interest" 
has occupied considerable attention from the Court in recent years. See supra text 
accompanying notes 128-38. 
245. See United States v. McHan, 101F.3d1027, 1037-38 (4th Cir. 1996) (admitting 
grand jury testimony of deceased co-conspirator). 
246. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89. 
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memoranda of interviews with some government witnesses. But the 
written record of a witness's prior statement is typically less complete 
than fully developed trial testimony, which might include hearsay 
statements that a memorandum does not. Also, there may be no 
grand jury transcripts or interview memoranda at all for some 
government witnesses.247 Even after pouring through an "open file," 
defense counsel has no real assurance that he has seen all significant 
government hearsay. 
A hearsay-notice rule covering more than just residual hearsay 
would provide a measure of protection against such uncertainty. It 
would avoid the unfairness that now exists where notice is tied to the 
happenstance of which "pigeonhole" ultimately provides the legal 
basis for admitting the hearsay. Perhaps most important of all, more 
regular advance notice of important hearsay would help to wean 
defense counsel from a tradition of "exclusionary thinking,"248 and 
allow more realistic opportunities to contest hearsay after it is 
admitted in evidence. With more regular pretrial notice, defense 
counsel are more likely to find and use ammunition that may 
contradict hearsay or impeach a declarant, or to subpoena available 
declarants for in-court cross-examination. Since advance notice is the 
first step in contesting hearsay, expanding such notice is probably the 
most important single reform one could make toward restoring an 
adversarial balance when the prosecution proves its case through 
hearsay. 
One way to accomplish that reform would be to impose a general 
rule requiring pretrial notice for all prosecution hearsay.249 But a rule 
247. Prosecutors have no obligation to "create" Jencks material. See United States 
v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1289 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that the prosecutor did not 
violate the Jencks Act by instructing agents not to take notes during witness 
interview); United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). In 
some instances, prosecutors may choose not to place a witness before the grand jury. 
especially at an early stage in an investigation, in part to avoid creating discoverable 
Jencks material. 
248. I use the term "exclusionary thinking" to describe an approach to hearsay 
which begins and ends with the question of admissibility. Beginning with the basic 
law school course on Evidence, lawyers devote considerable attention to excluding 
hearsay from trials. But few lawyers, even experienced trial lawyers, pay sufficient 
attention to the process of contesting hearsay after it is admitted in evidence. See 
Brannon, supra note 7, at 158 (noting trial lawyers' "virtual total neglect" of 
opportunities to impeach hearsay declarants). 
In a previous article, I argued that the Court's treatment of the Confrontation 
Clause as a rule of admissibility leads to exclusionary thinking, and can cause defense 
counsel to ignore, or even to avoid, available opportunities to impeach hearsay. See 
Douglass, supra note 6, at 221-24. 
249. See Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 532 (calling for pretrial notice as a 
precondition for admission of all hearsay). Such a proposal may be less revolutionary 
than it appears at first blush. For practical purposes, a broad hearsay-notice 
requirement already exists in federal civil cases as a result of the command in Rule 26 
that parties disclose "all persons with knowledge" about the case, a category which 
obviously includes declarants of any significant hearsay. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Once a 
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requiring the prosecution to identify "all persons with knowledge," as 
Rule 26 requires of civil litigants, would run into the familiar 
Congressional roadblock against compelled pretrial disclosure of the 
identity of government \vitnesses.250 An expanded hearsay-notice 
rule, modeled after Rule 807 but covering "all out-of-court statements 
which a party intends to offer in evidence," raises the prospect of 
voluminous, time-consuming, and largely unhelpful pleadings which 
could bury important hearsay amidst a catalogue of every business 
record that a party might choose to offer at trial.251 A more realistic 
approach would extend a notice requirement in criminal cases to 
those forms of hearsay where surprise is most likely to disadvantage a 
defendant. In a rough way, such an approach may provide a means to 
balance hearsay and criminal discovery, by expanding notice 
requirements generally for those categories of hearsay where the law 
of evidence and Confrontation Clause rulings have already e:-.-panded 
the admissibility of prosecution hearsay. 
One problem, of course, would lie in identifying the categories 
where pretrial notice should be required. It seems doubtful that a 
line-up of selected hearsay exceptions-presumably chosen from 
among the categories currently in the Federal Rules-would serve the 
purpose. Not all "excited utterances," for example, are equally 
significant or equally subject to challenge through attacks on the 
credibility of the declarant. Indeed, a major problem with the current 
approach is that it ties pretrial notice to the "pigeonhole" under which 
the hearsay happens to be admitted. Since our aim would be to 
identify types of hearsay where surprise would be most costly, then we 
should require pretrial notice: (1) where the hearsay was most likely 
to be important, that is, to have an impact on the jury; and (2) where 
adversarial testing is most likely to make a difference, that is, where 
the risk of unreliability is greatest.252 Using these criteria, we might 
declarant is identified under Rule 26, an opponent in a civil case can learn the 
substance of any hearsay statements either through written interrogatories or by 
taking the declarant's deposition. See id. 
A similarly broad requirement is not without precedent in criminal discovery 
systems. For example, New Jersey requires prosecutors to disclose "names and 
addresses of any persons whom the prosecuting attorney knows to have relevant 
evidence or information .... " 31 New Jersey Criminal Practice and Procedure§ 476, 
at 538-39 (3d ed. 1999-2000) (discussing Rule 3:13-3(c)(6) of the New Jersey Rules 
Governing Criminal Practice). 
250. See supra text accompanying notes 170-72. 
251. This is McCormick's principal complaint about expanded hearsay-notice 
provisions. See McCormick Hombook, supra note 2, at 545 ("[A) notice requirement 
has the disadvantage of adding a further complication to an already overcrowded 
array of pretrial procedures .... "). 
252. Similar criteria govern "notice" requirements in other contexts, scattered 
through the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Such 
notice requirements typically appear in situations where evidence poses particular 
risks of unreliability because, in the absence of adversarial inquiry, the opportunity 
and the incentive to faJ?ricate or manipulate such evidence arc relatively high. See, 
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require advance notice of hearsay from "impact" declarants like crime 
victims and-where identity is in issue-identification eyewitnesses, as 
well as from "risky" declarants like accomplices and co-
conspirators.253 Then, we might add any hearsay statements made to 
police during criminal investigation, both because police witnesses are 
likely to have an increased impact on many jurors, and because the 
adversarial nature of criminal investigation adds to the risk of 
unreliability.254 We would then arrive at a notice requirement for all 
hearsay from crime victims, identification eyewitnesses, accomplices, 
and all hearsay offered through the testimony of a law enforcement 
agent reporting statements made in response to criminal investigation. 
One could debate whether this list is too broad or too narrow. A rule 
requiring pretrial notice of these categories of hearsay would not 
eliminate all danger of unfair surprise at trial. It might include some 
rather insignificant hearsay on occasion. But it would provide an 
effective counterweight to prosecution hearsay in those cases where 
liberal admission of hearsay seems most out of balance with limited 
criminal discovery rights. 
Of course, an expanded pretrial notice rule would not come without 
costs. Arguments against the rule might raise (1) witness-related 
concerns, (2) concerns with reciprocity of discovery, and (3) efficiency 
concerns. The Justice Department has maintained that compelled 
pretrial disclosure of witness lists or witness statements poses a serious 
threat of witness tampering, harassment, intimidation, or worse.255 No 
e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1 (notice of alibi), 12.2 (notice of insanity defense). Other 
notice requirements focus on evidence most likely to surprise a party because it 
relates to issues only tangential to the central claim or defense in the case. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 404(b) ("other crimes" evidence), 412(c) (evidence of victim's past sexual 
behavior), 413(b) (evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases), 414(b) 
(evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases), 609(b) (criminal convictions 
more than ten years old). 
253. Professor Swift developed the paradigm of the "risky declarant" as one whose 
"self-serving" interests raised particular concerns about reliability. See Eleanor Swift, 
Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 495, 508 (1987). An accomplice whose 
confession implicates her partner in crime clearly fits the model. 
254. Indeed, historical fears of the power of police to manipulate evidence 
obtained through interviews conducted in secret probably induced the Framers to 
write the Confrontation Clause into the Bill of Rights in the first place. See Berger, 
supra note 28, at 561. To the extent that modem confrontation theory allows the 
admission of such hearsay, a pretrial notice provision would be an important first step 
toward shedding any available light on the process that gave rise to the hearsay 
statements. 
Including hearsay reported by the police makes sense for another reason. Because 
of the typically close cooperation between police and prosecutors, it will seldom prove 
inconvenient for a prosecutor to identify and disclose such hearsay. Typically, the 
hearsay will already be recorded in a police report which the prosecutor has in his file. 
If the officer testifies to recount the hearsay, his report will be discoverable at trial 
under the Jencks Act in any event. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 810 F.2d 485, 490-
91 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Jencks Act requires the disclosure of a 
government agent's summaries and notes when the agent testifies at trial). 
255. See supra text accompanying notes 170-72. 
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doubt, similar arguments would greet any proposal requiring pretrial 
disclosure of hearsay declarants and their statements. No one 
questions the importance of witness security, particularly in cases of 
violent crime or organized crime where convincing witnesses to talk 
may be the prosecution's most difficult challenge. But, as discovery 
reform proponents argue, courts could address witness-security 
concerns by ordering disclosure as a general rule, but limiting 
discovery where the government produced evidence suggesting a 
realistic threat of \vitness tampering or intimidation.256 In fact, pretrial 
disclosure of witnesses is often the practice in federal prosecutions 
today. It is simply left to the unreviewable discretion of the 
prosecutor who decides what he will provide through informal 
discovery.257 
The case for compelled disclosure is even stronger when it comes to 
hearsay declarants. Often, the government's need for hearsay arises 
because a declarant is dead, has disappeared, or refuses to testify in 
court. In those circumstances, the necessity which opens the door to 
hearsay largely eliminates \vitness-security concerns. Unavailable 
witnesses are an unlikely-sometimes an impossible-target for 
tampering and intimidation. Even in the case of available declarants, 
the very nature of hearsay reduces concerns over pretrial disclosure of 
the declarant's identity. The declarant's story has already been told, 
and will be repeated at trial even in the declarant's absence. The 
defendant cannot change the hearsay by intimidating the declarant. 
Nor can the defendant profit by harming a declarant whose damaging 
story will be told in court in any event.:?..c;s If the declarant can add 
something that might qualify or explain the damaging hearsay, the 
256. See, e.g., Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 14 ("[T)he proper 
response to the intimidation problem cannot be to prevent discovery altogether; it is 
rather to regulate discovery in those cases in which it is thought that witness 
intimidation is a real possibility."). 
257. Federal law requires pretrial disclosure of witness lists in capital cases. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3432 (1994). Most states have rules either permitting or requiring disclosure 
of witness lists, and many foreign systems make such disclosures routinely. In fact, 
most federal prosecutors voluntarily disclose witnesses ahead of trial in most cases. In 
light of these practices, none of which has been tied to evidence of increased threats 
to witnesses, it seems less than convincing to insist on a rule that leaves disclosure of 
witnesses and their statements entirely in the discretion of the prosecutor. Indeed, 
one could argue that intimidation and harassment are just as likely to occur in the 
absence of disclosure. Defendants awaiting trial are inclined to make educated 
guesses about the prosecution's \vitnesses in any event. Speculation about who is 
"snitching" is not an uncommon jailhouse topic. Where defendants are inclined to 
threaten or intimidate, they do not require formal notice to start the process. In some 
instances, formal pretrial notice might actually serve to protect some nonwitncsses 
who would otherwise become targets of a defendant's misguided speculation. 
258. Admittedly, retaliation against the declarant is a concern, even though it 
would not affect the reporting of hearsay. But the same concern \viii arise in any 
event, as soon as the government offers the hearsay at trial. Pretrial disclosure 
neither increases nor decreases the prospect of retaliation. 
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defendant's only incentive is to deliver her safely to court to tell the 
rest of the story.259 
Historically, another typical argument against expanded criminal 
discovery stems from lack of reciprocity.260 The same argument might 
be made against a rule requiring disclosure of the prosecution's intent 
to use hearsay. But the Court's approach to reciprocal discovery 
under the Fifth Amendment largely undercuts this claim.261 Rule 
807's notice requirement applies to the defense as well as the 
prosecution. Properly drafted, a broader hearsay-notice rule, applying 
equally to prosecution and defense, would satisfy Fifth Amendment 
standards and still eliminate concerns that hearsay disclosure would 
be a one-way street in favor of the defense. 
Finally, one might oppose an expanded pretrial notice rule on 
grounds of efficiency. The rule would be an inconvenience to the 
disclosing party, who might chafe at the burden of previewing his 
entire case in an attempt to disclose which witnesses or documents 
were likely to recount hearsay. Moreover, every new rule brings new 
litigation. A pretrial disclosure requirement might tum routine 
hearsay objections into extended discovery disputes.262 
These efficiency concerns, however, are probably more theoretical 
than real. There is no evidence that notice provisions under Rule 807 
and in other contexts263 have created overwhelming burdens for 
litigants. Most trial lawyers take account of any significant hearsay in 
preparing for trial in any event, as they construct arguments in favor 
of admissibility. Notice to the opponent would impose a 
comparatively minor burden and would reduce unnecessary 
guesswork in the opponent's trial preparation. Moreover, disclosure 
of documents, transcripts, recordings and sometimes agents' interview 
memoranda-which often contain the hearsay statements which the 
government expects to use at trial-is already a routine part of 
259. Of course, there might remain witness-security concerns regarding any witness 
who must appear in court to relate hearsay statements. Disclosure of the hearsay 
typically would disclose its source. But, as with any other witness, the court could 
limit discovery in response to evidence justifying real concerns over safety or 
tampering. Of course, federal courts already have a track record with a hearsay-
notice rule. Nothing suggests that Rule 807's notice provision has created serious 
hazards for hearsay-relating witnesses. 
260. See Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 7. 
261. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), for example, the Court upheld 
Florida's notice of alibi rule against a Fifth Amendment challenge. See id. at 102-03; 
supra text accompanying notes 212-14. 
262. See McCormick Hornbook, supra note 2, at 545 (noting that hearsay-notice 
requirements might unnecessarily complicate pretrial proceedings). 
263. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), 412(c), 413(b), 414(b), 609(b) (requiring the 
government to provide notice of "other crimes" evidence, evidence of victim's past 
sexual behavior, evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases, evidence of similar 
crimes in child molestation cases, and criminal convictions more than ten years old, 
respectively). 
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voluntary discovery provided by federal prosecutors in many cases.2t.t 
Finally, if properly administered, an expanded hearsay-disclosure rule 
need not lead to lengthy discovery disputes. The purpose of notice is 
to avoid unfair surprise, not to increase the odds of excluding 
probative evidence.265 A disclosure rule should be flexible enough to 
permit courts to grant recesses or change the order of presenting some 
evidence to avoid surprise to an opponent. By showing such flexibility 
in dealing with other discovery conflicts in both civil and criminal 
trials, courts have proved quite able to dispose of notice-related 
disputes without serious disruption to the trial process.~1.16 
In fact, a broader rule requiring pretrial notice of hearsay likely 
would add to the efficiency of federal criminal trials. Important 
hearsay issues too often arise in the heat of a criminal trial. A notice 
rule would encourage resolution of such issues through the more 
deliberate process of a pretrial motion in limine. Perhaps most 
important, assuming that most parties would comply \vith a pretrial 
notice rule in good faith, the rule should actually reduce the number 
of claims of unfair surprise-and resultant delays-that now arise 
when hearsay erupts unexpectedly in a criminal triat!b7 Finally, in the 
case of available declarants, pretrial notice would minimize delays and 
disruptions at trial by allmving time for defense counsel or 
investigators to contact the declarant and serve a trial subpoena. 
Of course, rulemaking for federal courts is a laborious process. 
And there is no prospect that an expanded hearsay-notice provision in 
the Federal Rules of Evidence is close at hand. Still, even in the 
absence of an amendment to the Rules, federal courts have the power 
to order pretrial notice of the government's intention to rely on 
hearsay. The drafters of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
264. See Levenson, supra note 189, at 562-63. A pretrial disclosure rule could be 
drafted to provide that disclosure of documents or recordings containing the hearsay 
statements would satisfy the rule. That would avoid the unnecessary burden of 
requiring a party to file a separate pleading, for example, identifying every business 
record as a hearsay statement. 
265. Exclusion, of course, could remain an available sanction for repeated or willful 
violations. 
266. In fact, federal courts already pursue such a flexible approach when they apply 
Rule 807. See Rand, supra note 101, at 885-88. 
267. Federal courts already possess the power to grant recesses and regulate the 
order of proof to address problems of unfair surprise. See Fed. R. Evid. 61 l(a). It is 
less certain that they possess the power to exclude evidence based on surprise alone. 
Compare United States v. Cole, 857 F.2d 971. 976 (4th Cir. 1988) (suggesting evidence 
can be excluded under Rule 403 on grounds of unfair surprise), with Fed. R. faid. 403 
advisory committee's note ("The rule does not enumerate surprise as a ground for 
exclusion .... "). A rule requiring pretrial notice of hearsay would make that power 
explicit, as Rule 807 now does for residual hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 807. But the 
grant of such power does not require the court to use the sanction of exclusion in 
every case. Courts have exercised flexibility in administering Rule 807. \\ith the aim 
of avoiding surprise without excluding probative evidence. They could. and should, 
follow a similar approach under an expanded pretrial notice rule. 
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Procedure explicitly noted that the Rule "prescribe[ s] the minimum 
amount of discovery to which the parties are entitled. It is not 
intended to limit the judge's discretion to order broader discovery in 
appropriate cases."268 The Supreme Court has recognized the 
inherent power of federal courts to order discovery in the absence of a 
legislative mandate,269 and lower federal courts have exercised that 
power in a variety of circumstances.270 Most closely on point, federal 
courts have exercised that inherent power to order the government to 
disclose witness lists before trial,271 even though Congress has rejected 
proposals that would mandate such disclosure as a general rule.272 If 
federal courts can compel pretrial identification of witnesses, then 
certainly they can require identification of hearsay declarants where 
witness security concerns are diminished and unfair surprise is more 
likely. 
Whether courts have the same inherent authority to order pretrial 
disclosure of the substance of hearsay statements is more problematic. 
It is arguable that the Jencks Act precludes such compelled disclosure 
under the theory that the declarant is a "government witness."273 But, 
as outlined below, there are substantial reasons to dismiss the Jencks 
Act as a limit on pretrial discovery of prosecution hearsay. 
2. Rule 16: An Opportunity to Discover Written or Recorded 
Hearsay, Or a Rule Against the Compelled Pretrial Disclosure of 
Hearsay? 
Aside from discovery controlled by Brady's constitutional 
principles,274 Rule 16 governs most aspects of pretrial discovery in 
268. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's notes to 1974 amendment. 
269. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975) (recognizing "the 
federal judiciary's inherent power" to require discovery of witness statements). A 
similar power exists in civil cases. See Weinstein et al., supra note 16, § 802.05[1 ), at 
802-15 (noting that the trial judge has discretion, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rules or 
Civil Procedure, to require parties at the time of the pretrial conference to indicate 
the existence of statements whose admissibility is problematic). 
270. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1515 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(recognizing court's inherent authority to order pretrial disclosure of list or 
government witnesses); United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 603 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(recognizing the district court's inherent authority to order pretrial deposition of a 
government witness even though Rule 15 did not authorize such a deposition). 
271. See United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 54 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing 
court's inherent authority to order pretrial disclosure of list of government witnesses): 
Moore. 936 F.2d at 1515 (same). 
272 See supra text accompanying notes 170-72. 
273. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994) ("[N]o statement or report in the possession of the 
United States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government 
witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpena [sic], discovery, or 
inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the 
case."). 
274. See infra text accompanying notes 333-37. 
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federal prosecutions.275 Rule 16(a)-which relates to defense 
discovery from the government276-gives us two, somewhat 
antagonistic commands. First, Rule 16(a)(l) is a rule compelling 
disclosure. It specifies five categories of information which, upon 
request, the government must provide to the defense.277 Second, Rule 
16(a)(2)-which incorporates the Jencks Act278-is a rule forbidding 
courts to compel disclosure. It limits the reach of the discovery rights 
created in Rule 16(a)(l) by prohibiting any compelled pretrial 
disclosure of the statements of government witnesses and prospective 
witnesses.279 These dual commands reflect an uneasy compromise 
between the drafters' efforts to permit discovery of the most critical 
elements of the government's case on the one hand, and Congress' 
reluctance to require pretrial discovery that would disclose the 
identity and statements of government \vitnesses on the other. 
Unfortunately, the drafters left us with little clue where to fit 
hearsay in that compromise. Neither Rule 16, nor the Jencks Act, nor 
their respective legislative histories explicitly mentions hearsay. To 
understand how, or if, these rules apply to prosecution hearsay, we 
must consider two questions. First, what hearsay-related information 
does Rule 16(a)(l) compel the government to disclose? Second, are 
hearsay declarants government "witnesses" or "prospective 
witnesses" whose statements are protected from compelled pretrial 
275. Defendants have no general right to learn the government's case. See 
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). 
276. Rule 16(b) provides for reciprocal discovery from the defense. See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 16(b). 
277. Rule 16(a)(l) requires the government, upon request of the defendant, to 
disclose: (A) statements of the defendant, (B) defendant's criminal record, (C) 
documents and tangible objects material to preparation of the defense or which the 
government intends to offer in evidence at trial, (D) reports of scientific examinations 
and tests, and (E) a summary of expert witness testimony. See id. Ruic 16(a)(l)(A)-
(E). 
278. 18 U.S.C. § 3500. The Jencks Act requires disclosure of a narrowly defined 
category of government witness statements, but only after the witness has testified at 
trial or in a pretrial proceeding. See id. 
279. Rule 16(a)(2) provides: 
(2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure. 
Except as provided in paragraphs (A), (B), (D), and (E) of subdivision 
(a){l), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, 
memoranda, or other internal government documents made by the attorney 
for the government or any other government agent investigating or 
prosecuting the case. Nor does the rule authorize the discovery or 
inspection of statements made by government witnesses or prospective 
government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2). Thus, the Rule contains two limits on disclosure. First, it 
creates a form of government "work product" privilege, exempting internal 
government reports and memoranda from discovery that Rule 16(a)(l)(C) might 
otherwise require. Second, Rule 16(a)(2) makes it clear that, with respect to 
government witness statements, the Jencks Act trumps any disclosure that Rule 
16(a)(l) might otherwise require. 
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disclosure under Rule 16(a)(2) and the Jencks Act? We will consider 
these questions in turn. 
a. What Hearsay-Related Information Does Rule 16(a)(l) Require to 
Be Disclosed? 
Of the five categories of discoverable information listed in Rule 
16(a)(l), only one-Rule 16(a)(l)(A), which relates to discovery of 
the defendant's own statements-has attracted much attention as a 
tool for discovery of hearsay. In retrospect, that attention has proved 
unfortunate because 16(a)(l)(A) is ill-suited to that task and because 
litigation over 16(a)(l)(A) may have diverted attention from 
potentially more fruitful arguments. Instead, Rule 16(a)(l)(C)-
which relates to discovery of documents and tangible objects-may 
offer more promise as a device for discovering prosecution hearsay 
before trial.280 
I. Rule 16(a)(l)(A) 
This subsection of the Rule establishes defendant's right to pretrial 
discovery of his own statements. On its face, it seems to have nothing 
to do with discovery of the out-of-court statements of anyone other 
than the defendant. For the first decade after the Rule took effect, 
however, defendants enjoyed some success in extending the reach of 
the Rule to cover an important and widely-used form of prosecution 
hearsay: the out-of-court statements of defendant's co-conspirators. 
Following the lead of Judge Weinstein,281 a number of courts reasoned 
that, since co-conspirator statements are admissible under the hearsay 
rules as "vicarious admissions" of the defendant,282 they should 
likewise be treated as defendant's statements for purposes of pretrial 
discovery.283 The theory of co-conspirator statement discovery under 
Rule 16(a)(l)(A), however, reached its zenith by 1985.284 Today, it 
280. In requiring discovery of the basis of an expert opinion, Rule 16(a)(l)(E) also 
may bring about disclosure of some prosecution hearsay. In fact, it may reveal 
inadmissible hearsay which will nonetheless form the basis of the expert's opinion. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 703 (expert need not base opinion on admissible evidence). 
281. See United States v. Percevault, 61 F.R.D. 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (Weinstein, 
J.), rev'd, 490 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1974). 
282. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The rule classifies co-conspirator statements 
as "not hearsay." Id. 
283. This breakthrough was especially significant in light of the growing number of 
drug and organized crime conspiracy cases in federal courts since the 1970s. Such 
cases often rely upon co-conspirator "hearsay" statements admissible under Rule 
801(d)(2)(E), and discovery of such statements can be a critical step in preparing the 
defense. 
284. See United States v. Roberts, 793 F.2d 580, 583-86 (4th Cir. 1986) (statements 
of co-conspirators discoverable under Rule 16(a)(l)(A) where co-conspirator not 
expected to testify as government witness), rev'd en bane, 811 F.2d 257, 258-59 (4th 
Cir. 1987); United States v. McMillen, 489 F.2d 229, 231 (7th Cir. 1972) (same); 
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stands rejected after a series of appellate decisions relying on the 
"plain language" of the Rule to establish that, Rule 801(d)(2)(E) 
notwithstanding, co-conspirators are not "the defendant" and their 
statements are not discoverable under Rule 16(a)(l)(A).w 
Despite its early success, Rule 16(a)(l)(A) seems unlikely to be 
resurrected as a tool for discovering co-conspirator hearsay, and 
probably for good reason.286 Aside from the fact that the "vicarious 
admission" theory stretches both the language and the purpose of the 
Rule, the theory seems doomed for more practical reasons as well. 
The government typically comes into possession of co-conspirator 
statements through one of three means: either (1) a co-conspirator 
makes post-arrest statements to a law enforcement agent who reports 
them in a memorandum and will testify about them at trial; or (2) 
during the course of criminal activity, a co-conspirator makes 
statements to an undercover agent or informant who can then testify 
at trial regarding the statements; or (3) the government obtains an 
audio or video recording of a co-conspirator's statement in the course 
of committing the crime. Regardless of one's view of the "vicarious 
admission" theory, Rule 16(a)(l)(A) is either unhelpful or 
unnecessary in each of these three cases. In the first case, the 
vicarious admission theory does not even apply, because the post-
arrest statement is not made "in furtherance of the conspiracy" and, 
hence, would not be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) in any event. 
In the second case, in order to disclose the co-conspirator's statement, 
the government must also disclose the "statement" of a prospective 
United States v. Konefal, 566 F. Supp. 698, 706 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (same). By 1985, one 
treatise noted, the view reflected in these decisions was the "more \\idely accepted 
interpretation of R. 16(a)(l)(A)." See 8 Jeremy C. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice CJ! 16.05[1], at 16-77 (2d ed. 1985). 
In a clear example of the widening hearsay-discovery imbalance, federal courts 
retreated from this rule of discovery at the same time the Supreme Court was 
expanding the admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay. See Bourjaily v. United States, 
483 U.S. 171, 176-81 (1987) (holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) modified 
the traditional "bootstrapping" rule of Glasser \'. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 
(1942), which had required independent evidence of conspiracy as a foundation for 
the admission of co-conspirator statements); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400 
(1986) (abandoning the unavailability requirement for admission of co-conspirator 
hearsay under the Confrontation Clause). 
285. See United States v. Rivera, 6 F3d 431, 439 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1988); /11 re United States, 834 F2d 283, 
286-87 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Roberts, 811 F.2d 257, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(en bane); see also United States v. Jackson, 757 F2d 1486, 1493 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) ("To attempt, as some courts ha\'e done, to justify 
discovery of the co-conspirator's statement as a 'vicarious admission' of the defendant 
is to make one person out of two .... " (citations omitted)). 
286. In cases where one of the defendants is an organization such as a corporation 
or labor union, Rule 16(a)(l)(A) still carries some potential to provide pretrial access 
to some important hearsay statements. In 1994, the Rule was amended to require the 
government to disclose statements of corporate officers or agents whose words or 
conduct might legally bind the defendant organization. 
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government witness-the undercover agent or informant who will 
relate the hearsay at trial. Such a statement of a prospective 
government witness is protected from disclosure by the Jencks Act.287 
Finally, the "vicarious admission" theory is unnecessary in the third 
case because, as I outline below, the audio or videotape is a 
"document or tangible object" discoverable under Rule 16(a)(l)(C). 
ii. Rule 16(a)(l)(C) 
The unsuccessful effort to bring co-conspirator statements under 
Rule 16(a)(l)(A) was the defense bar's only sustained foray into 
hearsay-related discovery under Rule 16. That choice seems 
misguided in retrospect, not only for the reasons outlined above, but 
also because Rule 16(a)(l)(C) is a rule of potentially broader 
application when it comes to prosecution hearsay. Ironically, Rule 
16(a)(l)(C) has been largely ignored as a device for discovering 
hearsay.288 
Rule 16(a)(l)(C) gives defendants a right to discover any 
"documents and tangible objects" which are "material to the 
preparation of the defendant's defense" or which "are intended for 
use by the government as evidence-in-chief at the trial."289 Though 
the Rule says nothing of hearsay, its language literally covers a broad 
category of important hearsay frequently used by prosecutors: out-of-
court statements which the government will offer in evidence in their 
"original" written or electronically recorded form, rather than through 
the testimony of a third party.290 Thus, documents and tangible 
objects discoverable under Rule 16(a)(l)(C) can include some of the 
most critical hearsay a defendant may face. For example, Rule 
16(a)(l)(C) would include: the tape recording of a phone call between 
co-conspirators discussing an upcoming transaction involving the 
defendant; the medical record reflecting a child's account of sexual 
abuse; a murder victim's recorded "911" call; an accomplice's 
videotaped confession to police; and, more routinely, a wide variety of 
business or public records documenting anything from complex 
287. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994). 
288. In the many cases debating discovery of co-conspirator statements under Rule 
16(a)(l)(A), most defendants appear to have ignored the alternative argument that 
Rule 16(a)(l)(C) permits discovery of co-conspirator statements contained in 
"documents" (other than internal government memoranda) or in "tangible objects" 
such as audio tapes. 
289. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(C). The Rule also applies to documents and things 
which were "obtained from or belong to the defendant." Id. On occasion, such items 
might contain important admissible hearsay, such as a co-conspirator's statements 
recorded on defendant's answering machine or found in a letter written to the 
defendant. 
290. The function of the third-party witness in introducing such hearsay is to 
authenticate the document or recording that contains the hearsay statements. See Fed. 
R. Evid. 901. 
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financial transactions to the daily weather.291 Indeed, such hearsay 
can have special impact on a jury precisely because it is in writing, or 
in a tangible, audible, or viewable form.292 
Of course, not every government document or tape recording is 
discoverable under Rule 16(a)(l)(C) simply because it contains a 
hearsay statement the government may offer at trial. Rule 16{a){2) 
precludes discovery of internal government memoranda. Such a 
memorandum would not become discoverable merely because it 
reported hearsay.293 Likewise, the Jencks Act protects against 
compelled pretrial disclosure of any statement of a witness who will 
testify at trial for the government. The testifying witness's statement 
does not become discoverable merely because it recites hearsay 
statements of someone else. Still, the potential reach of Rule 
16(a)(l)(C) as a device for discovering written or recorded hearsay is 
significant; it applies typically where the government possesses the 
most devastating forms of hearsay: statements written by the 
declarant, or recorded from the declarant's own mouth.2'>.i 
There remains, however, a potential roadblock to discovery of 
hearsay under Rule 16(a)(l)(C). Hearsay statements cannot be the 
subject of a pretrial discovery order if the hearsay declarant is a 
291. Given the scarcity of reported decisions, it is hard to gauge how frequently 
today's criminal defendants employ Rule 16(a)(l)(C) in this manner, or how often 
federal courts support those efforts. Certainly prosecutors routinely disclose volumes 
of documentary evidence under the Rule without giving a moment's thought to the 
fact that they are really disclosing the written or reported statements of multiple, 
sometimes anonymous, hearsay declarants. But whether prosecutors and courts 
always view audio and video recordings of hearsay-or even some forms of written 
hearsay-as discoverable under 16(a)(l)(C), is far from clear. A number of decisions 
seem to assume that such recordings are "tangible objects" discoverable under 
16(a)(l)(C). Throughout the co-conspirator hearsay debates under 16(a)(l)(A), 
however, defendants and courts alike seemed to ignore the possibility that tape 
recordings of co-conspirator statements were discoverable under an alternate theory 
provided by 16(a)(l)(C). 
292. An audio or videotape, for example, brings the dcclarant's voice to the jury's 
ears or his image to their eyes. Jurors are more likely to remember and place 
emphasis upon such statements than upon hearsay that is merely related by another 
government witness. 
293. If an agent testified at trial regarding hearsay he recorded in a memorandum, 
however, the memorandum might then become discoverable after his direct 
testimony. The agent would be a "witness called by the United States," and his prior 
written statement-the memorandum-would be subject to discovery at trial under 
the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b ). See United States v. Welch, 810 F 2d 485, 490-91 
(5th Cir. 1987). 
294. Rule 16(a)(l)(C) can operate not only to require disclosure of documentary or 
recorded hearsay, but also to provide additional discovery relating to that hearsay. 
The Rule covers documents and things "material" to preparation of the defense, a 
category broad enough to include any document or tangible evidence that may shed 
light on the credibility of the declarant or the circumstances under which the hearsay 
statement was made. Thus, a defendant may invoke Ruic 16(a)(l)(C) before trial, 
first, to obtain access to written and recorded hearsay in government hands, and 
second, to gather some of the ammunition that may assist in impeaching a hearsay 
declarant or discrediting a hearsay statement. 
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"government witness" under the Jencks Act. To that question we 
turn next. 
b. Are Hearsay Declarants "Witnesses" or "Prospective Witnesses" 
Whose Statements are Protected by Rule 16(a)(2) and the Jencks 
Act from Compelled Pretrial Disclosure? 
We often think of the Jencks Act as a rule of discovery. It functions 
that way at trial. After a government witness has testified on direct 
examination at trial, the Jencks Act requires the government, upon 
defendant's request, to produce a narrowly defined category of the 
witness's prior statements.295 
In the first instance, however, the Jencks Act is a rule against 
compelled discovery. The first sentence of the Jencks Act provides: 
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no 
statement or report in the possession of the United States which was 
made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness 
(other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpena [sic], 
discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct 
examination in the trial of the case.296 
Rule 16(a)(2) makes it clear that, as a rule against compelled 
pretrial discovery, the Jencks Act trumps any provision in Rule 
16(a)(l) that might otherwise require pretrial disclosure of 
government witness statements.297 To determine whether Rule 16 
creates any right to discover hearsay before trial, therefore, we must 
first determine whether the hearsay declarant is a "Government 
witness or prospective Government witness" under the Jencks Act. If 
295. The Jencks Act states: 
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct 
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United 
States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in 
the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to 
which the witness has testified. 
18 u.s.c. § 3500(b). 
Under the Jencks Act, a "statement" is: (1) a written statement made by the witness: 
(2) "a stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording;" or (3) a grand jury 
transcript. 18 U.S.C. § 3500{d). The notes or memoranda of an agent or attorney 
reporting the substance of an interview with a witness are not "statements" of the 
witness under the Jencks Act unless the notes or memoranda are shown to the witness 
and "signed or otherwise adopted or approved" by her. See United States v. 
Roseboro, 87 F.3d 642, 645-46 (4th Cir. 1996) (defendant not entitled to discover 
agent's notes where agent did not read them in their entirety to witness and ask 
witness to approve them); United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1994) 
{defendant not entitled to discover agent's notes which were neither verbatim recital 
of interview nor writings signed or approved by witness). 
296. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). 
297. Rule 16(a)(2) provides: "Nor does [Rule 16] authorize the discovery or 
inspection of statements made by government witnesses or prospective government 
witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16{a){2). 
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she is a witness, then her hearsay statements are not discoverable until 
trial. If she is not, then-as we explored in the previous section-
Rule 16(a)(l)(C) may authorize discovery of a \vide range of 
documentary and electronically recorded hearsay and related 
information. 298 
At the outset, we can set aside one category of declarant from all 
the others. The declarant whom the government expects to call at 
trial is obviously a "prospective Government witness" as described in 
the Jencks Act. The clear language of the Jencks Act prohibits 
compelled pretrial disclosure of her statements. But what of the more 
typical hearsay declarant-the one who is never expected to testify at 
trial? 
There are more than a few reasonable arguments for treating 
nontestifying declarants as "witnesses" under the Jencks Act. We 
might begin with a textual argument. After all, the word "witness," in 
its broadest sense, simply means someone who sees, hears, or 
perceives an event. Hearsay declarants certainly fit that definition. 
Functionally, hearsay declarants fit an even narrower definition of the 
term "witness." The government uses hearsay declarants, like other 
"witnesses," to relate information to the jury. Hearsay declarants 
simply do so indirectly through the words of a testifying witness or 
through a writing or recording. 
There is more to the textual argument. The Jencks Act restricts 
discovery regarding government witnesses "other than the 
defendant." But the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government 
from calling the defendant as a prosecution \vitness.299 He could only 
be a "government witness," therefore, through the admission in 
evidence of his earlier hearsay statements. If hearsay declarants are 
not "witnesses" under the Jencks Act, one could argue, there would 
be no need to include the phrase "other than the defendant" in its 
text. To avoid treating that phrase as meaningless surplusage, the 
textualist might argue, hearsay declarants must be "witnesses." 
We could turn next to judicial interpretation of the Rule. In an en 
bane ruling on discovery of co-conspirator statements, the Fourth 
Circuit embraced a government argument that discovery was 
precluded under Rule 16(a)(2) and the Jencks Act.300 The court found 
that even nontestifying co-conspirator declarants should be treated 
like testifying "government \vitnesses" under the Jencks Act. Its 
decision rested on a broad view of the "witness safety" purposes 
which gave rise to the Jencks Act. The Fourth Circuit majority argued 
that treating declarants as "witnesses" under the Jencks Act comports 
with the congressional purpose of protecting from pretrial harassment 
298. See supra text accompanying notes 289-94. 
299. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (stating that criminal 
defendants have an unqualified right not to testify). 
300. See United States v. Roberts, 811 F.2d 257, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane). 
2168 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
or intimidation those who provide information which the government 
needs to prove its case.301 That approach, the court noted, also 
provides an added measure of protection for those testifying witnesses 
who must relate spoken hearsay at trial, since disclosure of hearsay 
could likewise disclose the identity of the testifying witness and the 
information he provided to the government.302 The Fourth Circuit 
does not stand alone. The Second Circuit likewise has applied the 
Jencks Act to overturn a pretrial order compelling the government to 
disclose statements of nontestifying co-conspirators.303 
There is also an attractive constitutional basis for treating hearsay 
declarants as "witnesses" under the Jencks Act. In applying the 
Confrontation Clause to hearsay, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
stated that the hearsay declarant is a "witness against" the accused for 
Sixth Amendment purposes.304 Congress passed the Jencks Act in 
part to implement the Court's ruling in Jencks v. United States,305 a 
decision which-though not explicitly based on constitutional 
principle-was clearly driven by Confrontation Clause concerns.306 If 
the Jencks Act, at least indirectly, is a child of the Confrontation 
Clause, then it makes sense to interpret the key term in the Jencks 
Act just as we interpret the same term in the Sixth Amendment. 
Following that reasoning, the declarant is a "witness" under both the 
Confrontation Clause and the Jencks Act.307 
301. See id. at 259 ("The phrase 'witness safety' incorporates our concerns about 
those persons whose inculpatory statements may be introduced at trial. The 
dichotomy the dissent would have us draw between declarants and witnesses is utterly 
unrealistic."). 
302. See id. 
303. See In re United States, 834 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1987). At least one district 
court within the Second Circuit, however, contends that In re United States does not 
reach so far. See United States v. Murgas, 967 F. Supp. 695, 715 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) 
("The Jencks Act has no application to the statements of those other than actual or 
prospective government witnesses. It does not expressly prohibit the pretrial cross-
disclosure of nonwitness coconspirator codefendant statements. Indeed, that 
particular issue could not have even been before the Second Circuit in In re United 
States."). 
304. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992). For a more detailed discussion 
of the status of declarants as "witnesses" under the Confrontation Clause, sec 
Douglass, supra note 6, at 225-26; supra note 44. 
305. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
306. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 68 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("Jencks was based on our supervisory authority rather than the Constitution, 'but it 
would be idle to say that the commands of the Constitution were not close to the 
surface of the decision."' (quoting Palemo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63 
{1959) (Brennan, J., concurring))). 
307. In a previous article, I suggested that the Court's treatment of declarants as 
"witnesses" under the Confrontation Clause called for similar treatment under the 
Jencks Act: 
The Jencks Act provides for the discovery of the witness's statements 
"[a]fter a witness called by the United States has testified on direct 
examination." For Confrontation Clause purposes at least, the Court tells us 
that a hearsay declarant is a "witness against" an accused. The hearsay 
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Finally, treating declarants as "witnesses" under the Jencks Act fits 
neatly with their treatment under Rule 806 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Rule 806 provides that the opponent may attack the 
declarant's credibility with any evidence that would be admissible for 
that purpose if the declarant testified in person.:>as When a 
government \vitness testifies at trial, the Jencks Act requires the 
government to disclose prior statements by the witness on the same 
subject matter.309 Such "Jencks material" often forms the grist for 
defendant's cross-examination. If Jencks applies to declarants just as 
to testifying \vitnesses, then it likewise requires production of the 
declarant's other relevant statements once hearsay is admitted in 
evidence. Rule 806 then permits defendant to use those statements to 
impeach the declarant just as he might use them in impeaching a 
testifying \vitness. 
Despite this array of arguments, however, serious difficulties arise if 
we recognize the declarant as a "witness" under the Jencks Act. For 
one thing, we would put the Jencks Act and Rule 807 at odds. Rule 
807 compels the government to disclose residual hearsay statements 
before trial. But if the declarant is a "government witness," then the 
Jencks Act forbids courts to compel the same disclosure that Rule 807 
requires. The easy answer to that conflict may be that Rule 807, 
enacted years after the Jencks Act, is simply an exception to Jencks' 
general rule against compelled disclosure. Pretrial disclosure of 
residual hearsay is especially important, one might argue, so the 
exception makes sense. 
But an even larger problem looms if nontestifying hearsay 
declarants are ''\vitnesses" under the Jencks Act. Business records, 
public records, and other documents routinely disclosed by the 
government during pretrial discovery are chock full of assertions by 
declarants who \vill never testify. If such declarants are government 
witnesses covered by the Jencks Act, then no court could compel 
declarant's "testimony," in the form of hearsay, is offered in evidence in the 
government's case-in-chief. As an exercise in interpreting statutory 
language, then, it takes no large leap to conclude that a declarant is a 
"witness called by the United States" under the Jencks Act and that she has 
in effect "testified on direct examination" once the government has 
introduced her hearsay statements. 
Douglass, supra note 6, at 265-66. 
While I continue to believe that a defendant's right to discover statements of 
government "witnesses" should extend to statements of hearsay declarants, I am now 
convinced that application of the Jencks Act to hearsay is far more complex than I 
originally believed. As I outline below, see infra text accompanying notes 309-18, 
there are perhaps equally persuasive arguments that at least some hearsay declarants 
should not be treated as "witnesses" under the Jencks Act. Of course, since the 
Jencks Act is a two-edged sword-requiring discovery at trial, but prohibiting pretrial 
discovery of witness statements-neither interpretation offers an unqualified 
opportunity to expand the range of hearsay-related discovery. 
308. See Fed. R. Evid. 806. 
309. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1994). 
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production of such documents before trial under Rule 16(a)(l)(C). 
The absurdity of such a rule would be immediately apparent to any 
prosecutor or defense attorney who has ever tried a white-collar case, 
a money-laundering charge, an organized crime matter, or any other 
case where the government's proof includes a volume of significant 
documentary evidence. Of course, if all hearsay declarants are 
"witnesses" under the Jencks Act, then defendant has no right to 
pretrial discovery of the recorded 911 phone call of a victim, the 
videotaped post-arrest "statement against interest" of an accomplice, 
the medical record reflecting the child-victim's account of sexual 
abuse, or the tape-recorded phone call between his co-conspirators, 
even where the government expects to offer those very items in 
evidence at trial. It is hard to imagine that Congress expected the 
Jencks Act to gut Rule 16(a)(l)(C) so severely. 
The "witness safety" rationale which led the Fourth and Second 
Circuits to extend Jencks protection to hearsay declarants is also open 
to question. Certainly, there are plenty of hearsay declarants for 
whom safety, intimidation, and witness tampering poses no concern at 
all. Some declarants are dead, some are inaccessible, and some are 
even anonymous. Moreover, unlike trial testimony, the content of 
hearsay is fixed before trial. No amount of tampering with the 
declarant will change the statement. Of course, tampering with a 
witness who might recount the declarant's out-of-court statement 
remains a problem. But, in most cases of written or recorded hearsay, 
there is no such witness. The jury gets the hearsay straight from the 
mouth-or the pen-of the absent declarant.310 Using the Jencks Act 
to prevent pretrial disclosure of hearsay in every case seems like 
exploding a bomb to kill a mosquito. It may hit the desired target, but 
the residual damage is hard to justify.311 
Finally, when it comes to judicial authority, there is precedent 
conflicting with the views of the Second and Fourth Circuits, but in a 
different context. In United States v. Williams-Davis,312 the District of 
Columbia Circuit ruled on the defendant's request at trial for 
disclosure of Jencks material of a nontestifying hearsay declarant after 
the government introduced the hearsay in evidence.313 The court held 
310. One could theorize a "witness safety" concern for the witness whose testimony 
might be necessary to authenticate written or recorded hearsay. But such an 
argument seems far-fetched. 
311. It is worth observing that Rule 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires 
pretrial disclosure of the substance of hearsay, along with the name and address of the 
declarant. Yet Congress incorporated that notice requirement in the residual hearsay 
exceptions with no apparent fear for "declarant safety." There is no evidence that 
hearsay disclosure under the Rule has led to harassment of declarants. And if a 
particular case gave rise to realistic safety concerns, courts certainly have the power to 
delay disclosure. 
312. 90 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
313. See id. at 512-13. 
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that the declarant was not a "witness" under the Jencks Act and, 
accordingly, the Jencks Act created no right to discover the 
declarant's prior statements.314 Reciting the arguments for and against 
treatment of the declarant as a "witness" under the Jencks Act, 
however, is easier than resolving the issue. Still, a few observations 
may point toward solutions. First, judicial interpretation of the Act 
has been inconsistent, and that inconsistency is unfair to defendants. 
When defendants have sought pretrial discovery, courts have shielded 
hearsay from disclosure by ruling that declarants are "witnesses" 
under the Jencks Act.315 When defendants have sought discovery at 
trial, courts have denied discovery on the grounds that declarants are 
not witnesses.316 In other words, "Heads, I win. Tails, you lose." 
Obviously, the government cannot have it both ways. At a minimum, 
defendants should be entitled to (1) discovery of written and recorded 
hearsay before trial \vith no restriction imposed by the Jencks Act, or 
(2) discovery at trial of all relevant prior statements of the declarant, 
after hearsay has been received in evidence. Either result, applied 
consistently, would improve the current state of affairs. 
Second, it is at least worth considering whether a middle-ground 
might avoid some of the disadvantages of either interpretation of the 
Jencks Act. One could support an argument that some nontestifying 
declarants are "\vitnesses" under the Jencks Act, while others are not. 
In the Jencks Act, the word "Government" prominently precedes the 
word ''\vitness." An observer of an event, one might argue, only 
becomes a "Government \vitness" when she testifies at triaP17 or a 
"prospective Government \vitness" when she reports her observations 
to the authorities for the purpose of using the information in a 
314. See id. at 513 ("[T]hat a declarant is treated as a witness for purposes of Rule 
801(d)(2)(E) or Rule 806 does not mean he becomes one for purposes of the Jencks 
Act."). At least one federal district court has reached the same conclusion. See 
United States v. Padilla, No. Sl-94-CR-313-CSH, 1996 WL 389300, at 0 2 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 11, 1996). 
315. See In re United States, 834 F.2d 283, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Roberts, 811F.2d257, 259 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane). 
316. See Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 512-13; Padil/a, 1996 WL389300, at OZ. 
317. In the Confrontation Clause context, Justice Scalia made a similar argument: 
The Sixth Amendment does not literally contain a prohibition upon 
[hearsay], since it guarantees the defendant only the right to confront "the 
witnesses against him." As applied in the Sixth Amendment's context of a 
prosecution, the noun "witness"-in 1791 as today-could mean either (a) 
one "who knows or sees any thing; one personally present" or (b) "one who 
gives testimony" or who "testifies," i.e., "[i]n judicial proceeciings, (one who) 
make[s] a solemn declaration under oath, for the purpose of establishing or 
making proof of some fact to a court." The former meaning (one "who 
knows or sees") would cover hearsay evidence, but is excluded in the Sixth 
Amendment by the words following the noun: "witnesses against him." The 
phrase obviously refers to those who give testimony against the defendant at 
trial. 
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia. J., dissenting). 
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prosecution.318 Hearsay statements made under other circumstances 
by someone who will never testify in court-like the "statements" of a 
payroll clerk compiling a business record, a co-conspirator's phone 
call to order the next shipment of heroin, or even the frightened 911 
call of an assault victim seeking aid-are not the statements of a 
"Government witness" under this view, even though the government 
might later choose to offer them in evidence in a criminal trial. A 
sworn statement to police or a videotaped interrogation of an 
accomplice, on the other hand, would be the statement of a 
"Government witness" even though the declarant never appeared in 
the courtroom. 
There are several virtues to this middle-ground approach. First, it 
gives defendant pretrial access under Rule 16(a)(l)(C) to written or 
recorded hearsay which the government will put in evidence in its 
original form, except where the declarant made the statement in an 
interview with police or prosecutors. And statements to authorities in 
connection with prosecution are seldom admissible in any event,319 
except where the government relies on the residual exception.320 In 
those cases, Rule 807 would provide an independent avenue for 
pretrial discovery.321 Second, at trial this approach would provide 
discovery of Jencks material in cases where the government succeeded 
in introducing grand jury testimony of an unavailable declarant, post-
arrest statements of an accomplice, or a victim's statement identifying 
her assailant to police. These and similar cases of hearsay created 
during criminal investigation are often the ones where impeaching a 
hearsay declarant is most important and where access to Jencks 
material is, therefore, most critical.322 On the other hand, this middle-
318. At least one circuit has concluded that persons interviewed by government 
agents are "prospective Government witnesses" under the Jencks Act even if the 
government decides not to call them as witnesses. See United States v. Mills, 810 F.2d 
907, 910 (9th Cir. 1987). Logically, those same interviewees would remain 
"prospective Government witnesses" if the government intended to present their 
"testimony" in the form of hearsay through the mouth of the interviewing agent. 
319. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1901 (1999) (finding an accomplice's 
post-arrest confession not admissible under Confrontation Clause); Williamson v. 
United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994) (holding that only "genuinely self-
inculpatory" portions of accomplice's post-arrest statement may be admitted under 
hearsay exception for statements against interest). 
320. The many federal cases admitting grand jury testimony would fall in this 
category. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101. 
321. The Rule 807 pretrial notice requirement would have to be viewed as an 
exception to the Jencks Act's prohibition on pretrial disclosure of statements of 
government witnesses. No other interpretation of the Rule, however, would make 
sense. Otherwise, Rule 807 and the Jencks Act would be hopelessly contradictory. 
See supra text accompanying notes 309-10. 
322. As a general rule, these are the cases where the credibility and consistency of 
the declarant, rather than the circumstances giving rise to the statement, are our 
principal concern in assessing the accuracy of the statement. Hearsay created during 
the adversarial process of criminal investigation often carries the greatest dangers of 
unreliability. See, e.g., Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1905 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting 
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ground approach would not require production of Jencks material 
relating to a business record or a co-conspirator statement-forms of 
hearsay which are viewed as reliable more because of the context in 
which they are made than because of the credibility of the declarant.m 
Finally, this approach to the "witness" dilemma may be most 
consistent with the \vitness-security aims of the Jencks Act. It 
provides comfort to witnesses approached by police investigators, and 
thereby encourages cooperation with authorities. But it does not 
preclude disclosure when the statement is made without regard to any 
criminal investigation.324 
Admittedly, neither the "pick one" nor the middle ground solution 
to the declarant-as-\vitness dilemma is fully satisfactory.m A better 
solution would be to change the rules and eliminate the problem. The 
complexity of this issue, evidenced by the inconsistent judicial 
approaches, cries out for a legislative or rulemaking "clean up." The 
present muddle exists because rulemakers really gave no thought to 
hearsay when they wrote the discovery rules, and gave little thought 
to discovery when they wrote the hearsay rules:~ZL> A coordinated 
approach makes more sense. 
that "accusatory statements taken by law enforcement personnel with a view to 
prosecution" raise more serious reliability concerns than similar statements made to 
friends or family members outside of an investigative context); cf. Berger. supra note 
28, at 561-62 (arguing that concerns over police power to manipulate evidence 
obtained through ex parte investigation was a principal concern underlying the right 
of confrontation). 
323. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (noting that co-
conspirator's in-court testimony "seldom will reproduce ... the evidentiary value of 
his statements during the course of the conspiracy"). 
324. Of course, declarants whose statements merely found their way into police 
hands would not be without protection. Courts. in their discretion, can always delay 
disclosure in the face of real security concerns. 
325. One problem with any middle-ground approach is that it adds a layer of 
complexity. It would require a court lo determine if a statement was made in an 
investigative setting before deciding whether the Jencks Act applied. A rule applying 
consistently to all declarants would be simpler to administer. 
There is another possible approach that would preserve both defendant's right to 
discover documentary hearsay under 16(a)(l)(C) and also his right to obtain the 
equivalent of "Jencks material" after a hearsay declarant testified at trial. Courts 
might adopt the view that a nontestifying declaranl is not a .. ,,itness" for Jencks Act 
purposes, thereby freeing Rule 16(a)(l}(C) discovery of written or recorded hearsay 
from the impediments the Jencks Act would otherwise impose. Under this approach, 
the Jencks Act itself would create no right to "Jencks material" regarding the 
declarant even after the hearsay was introduced in evidence. Nevertheless, one might 
argue that the Confrontation Clause creates such a right, especially where the 
declarant's prior statements are essential to effective impeachment of the hearsay 
statements. See Douglass. supra note 6, at 267-68 (suggesting that Confrontation 
Clause creates right to discover prior statements of hearsay declarants); cf. 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39. 61-62 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
("[T]here might well be a confrontation violation if ... a defendant is denied pretrial 
access to information that would make possible effective cross-examination of a 
crucial prosecution \vitness. "). 
326. To add to the muddle. declarants-as "witnesses"-are not exactly fish and 
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The simplest step would be to amend Rule 16 by providing that 
nothing in subsection (a) of the Jencks Act would preclude pretrial 
discovery of any hearsay statement which the government will offer in 
evidence at trial.327 Such a rule would at least remove the Jencks Act 
as an impediment to discovery of written and recorded hearsay under 
Rule 16(a)(l)(C) and would explicitly harmonize the Jencks Act with 
Rule 807 and any future hearsay-notice provisions that Congress 
might approve.328 A helpful second step would be to amend 
subsection (b) of the Jencks Act to make it clear that, once hearsay is 
offered in evidence, the defendant is entitled to see any other 
statements the declarant may have made on the same subject matter. 
Without such a right, the defendant's opportunities for contesting 
hearsay under Rule 806 would be substantially diminished. 
Amendments such as these would allow defendants to see and hear 
before trial the same written or recorded hearsay that the government 
expected the jury to hear. At trial, they would give the defendant the 
same basic tools to contest hearsay that the Jencks Act provides when 
a government witness testifies. Perhaps most important, they would 
bring predictable rules to a difficult area where, so far, judicial 
inconsistency has added to the hearsay-discovery imbalance that 
already plagues criminal cases. 
B. Discovering Ammunition to Impeach the Hearsay Declarant 
Learning what hearsay "fastballs" the government may throw is 
only the first step in contesting prosecution hearsay. The next step is 
gathering ammunition that will help to impeach the declarant's story. 
In the case of a testifying government witness, much of the 
ammunition a defendant needs for impeachment rests in government 
files. During investigation, the government may have assembled a 
substantial volume of information about key government witnesses. 
Often, the prosecutor's file will contain notes and memoranda of 
interviews, transcripts of grand jury testimony, written statements and 
documents, or correspondence authored by the witness. In the case of 
cooperating or immunized witnesses, the government will have the 
agreements reflecting any benefits available to the witness as a result 
not exactly fowl. They function like witnesses. But only on limited occasion do they 
pose the same witness-security concerns as testifying witnesses. 
327. Alternatively, an even more cautious approach would provide that nothing in 
subsection (a) of the Jencks Act would preclude pretrial discovery of any statement of 
a nontestifying declarant which the government expected to offer in evidence at trial. 
This approach would give testifying declarants the same protection as other witnesses. 
328. A broader approach would be to repeal subsection (a) of the Jencks Act 
altogether. That would at least allow federal courts, in their discretion, to order 
pretrial discovery of witness statements in those circumstances where witness security 
was not a significant concern. Of course, that solution takes us well beyond hearsay, 
and into the broader debate about federal discovery reform generally. See generally 
Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 11-14. 
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of her testimony. Police records will report the witness's prior arrests 
and convictions. Presentence reports often will contain unsavory 
details of the witness's past. Government agents may have 
memorialized statements of one witness that undercut the credibility 
of another. 
In many cases, especially where hearsay is crucial to the 
prosecution's case, government files will offer a source of 
impeachment material for hearsay declarants no less fertile than that 
available for testifying witnesses.329 The most obvious example would 
be the now-unavailable declarant whose former testimony the 
government plans to offer under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(l) 
or Rule 807. In an earlier proceeding-perhaps at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or even in an earlier trial-the 
government already examined that witness. As a result, the 
government's files are likely to include the kinds of information 
assembled for any other testifying \vitness. Co-conspirator hearsay,330 
a staple of modern federal prosecutions, comes from a class of 
declarants-usually the defendant's confederates in crime-in whom 
the government obviously has an investigative interest, and about 
whom it is likely to have obtained considerable, often unflattering 
information. Young child-abuse victims, whose stories often emerge 
at trial through the mouths of others, quite often will have been 
interviewed by police, physicians, or counselors. The records of those 
contacts may prove critical in assessing the credibility of child 
declarants. In all of these instances, and more, government files may 
contain a raft of raw material useful for impeachment of the hearsay 
declarant. 
Federal criminal defendants have three basic tools for discovering 
ammunition to impeach government witnesses. First, Brady v. 
Maryland331 creates a constitutional right to discovery of exculpatory 
evidence. Second, Rule 16(a)(l)(C) allows for discovery of 
documents and tangible items that may serve to impeach a witness. 
Third, once a \vitness testifies at trial, the Jencks Act requires the 
government to disclose all relevant written or recorded statements of 
the \vitness.332 Properly applied, these same three tools can provide a 
defendant a fair opportunity to impeach prosecution hearsay. 
329. In other instances. of course, the government is likely to have assembled a 
much slimmer record-if any at all-regarding hearsay declarants whose statements it 
will offer at trial in the form of hearsay. After all, investigating agents arc unlikely to 
devote significant effort to compiling dossiers on individual payroll clerks whose 
collective input creates a report admissible at trial under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
330. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 
331. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
332 See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1994). 
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1. Applying Brady and Giglio to Hearsay 
The Due Process Clause creates limited rights to discover 
exculpatory material.333 In Brady, the Court held that "the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution."334 A decade later, in Giglio v. United 
States,335 the Court extended Brady to evidence which undermined the 
credibility of a government witness. Brady and Giglio establish the 
right to discover a significant variety of information critical to the 
cross-examination of government witnesses.336 For example, courts 
have found Brady violations in the nondisclosure of benefits offered 
to a witness in exchange for testimony, a witness's prior criminal 
convictions, "bad acts," or inconsistent statements.337 
333. Aside from the basic Sixth Amendment right of an accused to "be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation," see U.S. Const. amend VI, the Constitution 
does not address criminal discovery rights. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the Court 
has made it clear that defendants have no comprehensive constitutional right to learn 
the government's evidence before trial. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 
(1977). 
334. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
335. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
336. Although Brady is typically regarded as a tool of pretrial discovery, it is not a 
rule of fixed time limits. Belated Brady disclosures seldom lead to reversal of 
convictions, as long as the information becomes available in time for defendant to use 
it at trial. Moreover, the Jencks Act, which prohibits discovery of a government 
witness's "statements" until after the witness has testified on direct examination. can 
preclude pretrial discovery of the witness's prior inconsistent statements absent 
government agreement to earlier disclosure. See United States v. Trevino, 89 F.3d 
187, 189 n.2 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lewis, 35 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). 
337. See, e.g., East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996, 1004 (5th Cir. 1995) (requiring disclosure 
of a witness's criminal history); United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 936-37 (4th Cir. 
1994) (requiring disclosure of witness's suspicious banking activity and cult 
membership); Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1287-89 (11th Cir. 1992) (requiring 
disclosure of witness's prior inconsistent statements); United States v. Kiszewski, 877 
F.2d 210, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring disclosure of agent-witness's personnel file 
containing allegations of professional misconduct). 
Still, Brady is far from a rule requiring pretrial disclosure of all information useful 
to defense counsel in preparing to cross-examine government witnesses. It falls short 
of that mark in at least two important respects. First, since the Brady rule applies 
only to "exculpatory" information and not to incriminating or merely neutral 
information, Brady does not protect a defendant against inculpatory surprises-
against government "land mines." Brady discovery alone, then, provides defense 
counsel incomplete information in making the important tactical choices of which 
lines of questioning to pursue, or even whether to cross-examine a given witness at all. 
Second, although Brady generally requires disclosure of a government witness's prior 
inconsistent statements, without access to the full record of all the witness's prior 
statements the defendant may miss important opportunities for impeachment by 
omission or subtle change in emphasis. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 
(1957). 
Flat contradiction between the witness's testimony and the version of events 
given in his reports is not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from 
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Brady and Giglio should apply just as readily where the "witness" 
to be impeached is a hearsay declarant, even though she may never 
appear in person at trial.338 Information is discoverable under Brady 
where it is both "favorable to an accused" and "material." 
Undisclosed evidence is "material" under Brady where there is "a 
reasonable probability that its disclosure would have produced a 
different result."339 Information impeaching a hearsay declarant can 
fit comfortably \vithin that formula. First, incriminating hearsay, just 
like the testimony of a live government witness, can lead a jury to 
convict. Accordingly, evidence impeaching that declarant is just as 
"favorable" as evidence impeaching a live witness. And, in 
appropriate cases, evidence impeaching a hearsay declarant will meet 
the Brady standard of "materiality." Although hearsay is "second 
hand" testimony, it is not always "second rate." It is not hard to find 
cases where an absent hearsay declarant is the government's star 
witness.340 While it is probably true that juries tend to discount 
hearsay in comparison to live testimony.~' that tendency makes it no 
Id. 
the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the 
same facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-
examining process of testing the credibility of a witness's trial testimony. 
338. Surprisingly, there are only a small handful of reported cases applying Brady 
principles to discovery aimed at impeachment of hearsay declarants. See, e.g., United 
States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 513-14 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that the 
requested material was not in fact favorable to the defense); United States v. 
Hawryluk, 658 F. Supp. 112, 116-17 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (granting defendant's request for 
production of documents in part). But there seems to be no controversy over the 
notion that Brady applies to information impeaching hearsay declarants, just as it 
applies to impeachment material for testifying witnesses. Both \Vi/Iiams-Davis and 
Hawryluk readily reach that conclusion. 
339. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995). That "reasonable probability," the 
Court tells us, arises "when the government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial."' Id. at 434 (quoting United States \'. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)). If the undisclosed evidence relates solely to impeachment 
of a government witness, then it is "material" only when there is (1) a reasonable 
probability that it would affect the jury's assessment of the witness's credibility, and 
(2) a reasonable probability that the witness's testimony would affect the outcome of 
the trial. Nondisclosure of powerfully impeaching evidence may not constitute a 
Brady violation where it relates to the credibility of a witness whose testimony is 
insignificant or merely cumulative. Similarly, nondisclosure of evidence relating to a 
crucial government witness may not violate Brady where its impeachment value is 
limited, or where the defendant had other, equally effective means of impeaching the 
witness. 
340. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999) (declarant is defendant's 
brother and accomplice in robbery-murder): White v. Illinois. 502 U.S. 346, 349-50 
(1992) (young child, alleged victim of abuse, is hearsay declarant): Idaho v. Wright, 
497 U.S. 805, 809 (1990) (same); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 142 (1892) 
( declarants are two key \vitnesses in murder case). 
341. See Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewimess and 
Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 703, 719-22 (1992) (concluding that jurors rely 
more heavily on eyewitness testimony than on hearsay); Peter Miene ct al., Juror 
Decision Making and the Eva/11atio11 of Hearsay Evide11ce, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683, 688-
2178 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
less likely that information impeaching a hearsay declarant will satisfy 
the Brady standard of materiality. Impeaching evidence which 
provides the "last straw" which would cause the jury to reject entirely 
the already-discounted story of a hearsay declarant is no less material 
than evidence which might raise the first glimmer of doubt about an 
otherwise unimpeached witness who testifies in person. 
Moreover, treating declarants as witnesses for Brady-Giglio 
purposes is consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of hearsay 
declarants under the Confrontation Clause. The Court insists that the 
hearsay declarant is a "witness against" an accused within the 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment.342 It would make little sense to 
ignore the declarant's role as "witness" in applying discovery 
principles under the Due Process Clause. 
While it seems clear as a general notion that Brady applies with 
equal force to information which may impeach a hearsay declarant, 
hearsay does present some special considerations in applying the 
Brady materiality standards. Three important differences come to 
mind. The first, and most obvious, is a matter of timing. Consider, for 
example, the classic method of impeachment designed to demonstrate 
bias or self-interest of the witness. The cross-examiner may confront 
the witness with her plea agreement, demonstrating that she has 
bargained for a sentence reduction in exchange for testimony. 
Implicitly at least, counsel's questions will suggest that the witness has 
shaded her story to please the government in an effort to win a more 
favorable sentencing recommendation. The plea agreement is 
significant, and its nondisclosure may violate Brady, because it relates 
to the witness's self-interest at the time she testifies. By contrast, a 
hearsay declarant "testifies" before trial, at the time she utters the 
hearsay statement. To be "material" for Brady purposes, impeaching 
information relating to self-interest must reflect the declarant's 
motivation at the time she made the hearsay statement. Thus, for 
example, if the hearsay consists of the recorded statements of a co-
conspirator declarant during the course of the conspiracy, a plea 
agreement signed following arrest weeks later is not "material" under 
Brady, though that same agreement may well be material if the same 
declarant had made the same statements as a testifying witness at 
trial.343 
92, 699 (1992) (concluding that jurors discounted hearsay in comparison to other 
evidence). 
342. See White, 502 U.S. at 353. 
343. Bowman v. Gammon, 85 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1996), offers a straightforward 
example of this timing issue. There, the state's principal witness, Anthony Lytle, 
initially offered testimony on direct examination that failed to implicate Bowman in 
the charged murder. The state then introduced the text of a prior inconsistent 
statement, given by Lytle to the police, in which he claimed to have seen Bowman 
stab the victim to death. In his live testimony, Lytle said his hearsay statement was a 
lie, induced by police mistreatment. On federal habeas corpus review, Bowman 
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A second special consideration in applying Brady materiality 
concepts to hearsay can arise from the context in which the declarant 
utters the hearsay statement. Some hearsay consists of former 
testimony in a judicial proceeding. But most hearsay arises from a 
context quite different from the courtroom. That difference can 
matter when we attempt to assess the impeachment value-and 
therefore the "materiality" under Brady-of some types of evidence 
relating to the hearsay declarant. When the patient tells the doctor 
"where it hurts," for example, we expect the patient to reply truthfully 
out of pure self-interest.344 An oath and cross-examination hardly 
seem necessary.345 It is the context that lends credibility to the 
claimed a Brady violation when the government failed to disclose an alleged "secret 
deal" which provided sentencing benefits to Lytle. The district court found that there 
was such a deal and that it had not been disclosed before trial. Normally. of course, 
nondisclosure of a government "deal" with a significant prosecution witness would be 
a classic Brady violation. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But on 
these facts, the district court found no Brady violation and the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed. The critical fact was the timing of the "deal" in relation to the hearsay 
statement. The deal was struck sometime after Lytle made the hearsay statement 
implicating Bowman in the murder. The deal could not have motivated Lytle to lie in 
his earlier statement. The undisclosed deal, therefore, was not "material" under 
Brady. See Bowman, 85 F.3d at 1343-44; see also lVilliams-Dm·is, 90 F.3d at 514 
("Many of [the declarant's] statements introduced at trial were recorded as he and 
others went about committing the crimes, and it seems improbable that these would 
be vulnerable to impeachment. All the statements of his that were admitted were 
made before his arrest, so that they could not have been affected by his later plea 
agreement." (emphasis omitted). 
Other methods of impeaching a hearsay declarant may not raise such concerns 
about timing. In cases of impeachment by inconsistent statement, for example, it may 
not matter whether the declarant uttered the inconsistent version before or after 
making the statement which the government offers in evidence at trial. The 
declarant's change of story, at either time, could affect the jury's view of her 
credibility. The same analysis might apply to the declarant's criminal convictions or 
"bad acts." Though the conviction or the act might occur after the declarant made 
the hearsay statement, they still might be probative of an untrustworthiness that 
would affect the jury's assessment of the declarant's credibility. 
344. See Fed. R Evid 803(4) advisory committee's note. 
345. In the courtroom, we rely on three basic conditions to promote reliable 
testimony, or at least to permit the jury to detect unreliable testimony. First, the 
witness testifies under oath, a process which, in theory at least, both "induce[s) in the 
witness a feeling of special obligation to speak the truth," McCormick Hornbook, 
supra note 2, at 426, and subtly reminds her of the legal sanction of a perjury 
conviction for lying. Second, the witness faces both the accused and the jury. in 
person, when she testifies. Personal presence serves both to chasten the \\itness-it is 
harder to lie before an audience, and especially to lie "to the face" of the subject of 
the falsehood-and to permit the jury to assess credibility by obsening the demeanor 
of the \vitness. Finally, the defendant can cross-examine the testifying \\itness. The 
very prospect of cross-examination tends to induce truth-telling. while cross-
examination itself exposes limits, inconsistencies, and personal weaknesses that the 
jury may take into account in assessing credibility. 
The principle justification for the hearsay rule, of course, is that some or all of those 
three protections are absent when the declarant tells her story outside of the 
courtroom. Still, a great deal of hearsay is admissible under exceptions to that 
general rule. Typically, we justify those exceptions where the circumstances 
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statement, not the honesty or dishonesty of the declarant. In weighing 
the evidentiary value of some admissible hearsay, then, the 
circumstances under which the statement was made can be more 
important than any assessment of the personal trustworthiness of the 
declarant. Because the personal trustworthiness of the declarant may 
play a limited role in evaluating some forms of hearsay, information 
relating to a declarant's honesty may prove less "material" under 
Brady than similar information that would impeach a live witness. 
Conversely, since the circumstances surrounding the hearsay 
statement may be critical to an assessment of its truth, information 
raising questions about those circumstances is especially likely to meet 
the materiality standard of Brady. 
An example helps to illustrate the difference. Imagine a defendant, 
"Dan," on trial for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Imagine the 
government calls two co-conspirator witnesses, "Cory" and "Connie," 
who testify that they regularly went to Dan's house to pick up 
packages of cocaine. If the prosecution possesses records showing 
that Cory had three prior convictions for perjury, and that Connie 
twice falsified her name and personal data to obtain employment, 
chances are strong such information may be "material" to Dan's 
defense under the Brady standard because of its likely effect in 
impeaching the government's two principal witnesses.346 
Now change the facts a bit. Assume now that Cory and Connie 
never testify at trial. Instead, the government plays an audio tape of a 
recorded phone conversation in which Cory tells Connie, "meet me at 
Dan's for the shipment," to which Connie responds, "Okay, but don't 
forget the money to pay Dan for our three kilos of you-know-what." 
The court admits the recording as the statements of co-conspirators 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Under this scenario, 
Cory's perjury convictions and Connie's fraudulent acts take on far 
less significance in evaluating the evidentiary value of their 
statements. Both Cory and Connie may be untrustworthy characters. 
But now their personal trustworthiness seems less important than 
their obvious self-interest in being in the right place with the money to 
complete their transaction.347 As a result, their convictions and 
surrounding the statement provide a reasonably adequate substitute for the usual in-
court safeguards. 
346. See, e.g., East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996, 1004 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding witncss·s 
criminal history "material"); United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 937 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(considering a witness's suspicious banking activity and cult membership "material" 
under Brady); United States v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 210, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding 
agent-witness's personnel file "material" where it contained evidence of professional 
misconduct). 
347. As the Court noted in United States v. Jnadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986): 
When the Government . . . offers the statement of one drug dealer to 
another in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy, the statement often will 
derive its significance from the circumstances in which it was made. 
Conspirators are likely to speak differently when talking to each other in 
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fraudulent acts are less likely to make a difference to a jury and 
therefore are less likely to be "material" for Brady purposes.>t\\ On 
the other hand, if the government possessed evidence that, at the time 
of the phone call, Cory and Connie were aware their calls were being 
recorded by police and that they had a motive to "frame" Dan, those 
facts might be powerful evidence of fabrication and thus "material" 
under Brady. 
A third issue may arise in applying Brady principles to hearsay-
related discovery. And this issue takes us back to the question of 
admissibility. What if the government fails to disclose information 
that would have led the court to exclude the hearsay altogether?~9 
For example, imagine a case in which the court admits hearsay under 
a Rule 804 exception, finding that the declarant is "unavailable" 
because her whereabouts are unknown.350 But imagine further that 
the prosecutor has neglected to look carefully through his file which, 
furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand. 
Even when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will 
reproduce a significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements 
during the course of the conspiracy. 
Id. at395. 
348. The diminished impeachment value of prior convictions or "bad acts" in 
impeaching co-conspirator statements is important for another reason as well. Often 
co-conspirators are tried together, and frequently the government's evidence includes 
the out-of-court statements of one or more co-conspirators admitted under Rule 
801(d)(2)(E). A serious dilemma can arise where one defendant seeks to introduce a 
prior conviction to impeach a co-conspirator declarant who also happens to be a 
nontestifying codefendant. Admission of the conviction prejudices that co-defendant, 
but failure to admit it might limit the first defendant's right to challenge the hearsay 
statements. 
In many cases the solution to that dilemma becomes apparent by recognizing the 
diminished value of a prior conviction to impeach most co-conspirator hearsay. If the 
conviction has limited impeachment value, but poses a significant risk of prejudice to 
the nontestifying co-defendant, then the court has discretion to exclude the 
conviction, either under Rule 609 or Rule 403. Compare United States v. Robinson, 
783 F.2d 64, 67 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming the trial court's refusal to admit a prior 
conviction for the purpose of impeaching hearsay where declarant was nontestifying 
co-defendant), with United States v. Bovain, 708 F.2d 606, 613 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(allowing prior convictions to impeach nontestifying co-defendant whose hearsay 
statements had been admitted in evidence). 
349. Few federal courts have had occasion to consider the application of Bratly 
principles where undisclosed evidence may have affected an evidentiary ruling. In 
United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1075-77 {4th Cir. 1993), the defendant argued 
that the government improperly \vithheld information that would have changed the 
trial court's ruling on a suppression motion. The Fourth Circuit "decline(d) to 
address definitively on the merits the issue of whether Bratly should call for disclosure 
of material evidence at pre-trial suppression hearings." Icl. at 10n. The court found 
that the nondisclosed information would not have affected the suppression decision in 
any event. 
350. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b} ("The follO\ving are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a \vitness."). Rule 804(b) creates hearsay exceptions 
for (1) former testimony, (2) dying declarations, (3) statements against interest, and 
(4) statements of personal or family history. See id. 
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in fact, contains a note from the declarant showing her new address.351 
Is such information "favorable to an accused" under Brady where it 
would lead to the exclusion of incriminating hearsay? If it is, then 
how do we apply the Brady materiality standard to such a case?352 
The first question seems easy enough. Giglio tells us that the 
government must disclose information that serves to discredit a 
government witness. It follows that information would be at least as 
"favorable" under Brady where it would remove that witness's 
testimony from the trial altogether. Logically, the same analysis 
would hold true for information that would result in the exclusion of 
hearsay. What could be more favorable to the defense than to 
exclude the evidence altogether? One could argue, perhaps, that 
disclosure is required only where information negates the substance of 
a criminal charge, but not where it aids the defendant only 
"indirectly" by affecting an evidentiary or procedural ruling. But the 
language of Brady is quite broad, encompassing any "favorable" 
information, not just directly exculpatory evidence. Both Giglio and 
later comments from the Court seem to foreclose any narrower 
reading.353 
The "materiality" issue is more complex. Normally, exculpatory 
information is "material" where there is a "reasonable probability that 
351. Under Brady, it would not matter whether the prosecutor's oversight was 
inadvertent or intentional. Bad faith is not an element of a Brady violation. See 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
352. Where Brady material may have an impact on admissibility, the timing of 
disclosure obviously takes on additional importance. Consider, for example, a case 
where the government seeks a pretrial ruling under the "residual" hearsay exception 
in an effort to introduce hearsay statements from a young child abuse victim to a 
social worker. To admit the statement, the court must find sufficient "circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness." Fed. R. Evid. 807; see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 
805, 817-18 (1990) (stating that the Confrontation Clause requires courts to find 
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" in order to admit hearsay under the 
residual exception). In making that finding, the trial court may consider a variety of 
factors including, among others, the child's consistency in repeating the same 
information without contradiction on several occasions. See id. at 821-22. Imagine 
further that the government possesses a written or recorded prior statement of the 
child that is inconsistent with the account she gave to the social worker. Certainly, if 
the court admits the hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement is discoverable, as 
Giglio material, and perhaps also as Jencks material, so that the defendant can use it 
to impeach the declarant. But disclosure should come earlier, since the court must 
consider the inconsistent statement among the factors relating to admissibility. In 
such a case, the government's constitutional obligation to disclose Brady material 
affecting the admissibility determination would "trump" any time limits imposed by 
the Jencks Act, even if the court found the declarant to be a "witness" under the 
Jencks Act. 
353. A passage in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), supports the notion 
that Brady principles apply to any nondisclosures that adversely affect the defense, 
not simply to nondisclosure of information that is "directly" exculpatory. There, the 
Court stated that "the reviewing court may consider directly any adverse effect that 
the prosecutor's failure to respond [to a discovery request] might have had on the 
preparation or presentation of the defendant's case." Id. at 683. 
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its disclosure would have produced a different result.",;s.i Where 
undisclosed information might affect the court's decision to admit 
hearsay, the issue of "materiality" requires a two-step inquiry. First, 
the court must determine whether the nondisclosed information 
would have changed the ruling that admitted the hearsay in evidence. 
Unlike most Brady "materiality" questions, which require a court to 
assess the likely impact of evidence on a jury's fact finding, this 
inquiry simply requires the court to reconsider a ruling under the law 
of evidence. The only difference is that the court now takes into 
account the previously undisclosed information. If the court would 
have admitted the same hearsay statements in any event, then the 
previously undisclosed information is not "material" under Brady, 
unless it would have impacted the trial in some other way. 
But what if, as in our hypothetical case, disclosure of the 
information would have caused the court to exclude the hearsay 
altogether? The government's nondisclosure has allowed the jury to 
hear inadmissible hearsay. Under the typical Brady standard, a 
reviewing court still would not disturb the conviction unless it found a 
"reasonable probability" that the jury would have reached a different 
result without the inadmissible evidence.,;ss But the typical Brady 
standard seems out of place here. Normally, when an appellate court 
finds that a jury has heard inadmissible hearsay, the court must 
reverse the conviction unless it finds the error was "harmless,",;56 a 
standard more generous to the defendant than the "reasonable 
probability" standard under Brady.351 Which materiality standard 
should we apply? 
One might argue that we should treat this case like other Brady 
nondisclosures, and require the defendant to show a "reasonable 
354. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995). 
355. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
356. In cases of nonconstitutional error, a conviction will be set aside where the 
error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 
verdict." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619. 623 
(1993)). Some errors in the admission of hearsay may fall in that category. But, 
because the standard for hearsay admissibility under the Confrontation Clause has 
been tied so closely to the hearsay rules themselves, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 
66 (1980) (finding that hearsay falling within a "firmly rooted" exception is 
presumptively admissible), many errors in admitting hearsay against criminal 
defendants will amount to constitutional error as well. In such cases, the standard for 
harmless error is more generous to the defendant, requiring that a conviction be 
reversed unless the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887. 1901 
(1999) (calling for the application of the Clzapma11 standard where hearsay was 
admitted in violation of Confrontation Clause). 
357. The Court has explicitly recognized that the Brady standard of materiality 
imposes a higher burden on the defendant than the harmless error standard for 
nonconstitutional errors. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435-36. The defendant's burden is 
lower still in cases of constitutional error, such as Confrontation Clause violations. See 
supra note 356. 
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probability" of a different outcome. After all, why should the 
government pay the heavier price when it fails to disclose information 
that only indirectly relates to guilt? But the better argument favors 
use of the "harmless error" standard. It would be anomalous for the 
government to profit from a higher standard where its own failure to 
disclose exculpatory information led to the erroneous admission of the 
evidence in the first place. It makes more sense to treat this case like 
any other where a court admits evidence in error. The error requires 
reversal and a new trial, unless it is "harmless." 
In sum, though hearsay raises a few special considerations in 
applying Brady's materiality standard, the general principles of Brady 
should apply with equal force when the target of impeachment is 
hearsay rather than live testimony. Indeed, courts should demand an 
even more exacting adherence to Brady in the case of hearsay, where 
the lack of traditional cross-examination increases the danger of 
undiscovered contradictions. Properly applied, Brady should be a 
defendant's principal tool for compelling disclosure of material for 
impeachment of hearsay. 
2. Rule 16(a)(l)(C)-Documents Material to Preparation of the 
Defense 
Earlier, I discussed Rule 16(a)(l)(C) as a tool for obtaining pretrial 
disclosure of written or recorded hearsay which the government 
intends to offer in evidence at trial.358 The Rule has a second function 
relating to government hearsay. Its broad command to disclose 
documents and tangible items "material to the preparation of 
defendant's defense" should encompass any items which may assist a 
defendant in preparing to impeach or rebut a hearsay statement. Such 
items might range from a declarant's "rap sheet," to crime scene 
photos depicting a declarant's obstructed vantage point, to written 
correspondence suggesting inconsistencies or ambiguities in a 
declarant's account of events. 
For most such items, Rule 16 overlaps with Brady. Any tangible 
item "material" under the Brady standard should be covered by Rule 
16(a)(l)(C) as well.359 But a specific Rule 16 request for items 
shedding light on government hearsay may require the government to 
go beyond Brady. In theory at least, the threshold of "materiality" 
under Rule 16 is lower than under Brady.360 Brady "materiality" 
358. See supra text accompanying notes 288-94. 
359. The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 16 reflect that the Rule was 
designed to encompass Brady material: "Although the Advisory Committee decided 
not to codify the Brady Rule, the requirement that the government disclose 
documents and tangible objects 'material to the preparation of his defense' 
underscores the importance of disclosure of evidence favorable to the defendant." 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's notes to 1974 amendment. 
360. In practice, many courts seem to merge the two. Often, courts simply treat 
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requires a showing that undisclosed evidence is significant when 
measured against the government's evidence as a whole. By contrast, 
information may be "material to the preparation" of the defense 
simply because it helps defendant get ready for trial.361 Rule 16, then, 
should cover more than those items which directly impeach a hearsay 
declarant. It should extend, for example, to documents which might 
assist a defendant to locate and interview an available declarant, to 
identify another witness who could contradict or qualify a hearsay 
statement, or to prepare his own \vitnesses to respond to hearsay.302 
3. Jencks Material: Prior Statements of the Hearsay Declarant 
One of the most common, and most effective, forms of cross-
examination is impeachment by prior inconsistent statement.36..' When 
a government witness testifies, the Jencks Act often provides the 
defendant with ammunition for such impeachment. Once a 
government witness has testified on direct examination, the Jencks 
Act requires the government, upon the defendant's request, to 
disclose all relevant prior statements of the witness.™ In some 
instances, of course, the Jencks Act merely duplicates the 
requirements of Brady and Giglio. Prior inconsistent statements can 
be both "favorable to the accused" and "material" under the Brady 
standard. But Jencks goes further. It requires disclosure of any prior 
statements that fall \vithin its coverage,365 regardless of whether they 
are inconsistent or exculpatory. That difference can be significant, 
because changes in testimony often are subtle. A \vitness may be 
impeached by change of emphasis or by prior omission, as well as by 
direct contradiction.366 By providing access to the complete record of 
a witness's prior statements, Jencks may open avenues for 
impeachment that Brady material would not. 
Rule 16 and Brady requests together, with little effort to distinguish their standards of 
"materiality." See, e.g., United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1468 (9th Cir. 1984). 
Other courts cite different materiality standards while reaching the same results under 
both. See, e.g., United States v. Uphoff, 907 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (D. Kan. 1995). 
361. See United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
Rule 16 permits discovery that is "relevant to the development of a possible defense" 
if the defendant can show that the "[g]ovemment is in possession of information 
helpful to the defense." (citation omitted)). 
362 See United States v. George, 786 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that 
documents, to be discoverable under Rule 16, must "play an important role in 
uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony 
or assisting impeachment or rebuttal" (citation omitted) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
363. See, e.g., Mauet, supra note 11, at 246 ("Raising prior inconsistent statements 
is the most frequently used impeachment method at trial."). 
364. 18 u.s.c. § 3500(b) (1994). 
365. The Jencks Act's definition of "statement," however, is a rather narrow one. 
See supra note 295. 
366. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 (1957). 
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The Jencks Act can be just as important when the defendant seeks 
to impeach hearsay. As we have already seen, whether the Jencks Act 
applies at all to hearsay declarants is a complex and unsettled 
question.367 Jencks is also a two-edged sword, preventing pretrial 
discovery of witness statements, while allowing limited discovery at 
trial. But to the extent that courts adopt the view that hearsay 
declarants are "government witnesses" under the Jencks Act, then 
defendants should take full advantage of the side of that sword that 
cuts in their favor.368 When the government succeeds in offering 
hearsay in evidence, Jencks should compel the same kind of disclosure 
it requires for a testifying witness. The government must turn over 
the complete record of the declarant's relevant prior statements. And 
though the declarant may never appear in the courtroom, the 
defendant nevertheless can use those prior statements to challenge the 
credibility of hearsay in much the same manner that he would use 
prior statements to impeach a testifying witness.369 Indeed, 
impeachment of an absent declarant by prior inconsistent statement 
offers a major advantage over live cross-examination. The absent 
declarant cannot explain away the inconsistency.370 
One final issue regarding application of the Jencks Act to hearsay is 
worth noting. A 1983 amendment to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure made the Jencks Act applicable at suppression 
hearings. Similar amendments in 1993 extended Jencks discovery to 
various other proceedings, including preliminary hearings and pretrial 
detention hearings.371 If hearsay declarants are "government 
witnesses" for Jencks purposes, then these amendments may have 
367. See supra text accompanying notes 295-316. 
368. Unfortunately, the dearth of reported cases suggests that few defendants use 
the Jencks Act in an effort to obtain prior statements of hearsay declarants. See 
United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 512-13 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that this 
case was the first in any Circuit to raise the question whether the Jencks Act requires 
disclosure of prior statements of a hearsay declarant). 
369. See Fed. R. Evid. 806. For a more detailed description of the process of 
impeaching an absent hearsay declarant, see Douglass, supra note 6, at 251-60. 
370. Typically, the defendant would impeach the declarant by offering extrinsic 
evidence of the prior inconsistent statement, for example, a transcript, written or 
recorded prior statement, or the testimony of a witness who can recount the prior 
inconsistent statement. In the case of a testifying witness, Rule 613(b) requires that 
the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the prior statement. See Fed. 
R. Evid. 613(b). But Rule 806 explicitly removes the requirement that the declarant 
be afforded an opportunity to deny or explain the prior statement. See id. Rule 806. 
371. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.l(d) (relating to preliminary hearings), 26.2(g) (relating 
to various proceedings outside of trial), 46(i) (relating to detention hearings). 
The utility of these rules as a pretrial discovery device is limited for several reasons. 
First, suppression hearings generally do not address the merits of criminal charges. 
As a result, few suppression hearings require the government to call its principal trial 
witnesses. Second, because many cases are indicted before arrest, or shortly 
thereafter, there are few preliminary examinations in federal practice. Third, though 
detention hearings under Rule 46 occur often, the evidence often focuses on the 
defendant's criminal history and other personal history, rather than the crime itself. 
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created much broader discovery opportunities than their drafters may 
have anticipated. Unlike suppression hearings, preliminary hearings 
always, and detention hearings sometimes, require the government to 
present evidence on the merits of the criminal charge. At preliminary 
hearings and pretrial detention hearings, it is quite typical for the 
government to present its case largely through hearsay. Rather than 
calling the witnesses they expect to use at trial, prosecutors more 
often use investigating agents to summarize the accounts of those 
witnesses. Clearly, these expanded "pretrial Jencks" rules require the 
government, upon request, to turn over relevant prior statements of 
the testifying agent.372 But if hearsay declarants are "witnesses" as 
well, then the government also must disclose the relevant prior 
statements of each declarant whose information the agent 
summarizes. As a result, the preliminary or detention hearing could 
turn into a broad vehicle for discovering the grand jury testimony, and 
the written or recorded statements of witnesses who will testify for the 
government at trial. 
C. Discovery Depositions of Available Hearsay Declarants 
Confrontation Clause doctrine now allows the prosecution to 
present most hearsay without first showing that the declarant is 
unavailable to testify in person.373 While the most troublesome forms 
of prosecution hearsay tend to come when declarants are 
unavailable,374 there remain important classes of hearsay admitted 
regularly against criminal defendants when the declarant is alive, 
capable of testifying, and subject to subpoena. Co-conspirator 
statements, spontaneous declarations, statements for purposes of 
medical diagnosis, and business records-among others-all are 
admissible under the Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause 
regardless of the declarant's availability.375 
372. Often, such materials would include the agent's investigative reports on 
matters mentioned in his testimony. 
373. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353-54 (1992) (holding that under the 
Confrontation Clause, in cases involving forms of hearsay other than former 
testimony, the government is not required to show unavailability of the declarant as a 
condition to admitting hearsay); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 391-400 (1986) 
(holding co-conspirator hearsay admissible without showing that declarant 
unavailable). 
374. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999) (overruling state court's 
admission of confession of accomplice who invoked Fifth Amendment privilege). 
Almost all of the cases admitting grand jury testimony under the residual hearsay 
exception involve unavailable declarants. See, e.g., United States v. Earles, 113 F3d 
796, 799-801 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. McHan, 101 F3d 1027, 1037-38 (4th Cir. 
1996); Curro v. United States, 4 F.3d 436, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1993): United States v. 
Kladouris, 964 F.2d 658, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1992); United States\'. Pall7.ardi-Lespier, 918 
F.2d 313, 315-19 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 652-54 (1st 
Cir.1990). 
375. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (co-conspirator statements), 803(2) (excited 
utterances), 803(4) (statements for purposes of medical diagnosis), 803(6) (business 
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The Supreme Court has hinted at least that the defendant's right to 
subpoena such declarants and cross-examine them at trial effectively 
eliminates any concern over confrontation. After all, the Court 
suggests, if the defendant wants confrontation he has the means to 
bring it about.376 But as a practical matter, there are significant risks 
to a defendant in the Court's approach. Cross-examining an adverse 
witness is a bit like tap dancing through a minefield. And without 
sufficient discovery, counsel performs that dance in the dark. Few 
experienced trial lawyers will risk asking questions on cross-
examination when they cannot safely anticipate the answers.377 Even 
fewer will take the risk of calling a witness to the stand for the sole 
purpose of asking such questions.378 
The Court's recent rulings on confrontation of available declarants 
illustrate the dangers inherent when the admissibility of hearsay falls 
out of balance with a defendant's discovery opportunities. The Court 
offers nothing to balance expanded admissibility under the 
Confrontation Clause with access to the information necessary to 
contend with it. Confrontation law has put new pressure on the 
adversarial process of impeaching available declarants. But without 
some kind of pretrial access to the available declarant, the right to 
impeach her may be little more than an illusion. 
In civil cases, an opponent of hearsay can achieve such access 
through discovery depositions.379 However, in criminal cases, the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not authorize discovery 
depositions by the prosecution or defense.380 And there has been no 
serious effort to install them as a regular part of the federal criminal 
process.381 But without debating the merits of more extensive 
records). 
376. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 397 ("[If the defendant] independently wanted to secure 
[the declarant's] testimony, ... [t]he Compulsory Process Clause would have aided 
[him] in obtaining the testimony .... "). 
377. See Mauet, supra note 11, at 220 ("Ask questions that you know the witness 
should answer in a certain way .... "); Irving Younger, The Art of Cross-Examination 
23 (ABA Litigation Section Monograph Series No. l, 1976) ("[N]ever, never ask a 
question to which you do not already know the answer."). 
378. See Jonakait, Confrontation Clause, supra note 11, at 617 n.158 ("Time-worn 
admonitions tell the advocate not to call someone without knowing what he will 
say."). 
379. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30. 
380. Rule 15 authorizes depositions, but only for the purpose of preserving 
testimony, not for discovery. See supra note 206. 
381. Discovery depositions in criminal cases are not without precedent. A few 
states allow defense discovery depositions as a matter of right. See N.D. R. Crim. P. 
15; Vt. R. Cr. P. 15. Florida and Texas, populous states with large urban jurisdictions 
and active criminal dockets-and with no reputation for being "soft on crime"-both 
permit discovery depositions in criminal cases. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(h); Tex. Crim. 
Proc. Code Ann. § 39.02 (West 1999). The American Bar Association, admittedly an 
organization where defense lawyers tend to dominate criminal justice policy, calls for 
discovery depositions in criminal cases under limited circumstances. See Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Standard 11-5.2 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter ABA Standands]. As 
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reforms, the idea of discovery depositions has special merit in that 
limited class of cases where the government is allowed to rely on 
hearsay to prove significant, contested facts without putting an 
available declarant on the witness stand. There are at least three good 
reasons for allowing depositions under these limited circumstances: 
(1) enhancing accuracy; (2) fairness to the defendant; and (3) cost-
effectiveness. 
First, allowing depositions of available declarants increases 
accuracy in the fact-finding process at trial. When neither side 
chooses to call an available declarant for live testimony, it is not 
necessarily because the hearsay is accurate and incontestable. 
Frequently, it is because neither side is willing to take the risk of what 
an uncooperative witness might say.382 The hearsay is fixed and 
predictable. The uncooperative declarant is not. Thus, the proponent 
of the hearsay is content to leave "well enough" alone. Without 
pretrial access to the declarant, the opponent often will choose to 
avoid the risk of calling a live witness who may merely confirm or 
even amplify the hearsay statement. The jury never hears the full 
version from the mouth of the declarant. It remains in the dark 
because of the tactical choices made by the parties. But neither choice 
is based upon the likelihood that the hearsay is accurate. More 
important, in the absence of an opportunity to question the declarant 
before trial, neither choice is made with complete knowledge of the 
facts. If we believe that an adversary system produces accurate 
results, it is at least in part because we e:>..-pect each party to present 
early as 1974, the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure called for discovery 
depositions as of right for criminal defendants. See Unif. R. Crim. P. 431, 10 U.LA. 
130 (1974). 
382. This was exactly the case in United States i•. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). lnadi 
was charged and convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. See id. at 
388-89. At trial, the government offered in evidence several audio tapes which 
contained statements of co-conspirators, including a person named Lazaro who was 
reluctantly willing to testify. Over defense objection, the court admitted the tapes 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). See id. at 390-91. lnadi then raised a 
Confrontation Clause objection, arguing that the Clause prohibited introduction of 
hearsay unless the government first demonstrated that the declarant was unavailable. 
The trial court asked defense counsel if she wanted the government to produce the 
witness, and counsel responded only that she would ask her client. See id. at 390. The 
government apparently had no interest in Lazaro as a witness and made only a 
perfunctory effort to secure his presence. The defendant, who could have issued his 
own subpoena and insisted on further efforts to produce Lazaro, never even answered 
the Court's simple question, "Do you want him to testify?" See id. 
Inadi is not an aberration. The Inadi Court noted, "[T)he actions of the parties in 
this case demonstrate what is no doubt a frequent occurrence in conspiracy cascs-
neither side wants a co-conspirator as a witness." Id. at 397 n.7. Similarly, in Dutton i·. 
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), the Court noted, "Counsel for Evans informed us at oral 
argument that he could have subpoenaed (the declarant) but had concluded that this 
course would not be in the best interests of his clienL" lei. at 88 n.19; see also Lowery 
v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1368-70 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that neither the plaintiff nor 
the defendant sought to secure the testimony of the child-complainant). 
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the facts favorable to its side. Allowing hearsay from available, 
nontestifying declarants defeats that expectation when the opponent 
has no way to learn what the declarant might say on the witness stand. 
Second, the case of the available declarant presents the starkest 
example of unfairness that results when rules of admissibility are out 
of balance with rules of discovery. Modern confrontation doctrine 
and the law of evidence allow the prosecution to shift to the defendant 
all the risk of dealing with an uncooperative, but available 
declarant.383 No other litigant in the federal system must contend with 
such risk, because criminal defendants are the only class of litigant 
with no right to compel pretrial examination of adverse witnesses or 
hearsay declarants.384 Confronted with the prospect of adverse 
hearsay, a civil litigant need only schedule a deposition and can cross-
examine the declarant at will. Although prosecutors cannot take 
discovery depositions, the ex parte process of grand jury investigation 
is typically a more than adequate substitute.385 Only the criminal 
defendant has no means of access to an available defendant before 
trial, other than through a voluntary interview. And those can be 
hard to come by. 
Third, allowing depositions of at least some available declarants 
may actually reduce the costs of criminal justice. Opponents argue 
that the principal costs of discovery depositions are associated with 
the time they demand from prosecutors and defense counsel, costs 
born entirely by the state in cases with public defenders or other 
appointed counsel.386 Especially in those systems which allow 
depositions as of right, opponents complain of the number and length 
of discovery depositions. And, they note, when the state is paying the 
tab the defendant has no cost-driven incentive to set any limits. But a 
rule limiting discovery depositions to hearsay declarants whom the 
government does not expect to call at trial would have different 
economic consequences. First, there would be little concern with the 
number of such depositions. Cases of important hearsay from 
available declarants are relatively few in number.387 In addition, 
383. See Jonakait, Confrontation Clause, supra note 11, at 614-19 (arguing that 
lnadi unfairly transfers the risk of confronting an available declarant from the 
prosecution to the defense). 
384. See supra text accompanying notes 202-09. 
385. The prosecutor might not have the option to put the declarant before a grand 
jury, however, where the hearsay comes to light only after the case has been indicted. 
Due Process concerns can restrict a prosecutor's use of the grand jury to continue 
investigation after an indictment has been returned. See Jn re Grand Jury Subpoena 
Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating 
that the prosecutor may not use grand jury subpoena for the sole purpose of trial 
preparation). 
386. See John F. Yetter, Discovery Depositions in Florida Criminal Proceedings: 
Should They Survive?, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 675, 684-86 (1988) (summarizing 
arguments advanced by opponents and proponents of criminal discovery depositions). 
387. Normally, a prosecutor would prefer to call an available and cooperative 
2000] HEARSAY AND CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 2191 
where defendant regarded such hearsay as significant enough to call 
for a deposition, the prosecutor would have the option to avoid the 
burden of a deposition simply by informing the defense that he would 
call the declarant as a witness at trial.~~ 
If we take the Supreme Court at its word, allowing such depositions 
would virtually eliminate any Confrontation Clause contests at trial or 
on appeal over the admission of hearsay from an available 
declarant.389 Moreover, one might limit costs by permitting 
depositions only upon a motion establishing a particular need, as in 
cases where the available declarant refused counsel's request for an 
interview.390 Given such a rule, the very prospect of a deposition 
would lead some reluctant declarants to speak informally with counsel 
in order to avoid the burden of a formal deposition. Public defenders 
and defense investigators might spend less time on unproductive 
encounters with reluctant witnesses. In that respect, a deposition rule 
limited to uncooperative declarants might actually simplify the 
process of trial preparation and decrease costs. And. in cases where 
witness intimidation was a legitimate concern, appropriate protective 
orders could issue. Finally, a rule authorizing discovery depositions 
would carry the same benefit as any rule expanding discovery. It 
would assist both prosecution and defense counsel in evaluating the 
case. A likely result might be an increase in resolutions through plea 
agreement.391 
Of course, justifying reform in theory may be a great deal easier 
than bringing it about in practice. In light of the fate of much less 
ambitious discovery reform proposals,3in one could expect that a 
proposal to amend Rule 15 to permit discovery depositions as a 
general practice in criminal cases would be a political nonstarter 
declarant as a trial witness, rather than rely on hearsay. 
388. By making prosecutors more likely to present live testimony in the place of 
hearsay, the mere prospect of a deposition would tend to a\'oid trial and appellate 
contests over the admissibility of such hearsay. More importantly. as a matter of 
fairness, it would reduce the number of occasions where prosecutors choose to use 
hearsay and thereby shift to the defendant the burden of producing the declarant at 
trial. For a variety of practical reasons, the government is normally in a better 
position than the defense to locate and subpoena an available declarant. See Jonakait, 
Confrontation Clause, supra note 11, at 616. 
389. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397 (1986) (suggesting, at least 
implicitly, that the defendant's Compulsory Process right to subpoena an available 
declarant, combined with his right under Federal Rule of Evidence 806 to subject that 
declarant to hostile questioning, satisfied any concerns over confrontation). 
390. This is the approach called for by the ABA Standards. See ABA Standards, 
supra note 381, Standard 11-5.2. The ABA Standard permits discovery depositions, 
upon motion by either prosecution or defense, where there is no writing summarizing 
the witness's knowledge. where the witness has refused a \'Oluntary interview, and 
where the interview is necessary "in the interests of justice." Id. 
391. See Unif. R. Crim. P. 431 commentary at II2. IOU.LA. 130 (1974), reprinted 
in Yetter, supra note 386, at 679. 
392 See supra text accompanying notes 169-72. 
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before Congress.393 A more modest alternative, aimed only at 
correcting the existing hearsay-discovery imbalance in cases of 
available declarants, may be more attainable. A sensible starting 
point would be a rule authorizing federal courts, in their discretion, to 
allow a discovery deposition where: (1) hearsay was disclosed before 
trial; (2) the court found it admissible; (3) the hearsay was important 
evidence regarding a contested fact of consequence to the case; and 
(4) the declarant refused informal requests for an interview with the 
opponent. 
An alternative approach might achieve the same result with no 
amendment to existing Rules. At least one federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that, Rule 15 notwithstanding, federal courts have 
the inherent authority to order discovery depositions in unusual cases. 
The Tenth Circuit upheld a trial court's order allowing the defense to 
take depositions as a sanction for government misconduct which 
discouraged prospective government witnesses from talking 
informally with defense counsel.394 But there is nothing that restricts 
that inherent power to cases of misconduct affecting access to 
witnesses.395 A defendant is just as severely disadvantaged when a 
witness makes an independent choice to refuse an interview. That 
disadvantage is multiplied when the Confrontation Clause allows the 
government to proceed by hearsay, in effect daring the defense to 
take the risk of putting the declarant on the stand for "blind" cross-
examination. If "unusual circumstances" can justify the exercise of a 
court's inherent power to ensure the fairness of its own proceedings, 
then few circumstances present a better case for asserting that power. 
Exercise of this inherent power in appropriate cases would allow 
federal courts to experiment with the use of depositions where they 
would be most effective to remedy the imbalance that the Court's 
confrontation doctrine has created. And, in the process, federal 
courts and rule makers might learn that discovery depositions in 
criminal cases are not so frightening after all. 
393. Rule 15 now authorizes depositions only for the purpose of preserving 
testimony for use at trial. Though the language of the Rule is not explicit, its history 
and subsequent judicial interpretation make it clear that the Rule does not authorize 
a federal court to order depositions solely for purposes of discovery. See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 15 advisory committee's note; United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 602 
(10th Cir. 1986) (noting that Rule 15 "does not contemplate use of depositions of 
adverse witnesses as discovery tools in criminal cases"). 
394. See Carrigan, 804 F.2d at 602-04. 
395. The inherent power of federal courts to order discovery has been established 
for decades, and extends to circumstance where discovery is necessary to avoid 
unfairness. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), requiring disclosure of prior 
statements of government witnesses, is probably the most prominent example of the 
exercise of such power. See id. at 670-71. 
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D. Creating An Incentive for the Prosecutor to Disclose: Discovery as 
a "Circumstantial Guarantee of Trustworthiness" 
The preceding sections have addressed a variety of methods to 
enhance the opportunities of criminal defendants for learning more 
about prosecution hearsay and learning it earlier in the litigation 
process. Each of those methods involves the use of discovery devices 
such as Rule 16, Brady, discovery depositions, or pretrial notice rules 
like Rule 807. But there may be an even more effective way to shed 
greater light on prosecution hearsay before trial. Courts can increase 
disclosure simply by making evidentiary rulings which place a 
substantial value on discovery as a factor in admitting hearsay. The 
framework for doing so is already in place, under both the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause. 
Rule 807 requires a proponent to give advance notice of his 
intention to offer residual hearsay.396 In effect, the Rule encourages 
disclosure by making it the "price" for admitting hearsay. If the 
proponent fails to give notice, he risks the exclusion of hearsay. The 
same principle can apply in a broader context. To admit hearsay 
under Rule 807, a court must find "circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness" that are "equivalent" to those which support other 
hearsay exceptions.397 If courts regard full discovery as one such 
"guarantee," then the proponent of hearsay has a strong incentive to 
reveal all he can about the declarant and the circumstances 
surrounding the hearsay statement. 
The same notion holds true where hearsay must overcome a 
Confrontation Clause challenge. For hearsay fitting traditional-or 
"firmly rooted"-exceptions, the Confrontation Clause no longer 
forms much of a barrier.398 But for residual hearsay, and perhaps a 
few other controversial forms of hearsay, the Clause requires courts to 
find "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" before admitting 
such hearsay.399 Prosecutors would have more of an incentive to make 
full disclosure if courts insisted that discovery was an important 
"guarantee" of trustworthiness in admitting hearsay under the 
Confrontation Clause. 
It is not hard to envision how courts might apply this approach in 
practice. The clearest example would arise in a case where the 
government sought a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of residual 
396. See Fed. R. Evid. 807. 
397. Id. 
398. Hearsay falling within a "firmly rooted" exception is presumptively admissible 
under the Court's current approach to confrontation. See Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 
1887, 1894 (1999) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). 
399. See id. at 1899-1901 (plurality opinion) (holding that accomplice statements 
inculpating the accused are not within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception); Idaho v. 
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990) (finding that the residual exception is not "firmly 
rooted"). 
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hearsay from an available declarant whom the prosecutor did not 
expect to call as a witness at trial.400 The court could simply inform 
the prosecutor that it would be more inclined to look favorably upon 
such hearsay if the government produced the declarant for pretrial 
examination by the defense, along with copies of any prior statements 
by the declarant. The court's power to order a discovery deposition 
would not be in issue; nor would the court have to determine whether 
the Jencks Act prevented it from ordering production of declarant's 
prior statements before trial. Instead, the government would have the 
incentive to provide discovery "voluntarily" if it wanted the hearsay in 
evidence. The same approach would work to encourage discovery 
where the declarant was unavailable. If the court viewed discovery as 
an important guarantee of trustworthiness, then it might condition its 
ruling admitting hearsay on full disclosure of the declarant's prior 
statements, criminal record, and any other information that might 
shed light on the declarant or her statement. If the court was satisfied 
that full disclosure gave defendant a fair chance to contest the 
hearsay, then the court would admit the statement in evidence. 
There is a sound basis supporting an approach which views 
discovery as a "guarantee of trustworthiness" under both Rule 807 
and the Confrontation Clause. In both contexts, the term 
"trustworthiness" is something of a misnomer. Hearsay testimony 
may have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness even though it is not 
particularly believable. For example, former testimony can be 
admissible under the Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause 
even though it may contain internal contradictions or inherently 
implausible statements.401 Cross-examination, the core of the 
400. In fact, there are relatively few cases of residual hearsay from available 
declarants, because of the requirement that the hearsay be "more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts." Fed. R. Evid. 807. Normally, the live testimony of the 
available declarant would be "more probative," except in unusual cases involving 
failing memories or recalcitrant witnesses with changing versions of events. 
The scenario described in the text might also arise in cases where the declarant was 
physically accessible but not deemed "available" to testify as a witness at trial as, for 
example, in the case of a small child who made out-of-court complaints regarding 
sexual abuse. Indeed, some state rules condition the admission of such hearsay on 
procedures giving defense counsel discovery opportunities, including pretrial notice of 
the particulars of the statement and the right to take the deposition of the witness 
who will relate the hearsay at trial. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 775(c)(4) 
(1957). In similar cases, the Uniform Rules of Evidence grant defendant a right to 
question the child in a setting less formal than the courtroom. See Unif. R. Evid. 
807(b) ("Before a statement may be admitted ... the court shall, at the request of the 
defendant, provide for further questioning of the minor in such manner as the court 
may direct."). 
401. "Classic" former testimony, where the same defendant was present at an 
earlier proceeding and had an opportunity to cross-examine, is admissible under Ruic 
804(b)(l). Federal courts have also admitted other forms of "near miss" former 
testimony under the residual exception as well, in cases where a party having similar 
interests conducted cross-examination of the witness. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 
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adversarial testing process, is a sufficient "guarantee of 
trustworthiness." In formulating the Confrontation Clause standard, 
the Court explicitly equated "guarantees of trustworthiness" with 
circumstances where "adversarial testing would add little to [the 
hearsay statement's] reliability."402 In effect, "guarantees of 
trustworthiness" are substitutes for cross-examination. And discovery 
certainly fits that definition better than many "guarantees" which 
federal courts have endorsed as grounds for the admission of 
hearsay.403 Discovery directly enhances an opponent's ability to test 
hearsay, either through actual cross-examination in a deposition, or 
through access to information that may be offered at trial to impeach 
or qualify the out-of-court statement of an absent declarant. 
If federal courts are inclined to admit a broader range of hearsay 
against criminal defendants-as they clearly seem to be-then they 
should be equally inclined to allow defendants the tools for a fair 
challenge to that hearsay. At least when they venture toward 
hearsay's frontiers-admitting hearsay which falls outside "firmly 
rooted" exceptions for Confrontation Clause purposes-federal 
courts already possess the power to provide those tools in the form of 
more complete discovery. That power arises whenever they look for 
"guarantees" that hearsay is trustworthy. They need only make it 
clear that full disclosure is one such guarantee. Prosecutors will 
understand the message. 
CONCLUSION 
Hearsay and discovery are out of balance in the federal system. 
Despite theoretical protections in both the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and the Confrontation Clause, in reality federal criminal defendants 
face a broader range of admissible hearsay than other litigants. But 
they have fewer tools to contend \vith it. 
I have suggested a handful of new discovery tools that would help 
to correct that imbalance, including amendments to Rule 15 allowing 
discovery depositions of some available declarants; changes in the 
Rules of Evidence to expand pretrial notice beyond the residual 
exception; and amendments to Rule 16 and the Jencks Act to require 
69 F.3d 1249, 1254 (4th Cir. 1995) (admitting testimony from trial of defendant's co-
conspirators which occurred while defendant was fugitive); United States v. Deeb, 13 
F.3d 1532, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994) (admitting testimony from co-conspirators trial where 
witness was subject to cross-examination by co-defendants). 
402 Wright, 497 U.S. at 821. 
403. In Wright, the Court provided a nonexclusive list of "guarantees of 
trustworthiness" to guide courts in applying its flexible standard for assessing non-
firmly rooted hearsay. See id. at 821-22. Accepting Wright's broad invitation, lower 
federal courts have found sufficient "guarantees" in a wide variety of circumstances, 
and often have contradicted one another in the process. See Douglass, supra note 6, at 
218 ("Lower courts searching for 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' have 
managed only to prove that reliability is in the eye of the beholder."). 
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pretrial disclosure of written or recorded hearsay and disclosure at 
trial of prior statements of hearsay declarants. Further, I have 
suggested how the Brady doctrine can create important opportunities 
for shedding light on prosecution hearsay. But courts need not await 
new rule-making or legislation to begin a process that is already 
overdue. Federal courts possess the inherent power to order broader 
discovery than existing rules now require. Equally important, at least 
in cases of hearsay falling outside of traditional exceptions, they have 
the power to condition evidentiary rulings on the government's 
willingness to make earlier and broader disclosures. In those cases, 
courts can begin to correct the hearsay-discovery balance simply by 
making discovery a factor in their decisions to admit hearsay. 
I do not pretend to offer a complete prescription for discovery 
reforms that would shed light into every unexplored corner of 
prosecution hearsay. Nor do I suggest that even the most liberal 
discovery rules would justify the elimination of all restrictions on 
hearsay in criminal cases. What I hope to do through this Article is to 
encourage a new discussion about hearsay that begins where most 
traditional discussions end: when hearsay is admitted in evidence. In 
my view, the time is ripe for such a discussion because the major 
battles for excluding hearsay in the last two decades have been lost, 
often for very good reasons,404 and there is little reason to expect a 
large-scale counterattack in favor of excluding more hearsay from 
criminal trials. Today, criminal defendants cling to a Maginot Line of 
admissibility, hunkered down behind increasingly futile evidentiary 
and constitutional objections to hearsay, while more advanced 
weaponry rumbles around their flanks.405 Given that state of affairs, I 
wonder that the future of "hearsay reform" in criminal cases may lie 
not so much with rules which regulate admissibility, but with pretrial 
and trial procedures which enhance a defendant's ability to contest 
whatever hearsay is admitted in evidence. Rather than limit our 
discussion to adjustments in the rules of admissibility, we should give 
404. While observations that the hearsay rule is "dead" may be a bit exaggerated, 
see Park, Dead or Alive?, supra note 28, few would deny that the rule is showing the 
wear and tear of battle. The truth is that in a world of increasingly complex litigation 
in an increasingly mobile society, hearsay evidence has become increasingly 
convenient. And particularly when compared with the carefully rehearsed trial 
testimony of many courtroom witnesses, much hearsay no longer sparks judicial 
concern over its reliability. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has expressed a 
preference for "the evidentiary value" of some forms of hearsay over that of live 
testimony. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (noting that co-
conspirator's in-court testimony "seldom will reproduce ... the evidentiary value of 
his statements during the course of the conspiracy."). 
405. The Maginot Line, constructed after World War I along the eastern border of 
France, was conceived in an age of trench warfare and viewed as an impenetrable 
barrier to any German assault. In May 1940, it proved ineffectual against a 
mechanized German army which swept around it to the north and captured Paris in a 
matter of weeks. See John Keegan, The Second World War 59-67, 84-85 (1990). 
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more thought to adjusting the criminal process itself to account for the 
increasingly generous rules admitting prosecution hearsay. The 
process of criminal discovery offers a natural place to begin that 
discussion. 
Notes & Observations 
